REGIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL PATRIMONIALISM IN BRAZIL

by

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Editorial Note

This volume brings together Simon Schwartzman's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of California, Berkeley in 1973, together with the English translation the prefaces written for successive Brazilian editions of the work between 1975 and 2015.

The dissertation was defended under the title Regional Cleavages and Political Patrimonialism in Brazil. Its central argument — that Brazilian political life cannot be understood through the lens of interest-group representation imported from Western liberal theory, but must instead be analyzed through the concept of political patrimonialism and the structural tension between the country's economic and political centers — proved remarkably durable. The work circulated in manuscript and informal copies among Brazilian and Latin American social scientists throughout the 1970s, and was translated and published in Portuguese as São Paulo e o Estado Nacional in 1975. A substantially revised version appeared as Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro in 1982, with further editions in 1988, 2007, and 2015, the last published by Editora da Unicamp.

The original English dissertation was never formally published. It has been available through ProQuest Dissertations and in copies deposited on Academia.edu and the Internet Archive, but has lacked a stable, indexed, institutionally-grounded English-language home. This republication corrects that gap.

The theoretical contribution of the work sits at the intersection of Weberian historical sociology and comparative political analysis. Drawing on Weber's concept of patrimonialism — understood not as a relic of pre-modern society but as a distinctive path of political modernity — Schwartzman argued that Brazil inherited from Portugal a state apparatus that preceded and consistently dominated civil society, absorbing emerging elites through co-optation rather than representing them through interest articulation. Against this background, he identified four regional political actors whose interaction structured Brazilian national politics: Rio de Janeiro as the administrative-patrimonial center; São Paulo as the economically dynamic but politically marginalized periphery; Minas Gerais as the archetypal traditional politics of patrimonial dependency; and Rio Grande do Sul as the frontier military state, whose Positivist-inflected republicanism fed directly into the 1930 revolution and the Vargas era.

The dissertation appeared at a moment — 1973, the height of the military regime's consolidation — when these questions were not merely academic. Its argument that Brazilian authoritarianism was not an accident or deviation but an expression of deep structural patterns in state-society relations challenged both liberal optimism and orthodox Marxist frameworks simultaneously. The subsequent fifty years of Brazilian political history — democratic transition, the Workers' Party period, the crisis of 2014–2016, and the Bolsonaro interlude — have repeatedly vindicated the basic framework, even as much of the empirical detail has inevitably dated.

The three prefaces translated here document Schwartzman's own evolving assessment of his work across four decades. The 1988 preface, written as Brazil emerged from military rule into the Nova República, elaborates the conceptual apparatus of neopatrimonialism, corporatism, and plebiscitary populism, and asks how far the social transformations of the preceding decades had genuinely altered the underlying structures. The 2007 preface, written after the first Lula government, offers the striking observation that the apparently modern PSDB-PT party competition of the 1990s proved short-lived, and that "the old politics has demonstrated an enormous and unexpected capacity for survival and metamorphosis." The 2014 preface, written as the political and economic crisis that would eventually consume the Dilma Rousseff government was beginning to unfold, closes with the judgment that the neopatrimonial practices embedded in the Brazilian political system remain the central obstacle to durable democratic development.

The dissertation text is reproduced here in full from the digitized version of the original typed manuscript. Minor errors have been silently corrected, but the text, argument, footnotes, tables, and bibliography are otherwise unaltered. The English translations of the original Portuguese versions o the books' prefaces were done with the help of AI. This republication is offered in the conviction that the original English text retains both historical and analytical value: historical, as a document of Brazilian social science at a critical moment; analytical, because the framework it develops continues to illuminate a country that remains, in many essential respects, the one Schwartzman described.

Abstract

Analysts of the Brazilian political process tend to find a contradiction between the country's relatively high levels of social differentiation, complexity and modernization, on one hand, and a historical weakness of the structures of interest aggregation and articulation on the other; this contradiction is used to account for the fragility of the country's political institutions, but it is in itself seldom explained in a satisfactory way.

The basic proposition of this dissertation is that this is a conceptual difficulty due to an implicit theoretical model which identifies politics with interest-group representation, and which tends to be applied to Brazil in an often naive and generally inappropriate manner. The first part is therefore a discussion of the interest-group representation model, and suggests an alternative approach, at two different levels. One is more structural, and has to do with how society is organized for the production, distribution and political re- allocation of wealth. The other is more specifically political, and refers to the way in which different groups in society are called to, permitted or refused the right to participate in the political process, as well as to the ways in which this participation takes place.

There are three conceptual elements at the structural level of analysis. First, the notion of patrimonialism, used in Weberian terms to refer to a type of traditional system of domination in which political structures and behavior are privatized as an extension of the ruler's household; and where, at the same time, economic activities are carried on by the State. The key notion here is that patrimonialism is not merely a pre-capitalist system of the past; it has led to a contemporary type of social and political organization which cannot be understood in terms of the political imagery derived from the contemporary developments of feudal Europe. Regionalism is a second key concept, derived from the consideration of the process of territorial occupation and state consolidation under patrimonial rule. Four basic regions are identified in Brazil: the seat of the central administration, Rio de Janeiro; the economic center, São Paulo; the frontier state, Rio Grande do Sul; and the more " traditional" countryside, typified by Minas Gerais. The third conceptual element is derived from the study of the interplay among these regions, and the observation of the lack of correspondence between the country's economic and political poles - a fact which has had deep consequences on the workings of the country's political system. One of these consequences is what is called “patrimonial dependency": a trade-off of economic concessions for access to and support in the control of the state's patrimonial bureaucracy. The political level refers to the analysis of social participation, and here two basic types are confronted. One is "political representation," which corresponds to the classical notion of politics as interest-group articulation and aggregation; the other is the notion of "political co-optation," and refers to what occurs when conditions for participation emerge in the context of a relatively highly developed and strong governmental apparatus. The combination of these two types of political participation with the structural elements indicated above leads to several empirical propositions which are the core of the dissertation: the different geographical location of the two types of political participation; the historical prevalence of political centralization and co-optation over attempts at representation; the historical political marginality of the country's economic pole, São Paulo; the pattern of patrimonial dependency; and so on.

Historical materials are used in an attempt to test the usefulness of the conceptual approach over a large time span: from the patterns of colonization to the country's linkages with the external

market during the period of coffee expansion; from the patterns of political centralization in the Portuguese colonial administration to the role of the central State in the process of economic development and industrialization after 1930; from the attempts for political decentralization in the late nineteenth century to the system of political participation between 1945 to 1964. This wide scope of analysis places severe limits on the accurate testing of empirical interpretations and propositions at any given instance; but it hopefully leads to a pattern which can test the heuristic value and interpretative quality of the proposed framework of analysis. This last part is a discussion on the country's political perspectives, which stems from the proposed framework.

Note to the 5th edition of Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro, São Paulo, Editora da UNICAMP, 2015.

I am deeply grateful to Unicamp Press for this new edition of Bases of Brazilian Authoritarianism, a book that originated in my doctoral dissertation in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1973, initially published in Portuguese as São Paulo and the National State. This version is based on the 1982 edition, reissued in 1988, with minor stylistic corrections, orthographic updates, and revisions to references.

Much has changed in Brazil, in the world, and in the social sciences over these forty years, as has my own way of thinking, rendering many of the analyses and discussions in the text outdated or superseded. Nevertheless, the book has not lost its relevance, as evidenced by the hundreds of citations and commentaries it continues to receive. This can be explained, it seems to me, by two main reasons. The first, more conceptual, is that the book was among the first — alongside works by Raymundo Faoro, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe Schmitter — to place the themes of bureaucratic patrimonialism and authoritarianism at the center of interpretations of the Brazilian and Latin American political system, themes that remain pertinent. The second, more substantive, is the persistence of the issues of the characteristics of the Brazilian state, the functioning of the party-political system, and, more broadly, the question of democracy, as discussed in the more recent revisions by Elisa Pereira Reis and Bolívar Lamounier.

Having completed this work, I began to turn my attention no longer directly to the state and the political system, but to society, and more specifically to what I called at some point the "politics of knowledge" — that is, the way in which society organizes itself, or fails to do so, to acquire and expand competencies — from science and technology to basic education — without which democracy and social development cannot be durably established. I also turned my attention to social policies more broadly, among which education occupies a central place. Not surprisingly, the themes of neo-patrimonialism, corporatism, co-optation, and political representation, as well as regional cleavages, appear in all of these areas, and it is of great importance to understand what has been happening and what can be expected.

Economic growth and the reduction of social inequalities over the past decade in Brazil and in other countries such as India and South Africa gave rise to the hope that, perhaps, these countries were forging a new path of development with democracy — avoiding both the fascination with China's authoritarian communism and the extreme prescriptions of liberal economism known as the "Washington Consensus." My participation in a comparative study of the experiences of these countries allowed me to return to the analysis of the nature of the bureaucratic patrimonial state and the conditions for development with democracy and greater social justice in Brazil. The economic and political-institutional crisis that set in after 2014 showed that without significantly overcoming the neo-patrimonial practices deeply embedded in the Brazilian political system, it will not be easy to move forward. In this sense, the book remains current insofar as it helps us reflect on the origins and unfolding of that crisis.

Note to the Fourth Edition of *Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro*, Publit Soluções Editoriais, 2007.

This new edition of Bases of Brazilian Authoritarianism, made available thanks to new information and communication technologies, reproduces in full the text of the original 1982 edition, which originated in my doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1973, under the title Regional Cleavages and Political Patrimonialism in Brazil, first published in Brazil as São Paulo and the National State (DIFEL, 1975). It also reproduces the preface to the third edition of 1988, which sought to place the book — written at the height of the military regime — in the context of what was then called the New Republic.

More than thirty years on, one of the book's central propositions would seem to have been borne out. What I sought to demonstrate in 1973 was how the dynamics of Brazilian political life had always had as a central feature the relative marginalization of the more economically dynamic and organized sector of "civil society" — located predominantly in São Paulo — from the core of central power, which was far more anchored in the Rio de Janeiro–Brasília axis, in alliance with the traditional political oligarchies of the poorer states. More than geographical differences, what mattered most to me were the different forms of organization and participation in economic, social, and political life that coexisted and competed for space in the country.

In the 1988 preface I wrote that "it was from São Paulo that the strongest social pressures against the powers concentrated in the federal government emerged, both from business groups and from the organized labor movement; it is in São Paulo, ultimately, that the possibility of constituting a more open and stable political system — one capable of giving the opening process a more permanent foundation — is at stake."

From 1995 onward, with the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio da Silva and the presidential candidacies of José Serra and Geraldo Alckmin, the center of gravity of Brazilian politics shifted to São Paulo. In the 1994 and 1998 elections, the opposition between the PSDB and the PT came close to what we might describe as a contest between two modern political parties — one with greater support among the middle classes and business, the other with greater support among unions and independent social movements. Since then, however, political parties have lost substance, clientelism has expanded, trade unionism and social movements have been co-opted, and a good part of the old patrimonial elites have maintained their longstanding power, now operating as mere kleptocracies. The "modern" period of Brazilian politics was short-lived, and old-style politics has proven to have an enormous and unexpected capacity for survival and metamorphosis. The question left for voters is why this is so, and what we can expect for the future.

Rio de Janeiro, July 2007.

Preface to the Third Edition (Editora Campus, 1985)





After twenty years of military rule, the New Republic found Brazil profoundly transformed. It is now a far more urbanized, industrialized, and populous country than it was in the 1960s. At the same time, social conditions appear to have worsened: income inequality has grown, urban crime seems out of control, and public health problems are critical. How many of these transformations are attributable to the political regime that prevailed over the past few decades? How many would have occurred independently of it?

The experience of authoritarianism has generated many analyses and controversies about its true meaning. Were these years merely an unpleasant accident in an inexorable process of economic, social, and political development, as the development theories of the 1950s and 1960s would suggest? Or, on the contrary, were they simply a return to a more recurrent and deeper pattern of Brazilian society or culture — inherently authoritarian and incapable of evolving toward a stable democratic order? How are we to understand the years of authoritarian rule? Is it possible to say that Brazil stood still in 1964, only to awaken twenty years later from a long nightmare? Or were the transformations that occurred during those years sufficiently broad and deep — regardless of the successive military governments' intentions — to make any simple return to the pre-1964 period unthinkable? And how are we to interpret the current situation?

It is impossible to answer these questions at such a level of generality. To address them, one must have an adequate understanding of our social and political past, of the profound changes that have occurred over recent decades, and of the repercussions this accumulated legacy still has on the way our society moves. At the end of this work we will not yet be in a position to know with certainty what the future holds, but we will have, at least, a clearer idea of the issues at stake.

Bases of Brazilian Authoritarianism aims to be a contribution to this effort. Its initial version, under the title São Paulo and the National State, was written and published in the early 1970s, in the full force of AI-5 and the harshest years of the military regime. The current version, republished with minor corrections of detail, was written in the early 1980s, when the process of political opening was already showing itself to be irreversible. The continued interest the book has found over these years seems to confirm that the theme of Brazilian authoritarianism is not a mere passing

phenomenon, but has deep roots and implications that are not dissolved by mere institutional rearrangements. To acknowledge this does not mean supposing that Brazil suffers from a congenital authoritarian stigma from which there is no salvation. But it does mean that this past and its present consequences must be faced directly if we are to have a real chance at a more promising future.

II

One of the central theses of this book is that Brazil inherited a political system that does not function as a "representative" or "agent" of specific social groups or classes, but has its own independent dynamic — one that can only be understood by examining the history of the formation of the Brazilian state. This thesis may seem incomprehensible within a conventional Marxist or economist framework, which tends to interpret everything in terms of class divisions. It becomes more intelligible, however, from a Weberian perspective, which distinguishes and treats differently the systems of class, political domination, and social privilege and status in a society. It is through the Weberian perspective that we can see that the Brazilian state has as its predominant historical characteristic its neo-patrimonial dimension — a form of political domination generated in the process of transition to modernity, burdened by a heavy administrative bureaucracy and a weak, poorly articulated "civil society." Brazil never had a nobility worthy of the name; the Church was almost always subservient to civil power; the wealthy generally depended on the favors of the state; and the poor, on its magnanimity.

This pattern of state predominance has historically produced a state with two overriding characteristics. First, a bureaucratic and administrative system we call — following the Weberian tradition — neo-patrimonial, characterized by the appropriation of public functions, offices, and revenues by private sectors that nonetheless remain subordinate to and dependent on central power, forming what Raymundo Faoro called the "bureaucratic estate." When this type of administration modernizes and segments of the old bureaucratic estate become professionalized and bureaucratized, a second characteristic of the Brazilian state emerges: bureaucratic despotism. From the wise emperor Dom Pedro II to the military officers of the Superior War College, passing through the positivists of the South and the technocrats of the Estado Novo, our rulers have tended to believe they know everything and can do everything.

III

The political game that unfolds under these conditions consists far less in a process of representing social sectors before the state than in a continuous negotiation between the neo-patrimonial state and all manner of social sectors regarding their inclusion or exclusion from the channels of access to benefits and privileges controlled by the state. It is not a negotiation between equals: "outside of power there is no salvation," as the old Minas Gerais politician used to say. This continuous negotiation leads to various outcomes. More active leaders are co-opted by the political system. When co-optation becomes institutionalized, it often assumes corporatist characteristics — attempts to organize functional and interest groups into institutions supervised and controlled by the state.

The other side of co-optation is exclusion — both from political and decision-making processes and from the eventual distribution of social wealth. The Estado Novo, while seeking to organize and co-opt the urban working class, excluded the peasantry from any form of access to its benefits. The exclusion of the peasantry is only the most glaring example of the conservative modernization that has characterized Brazilian development. The post-1964 regime also sought to exclude urban workers, intellectuals, and the populations of the large cities from any meaningful influence on political life.

In addition to co-opting, incorporating, or excluding individuals and social sectors, the neo-corporatist state engages in economic activity that can be characterized as neo-mercantilist. As in the mercantilism of old, the state intervenes in economic enterprises of all kinds. The final characteristic of the neo-corporatist state is its plebiscitary, or populist, dimension — the attempt to establish a direct relationship between political leadership and "the people," without the intermediation of organized social groups. Plebiscitary populism, as the experience of European fascism demonstrated, is the other face of authoritarianism.

IV

Faced with a state of these characteristics, Brazilian society tends, in general, to be dependent on the state for the obtaining of benefits, sinecures, authorizations, jobs, regulations, and subsidies. The other side of dependence is clandestinity. Since the state purports to control everything — without, however, succeeding — unregulated behaviors come to be seen as illegitimate, but are at the same time tacitly and consensually accepted: the informal economy, the numbers lottery, popular religions, smuggling, private power in its various manifestations. As a result, daily life tends to be devoid of ethical and normative content — an endemic situation of anomie whose consequences have not yet been fully understood by our social scientists.

The case of the Catholic Church is an interesting illustration of these relations between state and society. In the Portuguese tradition of royal patronage, transposed to Brazil, the Church is part of the state in a symbiosis in which religion handled rites and education without interfering — and in fact legitimizing — the political power constituted without its consent. In the 1920s and 1930s the Church sought, for the first time, to constitute itself as an autonomous social and intellectual movement capable of decisively influencing the country's politics. It ended, however, by being co-opted by the Vargas regime, which handed it the Ministry of Education while simultaneously stealing its banner of private education.

V

From the mid-twentieth century, Brazilian society entered a period of profound transformation, most notably characterized by accelerated demographic growth accompanied by intensified migratory processes from the countryside to the cities. The more traditional and declining rural economy slowly emptied out. The counterpart to the depopulation of the countryside is the swelling of the cities. The existence of "dangerous classes" — popular sectors coexisting with high levels of violence and threatening the physical safety of the middle and upper classes — has been a constant feature of Rio de Janeiro's history and constitutes a central characteristic of a society based on the predominance of political-administrative centers lacking an adequate industrial employment structure.

The postwar period also marked the emergence of a significant urban middle class, the consolidation of an industry oriented toward the domestic market providing a base for a growing urban proletariat, and the emergence of an internationalized industrial sector in São Paulo more markedly than ever before in the country's history.

VI

Such intense transformations could not fail to place in crisis the symbiotic relationship of dependence that had been established in the past between the Brazilian state and civil society. The classical patrimonial administration — formalistic, unwieldy, inefficient, and geared toward the distribution of jobs and privileges — enters into crisis. The old corporatist system also collapses: the number of participants increases while the resources and privileges to be distributed fail to grow in proportion.

One sector where the crisis manifests itself with particular clarity is social security. The myth that the Brazilian social security system is "one of the most advanced in the world" was maintained for many years thanks to the historical exclusion from its benefits of rural populations and those linked to the informal economy. There is no doubt that its economic and financial crisis is extremely serious and will necessarily lead to profound revisions in the way Brazilian society has traditionally expected to receive state benefits.

Finally, the system of political co-optation enters into crisis. The organization of the more active sectors of society into corporations subordinate to the state is a convenient arrangement when those corporations are relatively weak and small. Over time, however, these corporations grow and their capacity for demands increases, while the state's ability to meet those demands progressively diminishes.

VII

The first reaction to the crisis was, as we all know, repressive. Rights and demands for political participation and for the organized assertion of interests were immediately repressed. The history of twenty years of military government

shows that, despite its generic commitment to the "capitalist system," there were sufficient variations and contradictions to make this term, in and of itself, explain very little.

The military regime also came to an end through a dynamic of internal conflicts that tended inevitably to incorporate new actors into the struggles for power, ensuring that, even in periods of more intense authoritarianism, the civilian sector of the country's political system was never completely dismantled. The negotiated transition between the military regime and the New Republic implied the containment of the reformist impulses expressed by the "Diretas Já" movement and the transfer of power to a more traditional and "trustworthy" civilian leadership — capable of using populism without being dominated by it.

VIII

This panoramic view of Brazil's evolution over recent decades allows for some tentative answers to the initial question about whether the processes of political opening and democratization we are witnessing are reversible or not. One thesis holds that the years of authoritarianism would already have fulfilled their function — carrying out the transition of the Brazilian economy from a proto-capitalist system to a fully capitalist economy. This thesis is difficult to sustain from the perspective adopted in this book, which seeks to demonstrate that the Brazilian state has characteristics of its own, rooted in its patrimonial origins, that make it quite distinct from the models of Western capitalist countries.

Another thesis — what we might call the "overflow thesis" — holds that the growth and modernization of Brazilian society has been of such a magnitude that the traditional systems of political control of society — through co-optation of leaderships and corporatist incorporation of organized sectors of the population, or through the populist mobilization of the electorate — are now things of the past. This thesis is only partially true. What is not certain is that this process means the consolidation of permanent ascendancy of "civil society" over the state, definitively overcoming our authoritarian past.

IX

Theories about the "maturity" of citizens usually come in two versions — one evolutionist, the other grounded in more religious foundations. The evolutionist version holds that as societies develop and the people become more educated and cultured, their level of political engagement and maturity also increases. Theories with more religious foundations dispense with evolution entirely and start from the thesis that the people are naturally good, just, and wise — and that the problem lies in the manipulations of the elites.

The results of the 1986 elections allow us to test some of these theses. What this brief analysis reveals is that the "maturity of the people" — as well as their hypothetical natural wisdom and goodness — is far from providing a solid basis for the constitution of a new democratic order. The fundamental question is not one of the "maturity" of the people, but of the nature of the existing social, governmental, and party institutions. The main problem with neo-patrimonial states is not that they keep the people in a dependent and alienated condition, but primarily that all forms of social organization they generate tend to be dependent on public power and oriented toward obtaining its favors.

X

Ultimately, if the state is all-powerful, nothing is more rational than to seek its favors and protection. The current crisis of the Brazilian patrimonial state is that it seems to have an ever-diminishing capacity to meet the demands placed upon it. The Brazilian state faces the problem of the country's "ungovernability."

The development of higher degrees of governability in a context of political legitimacy depends — as much as the construction of a stable democratic order — on the constitution of a series of stable and self-referential institutions that mediate, on one hand, between shapeless and manipulable public opinion and the private and sectoral interests capable of mobilizing it and, on the other hand, the state. These institutions are necessary not only on the "civil society" side — political parties, mass communication media, professional and union associations, organized interest groups

— but also on the state side, through the constitution of a motivated civil service conscious of its responsibilities, a judiciary jealous of its competence and independence.

XI

One question that poses itself with intensity is that of the mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion of the sectors currently marginalized from "modern Brazil." This question is sometimes framed as an opposition between an internationalized development model — based on a relatively open flow of ideas, people, and goods between Brazil and the rest of the world — and a more autarkic, closed model. Those who know something of the history of Brazil know, however, that we did not in the past possess a more authentic civilization model of our own to which we might aspire to return.

This discussion brings to the surface the question of Brazil's dependence on the centers of contemporary international capitalism. The so-called "dependency theories" start from an important and well-known fact — that countries like Brazil were constituted, from their origins, as dependencies of other centers — and often arrive at two paradoxical conclusions. What we seek to show, on the contrary, is that dependency does not exclude the existence of a reality that is specific and internal to the country, not reducible to its relations with the more developed capitalist centers.

XII

The general conclusion of all that has been said is that Brazilian authoritarianism — whose foundations are laid in the very initial formation of Brazil as a Portuguese colony, and which evolves and transforms itself throughout our history — does not constitute a congenital and insurmountable trait of our nationhood, but is certainly a powerful conditioning factor in relation to our present and future as a country. It is on the overcoming of this historical pattern and its consequences that our future depends. And since the past is contradictory and the future open and ready to be built, it is possible to be optimistic.

Preface to the First Edition of *Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro*. Editora Campus, 1982 e Editora da Universidade de Brasilia, 1982



Few would be surprised today by the assertion that Brazil is a country with a long authoritarian tradition. However, adequate understanding of this tradition — whose origins are tied to the patterns of relationship between the Brazilian state and society — only began to be sought in a more systematic way over the past fifteen years, in part due to the trauma caused by more recent authoritarian experiences, and in part also by the opening of new intellectual and analytical horizons among scholars of the country's social and political reality. This book aims to be a contribution to that understanding.

Bases of Brazilian Authoritarianism should be understood as a deepened re-examination of São Paulo and the National State, published in 1975. Some parts of the 1975 text were retained, others were profoundly revised, and new material was added. In general, this is a more explicitly theoretical and conceptual work, which also aspires to be more comprehensive and well-grounded.

São Paulo and the National State was written during one of the most intense periods of authoritarian rule in Brazilian history, while the current text was prepared during the experience of relative political opening under the Figueiredo government. The political experience lived through in recent years confirms the thesis that understanding Brazilian political life necessarily passes through the analysis of the contradictions between the economic and more organized center of "civil society" — located in São Paulo — and the core of central power, far more anchored in the Rio de Janeiro–Brasília axis.

This recognition, though promising, must not obscure the historical fact that Brazilian civil society has been incapable of creating a political system able to effectively counterpose itself to or counterbalance the overwhelming weight of central power. One such reason is that opposition to authoritarianism tends frequently to conflate two entirely distinct types of problems: on one hand, the contrast between the patrimonial, irrational, centralizing, authoritarian state and the sectors of society that claim to be autonomous and decentralizing; on the other, the contrast between liberal ideologies of non-interventionism and laissez-faire, and the inescapable needs for governmental planning and state intervention.

The crucial problem of contemporary states of bureaucratic-patrimonial origin is how to make the transition from an inefficient, cumbersome structure steeped in an outdated and conservative value system to an agile, modern structure capable of finally carrying out the passage from underdevelopment and backwardness to development and justice.

What the country needs is to complete simultaneously two fundamental transitions. On the state side: to leave definitively behind the inefficient, bureaucratized, and authoritarian patrimonial residue, in favor of a more modern, efficient structure — open to information and innovation, and conscious of its responsibilities in guiding Brazilian society. On the society side: to leave behind sclerotic liberalism and the fallacious identification of freedom with privatism, creating the conditions for the development and implementation of a more real and diversified representative system.

It should be possible, sooner or later, to arrive at this new social compact between state and society — if for no other reason than that no other alternatives seem to exist except pure and simple authoritarianism.

Presentation of *São Paulo e o Estado Nacional*, São Paulo, Difusão Europeia do Livro - Coleção Corpo e Alma do Brasil, under the direction of Professor Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 1975.



Back cover

The problem discussed in this book is classical and well known: why cannot political events in a country like Brazil be understood and predicted in terms of the familiar patterns of polarization and conflict between rich and poor, bourgeois and proletarians, exploiters and exploited?

There is the structural approach, which has to do with the way in which society organizes itself for the production, distribution, and political reallocation of scarce goods.

The other approach is political, and refers to the ways in which different groups in society are or are not called upon, and have or have not their rights of participation in the process of social distribution of wealth recognized.

São Paulo, since the beginning of the twentieth century, has been the largest, wealthiest, most industrialized, and most modern sector of the country. Yet it has never played a political role corresponding to its economic and demographic importance in the national context.

A thorough analysis of these problems and of the atypical phenomenon that is São Paulo is offered to readers in this book.

Flap text

This book is essentially an attempt to recover and update an important tradition of Brazilian social science: the concern with the great problems of *national political organization*, or, as one says today, with the "political model." It is situated, therefore, as a contribution in the line of Alberto Torres, Oliveira Vianna, Victor Nunes Leal, Raymundo Faoro, and many others. And like these illustrious predecessors, it draws on a broad and rigorous review of the tendencies of our historical formation, engaging with the most diverse currents of interpretation and even adding to them, in several points, original research. It contains, in this regard, a dual critique that will certainly generate a most fruitful controversy: on one side, against overly abstract theorizations about *political development* without adequate grounding in historical research; on the other, against a certain mode of historical research that, under the pretext of avoiding empty theorization, converts itself into naive empiricism or, worse still, into dogmatic petrification, averse to new inquiries and new analytical perspectives.

Substantively, the book's basic thesis is that of a contradictory development, in the Brazilian historical process, between the tendency toward the strengthening of central power along bureaucratic-patrimonial lines, and the growing demands for representation and autonomy on the part of "civil society." The author sees in the state of São Paulo the singularity of a historical development closer to the "representative" and anti-bureaucratic model, contrasting with the "co-optive" pattern of the central power and the other regions of the country. He thus establishes a basic cleavage between structures and processes simultaneously tending toward authoritarianism and toward liberalism. It is also on the basis of this hypothesis that he undertakes, in the last chapter of the book, an important critical assessment of the current debate on the institutionalization of a "Brazilian political model." Written by a political scientist with a solid

interdisciplinary background, *São Paulo and the National State* opens broad perspectives for historical and political reflection.

Acknowledgments

The first complete version of this work was presented as my doctoral dissertation in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. I had the opportunity to spend the years 1967 and 1968 in a doctoral program at that University thanks to a fellowship provided by the Ford Foundation, which also contributed to the costs of the final elaboration and publication of the doctoral dissertation. The Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California also contributed to covering part of these expenses, for which I am grateful.

Of fundamental importance during this doctoral period was the influence of David E. Apter, who as a friend, teacher, and chair of my dissertation committee, always represented a pressure and a reminder never to allow intellectual audacity and concern with fundamental theoretical problems to succumb to the routine and bureaucratic preoccupations of academic and professional life. I have done my best to live up to that challenge.

In 1969 I had the occasion to organize a research seminar at the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), in which students were to gather data on the relations between State and Society in Brazilian political history. The main results of that seminar appeared in issue No. 7 of the journal *Dados*, and the introductory article of that issue represents my first attempt to view the Brazilian political system from the perspective developed here. I owe to the participants of that seminar — Celina do Amaral Peixoto Moreira Franco, Fernando José Leite Costa, Hélio Matias, Luís Werneck Vianna, Lúcia Lippi de Oliveira, Lícia Maria Gomes Klein, Maria Aparecida Hime, Maria Antonieta Parabyba, Nancy Aléssio, Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr., Sérgio da Rocha Souza, Vera Maria Pereira — much of what I went on to develop later, based on their research.

Preliminary versions of various parts of the book were published in different forms and are referenced in the bibliography. Gradually, the theme of the relations between São Paulo and the National State acquired prominence, until it emerged as the current title of the work as a whole. Numerous colleagues read and commented on these preliminary texts, identifying conceptual inconsistencies, weaknesses in empirical grounding, and problems of clarity that were, whenever possible, addressed — often leading to profound transformations in presentation and content. I am especially grateful to those who followed and encouraged this work from its beginning, including, among others, Antonio Octávio Cintra, Fábio Wanderley Reis, Peter McDonough, Elisa Maria Pereira Reis, Renato Boschi, Bolívar Lamounier, Glaucio Dillon Soares; to those who contributed with critiques of more specific aspects of the work, including Amaury de Souza, David Nasatir, Eulalia Maria Lahmayer Lobo, Gustavo Bayer, Michel Conniff, Nelson do Vale, Torcuato Di Tella, Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos. Finally, Fernando Henrique Cardoso contributed, through his critique, to the final form in which this book now comes to light.

I am also grateful to Simone A. Bateman Novais and Maria Lúcia de Oliveira for their critical revision of the text, as well as for the final revision carried out by Leíla Abraham and Kallás Roberto Kallás. Edson Crespo dos Santos, finally, undertook the transcription of the originals as many times as proved necessary.

This work is, in sum, a personal vision of the effort of many, and of a continuous dialogue about the past and the future with a remarkable group of Brazilian social scientists of various generations, to whom all those cited above belong, along with many others. To them, therefore, it is dedicated.

Rio, August 1974.

REGIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL PATRIMONIALISM IN BRAZIL

by

Simon Schwartzman

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

1973

> The analysis of political development has had about the same relationship to historical experience as a dog on a long leash to the tree at the other end of the leash. The dog can roam in almost any direction. He can even get the illusion of rushing off on his own. But let him rush too far, too fast and his collar will jerk him back: it may even knock the wind out of him . . .. Major political transformations which occurred in the past may not repeat themselves in exactly the same way, but any theories that claim to encompass general processes of political transformations must be consistent with past experience; and ought to be checked carefully against that experience before gaining wide acceptance. [Introductory statements, Charles Tilly (forthcoming)]

Acknowledgments

The ideas presented here were first sketched in Berkeley in 1968, and have since then been reformulated, changed, substantiated and rewritten before coming to the present shape. After circulating preliminary papers in the meantime, I received comments and criticisms which are, wherever possible, incorporated here. It is therefore impossible to acknowledge all the intellectual debts contracted in this process.

It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of David E. Apter in this work. As a friend, teacher and chairman of my dissertation committee, he represented a constant pressure towards intellectual boldness and theoretical relevance; I have done my best to keep up to his challenge.

In 1969 I was in charge of a research seminar at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (Cândido Mendes), in which the students were asked to look for data and historical information about the relationships between State and society in Brazilian political history. The main results of that seminar are embodied in Dados, No. 7, and represent my first attempt to look at Brazilian politics from the perspective which is developed here. I am grateful to all participants of that seminar: Celina do Amaral Peixoto Moreira Franco, Fernando José Leite Costa, Hélio Matias, José Werneck de Castro, Lucia Lippi de Oliveira, Lucia Maria Gomes Klein, Maria Aparecida Hime, Maria Antonia Parahyba, Nancy Alessio, Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr., Sérgio da Rocha Souza, Vera Maria Pereira, for that unique academic experience.

Several colleagues have commented and helped to find conceptual inconsistencies, empirical weaknesses and problems of clarity in several of the preliminary papers and drafts. It is impossible to list them all, but I am particularly grateful to those who have shared the whole development of this work with me, with sharp but not always accepted criticism: Antonio Octávio Cintra, Fábio Wanderley Reis, Peter McDonough, Elisa Maria Pereira Reis, Renato Raul Boschi; and to several others who have contributed to more specific aspects of it: Amaury de Souza, Bolivar Lamounier, Celso Lafer, David Nasatir, Eulália Maria Lahmayer Lobo, Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, Gustavo Bayer, Michael Conniff, Nelson do Vale, Torcuato S. di Tella, Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos and many others.

This work has been and still is the fruit of a constant dialogue on the past and future of the Brazilian political system, with a remarkable group of Brazilian social scientists to which all these colleagues belong. It is dedicated to them.

I had the opportunity to spend the years of 1967 and 1968 at the University of California, Berkeley, thanks to a fellowship from the Ford Foundation, which also supported the final editing, typing and presentation of this manuscript. I am especially grateful to Peter D. Bell for his personal interest in my studies. Finally, Simone Bateman Novaes has painstakingly worked to bring my English into proper style. It is certainly not her fault if I often insisted on my barbarisms.

In short, I gathered my ingredients wherever I found them. Only the recipe is mine, and I am solely responsible for the quality and taste of what comes out now from the casserole.

Rio de Janeiro, May, 1973.

PART I - FRAMEWORK

1. Interest group representation and beyond

The problem discussed in this thesis is a classic one: why political cleavages and conflicts in a country like Brazil do not follow the expected patterns of polarization between rich and poor, bourgeoisie and proletariat, exploiters and exploited. Philippe Schmitter, in his book on Brazil, has approached the problem in a very specific way: the analysis of how much, or rather how little Brazilian politics corresponds to the usual pattern of interest-group representation, and why[1]

As a matter of fact, politics would be transparent if one could trace each and every political manifestation to a given interest group. Most of the efforts of political analysts in all countries tend in this direction. The classic debate between elitists and pluralists in American political science deals with whether these interest groups are few or many, concentrated or dispersed, ad hoc or permanent; but it does not question the fact that politics is always a matter of "interest aggregation."

It is disturbing, therefore, when one sees that people do not care about politics, and that elections are decided on issues which are either not easily translated into interests or which belong to the past. Once this reality is discovered, political science becomes concerned with the explanation of how politics is actually played, and why. With all the research already done along

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1 Schmitter's main conclusion about Brazilian politics is, precisely, the limited relevance of interest-group politics to the political system: "The most challenging findings . . . are those concerning indeterminate relations between development and associability, findings that in effect involve the confirmation of a null hypothesis. First, the structural transformation of Brazilian society has not led to the formation of autonomous, aggressive, and highly interactive interest groups articulating competitive, alternative demands . . . . Second, these changes do not seem to have produced cohesive, multi-faceted coalitions of associations along mutually exclusive and totally antagonistic lines. The Brazilian case calls into question orthodox assumptions about the relationship between industrialization and polarized class conflict. Third, despite the conclusive evidence on the general increase in associability, there is not such evidence of an increase in the influence these groups have upon public policy-making. In short, pressure-group predominance may not be the inevitable component of political modernity that it is often thought to be. (Philippe Schmitter, 1971)

Later, he developed an analysis of the Brazilian political system in terms of authoritarianism, establishing a link between the structure and behavior of a delayed and dependent process of development, on the one hand, and a permanent authoritarian system on the other. His conclusions are similar to mine regarding the permanence of an active role of the State in political life ("die veselbständigten Machte der Exekutivegewalt," according to his reference to Marx). The differences are essentially three. First, the identification he makes between a structural element, the role of the State in society, and a trait of political behavior and "climate," authoritarianism. This identification may lead to the liberal proposition that non-authoritarian regimes are only those where the State is not active in the social and economic life, which is not necessarily true. Second, he does not take into consideration the split between political and economic development with its regional implications, which is central in this work. Third, he seems to imply that these regimes cannot promote development, and are geared basically to keeping the social and economic status quo in contexts of underdevelopment and growing expectations. The most recent Brazilian experience seems to show that his implication is not necessarily true. Cf. Schmitter (1972).

these lines, nobody is quite so naive as to take the interest representation model for granted.[2] The difficulty, however, is that the old model is so neat, so convincing that it remains as a background for all new conceptual developments. For this reason, I also believe that it is worth starting from the same framework.

The empirical analyses of political participation in so-called developing countries do not show the same level of methodological and theoretical sophistication as American studies. They follow essentially two analytical trends. The first tends to look for the peculiarities of a given political system, and uses them to explain the differences between reality and the interest-group model. These peculiarities, often taken together as a "political culture" syndrome, tend to be explained, in turn, by a variety of psychological, psychoanalytical and anthropological theories.[3] The net outcome tends to be an explanation which resorts to the "uniqueness" of a country's political culture, with little room for more structural approaches.

One of the difficulties of this approach is that it leads to the very uncomfortable notion that countries are bound to their political culture, and are therefore not likely to move into a stage where political life can be "properly" performed and understood. These difficulties lead to several theories of political development, and more generally, of social modernization. Applied to Brazil, these theories hold that the country has not yet developed conditions for strong interest-group representation, which would tend to appear with the emergence of institutional differentiation, modern values, and so on. These models imply that the country will eventually reach the stage of acute class conflict, and then develop either into a socialist-type regime, or into an open,

2 The main references here are, of course, Bernard Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. N. McPhee (1954); Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes (1960); and the series of studies derived from the Columbia and Michigan groups. For the perception of political objects, cf. Phillip Converse (1964). On the autonomy of political issues and their persistence through time in the United States, cf. G. Pomper (1967).

3 See for instance G. A. Almond, and Sidney Verba (1963); Lucien Pye (1962), O. Mannoni (1956). The most important example for Brazil is the work of Oliveira Viana: it contains what is probably the first, most penetrating analysis of Brazilian political reality, in contrast with its constitutional façade. His explanations, unfortunately, are not as interesting as his description of reality, given his racist theories of the inferiority of Blacks and Indians. Cf. Oliveira Viana (1949), as well as Oliveira Viana (n.d.).

representative democracy[4], having, in both cases, an intervening period of political authoritarianism.[5]

Perhaps the most important and obvious reason for the failure of the usual explanatory models is that Brazil is certainly not developed and industrialized like Western Europe, the United States or Japan, but neither is it a "traditional" society. The country was, after all, colonized by one of the leading colonial powers of its time and, since its independence in 1822, it has developed close ties with the most active economic and cultural centers of the Western Hemisphere: England, France, Germany and the United States. The native population founded by the Portuguese never became a sizable group in the country, and, in this sense, Brazil differs sharply from other Latin American countries, where colonial administration was imposed upon a significant, well-organized and sizable native society. There was, of course, the importation of the Negro slave, but slavery usually existed only in the more capitalized, i.e. the more modern sections of the economy. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the country became an important target for international migration from Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal and, later on, Japan.[6] What we have, in short, is a country which has changed according to patterns which are peculiar to the type of colonization it received and the types of relationships it entertained with the more dynamic centers of the world economy. These patterns - some of which I will try to identify - are very "modern," even if not "developed," and need to be considered within a fresh conceptual framework.

There are a few disturbing facts about Brazilian politics which make this need for a fresh conceptual framework still more pressing than the discussion above suggests. The first and most

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4 I am putting the two ideological preferences together on purpose, since I believe that they share the same explanatory model. The basic references for the evolutionist version are Gabriel A. Almond and B. Powell (1966), and Daniel Lerner (1958). One of this model's difficulties is, of course, the quality of its predictions. Gino Germani, for instance, has predicted a continuous expansion of political participation in Latin America, which obviously has not occurred. But the other, and probably more serious difficulty, is that it cannot explain what happens before modernization occurs, since all conceptualizations tend to be created by default; non-differentiation, diffuseness, lack of class consciousness, non-specificity of functions, and so on. Cf. Gino Germani (1962). The revolutionary alternative copes with this problem through the concept of "class in itself," a class which is considered to be "still" unaware of itself. The mechanisms for its transformation towards a "class for itself" are usually considered to lie in the country's industrialization process. A recent Brazilian example of this point of view is a study of the Brazilian working class which, according to this theory, is considered to be the vanguard of the social, economic, and political development of the country: "The proletariat is the dynamic stratum in objective terms, which does not mean that the majority of its members are already conscious of their function in society. As we have shown above, they are in the process of apprehending this condition, due to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, but mostly to the latter; which presupposes a long road ahead towards total consciousness." [Trans. from H. Vinhas, (1970)]

5 Political authoritarianism is an "intervening period" in the sense that it does not quite fit either the traditional-modern or the class-conflict model. One unintended benefit of the contemporary authoritarian regimes has been an improvement in the attempts of political theory to account for the occurrence of such regimes. Important references concerning these new developments include the works of Barrington Moore and Juan Linz on Spanish authoritarianism, Germani and Organski' s analysis of Italian fascism, as well as David Apter's notions concerning non-democratic representation. Cf. Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966), Juan Linz (1964), David E. Apter (1968), A. F. Organski (1969). This list, is of course, only illustrative.

6 Cf. Chapter V, below, for references on European immigration to Brazil.

evident fact is the constant lack of correspondence between the country's formal political institutions and its social and economic reality. Oliveira Viana made a sharp description of this situation. According to him, the Brazilian political elite in the twenties was still

> In that stage of political philosophy in which the State is conceived of as a structure alien to society, juxtaposed to it, imposed from above as if by divine right - rather than emanating from it, sharing its material and spiritual conditions, living as a "culture," and undergoing the influence of its transformations[7]

The elites are culturally alienated, and the political system is created not as a function of the interests and preferences of the social groups, but according to a more or less prestigious foreign model. The consequence, according to Oliveira Viana, is not simply a lack of correspondence between the formal and informal structures of political organization, but also a lack of correspondence between a model of political organization, which presupposes high levels of interest aggregation and concern with the nation as a whole, and a political culture where horizons do not surpass the local level.[8]

The very notion of interest-group politics is repugnant to the prevailing values of the Brazilian elite[9]: the fact is that it is usually difficult to identify government office-holders and policies with specific class interests in any precise and determined way. Surely enough, no Brazilian government ever intended a thorough reorganization of the land-tenure system; but this

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7 Translated from Oliveira Viana (1949), p. 22 .

8 Oliveira Viana anticipates by decades the theories of political localism and familism as explanations of political "backwardness." The best known contemporary reference here is E. Banfield (1958).

9 A survey among the participants of the Fourth National Meeting of the prestigious *Ordem Nacional dos Advogados do Brasil* (Brazilian Lawyers' Association) furnishes a good indication of this fact. When asked whether Brazilian political parties should represent different interest groups or remain above private interests, the lawyers consistently answered that political parties should remain above private interests; this opinion was reinforced with increasing age:

View on parties	Young	Middle age	Old
Parties should represent specific or non-specified interest groups	23.2%	17.8%	0.0%
Parties should remain above private interests	73.5%	82.1%	91.6%
DK / No answer	2.9%	0.0%	8.3%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

I am grateful to Lucia Maria Gomes Klein for this unpublished data. For a report on the survey, see O. B. de Lima Junior, L. M Gomes Klein, A. Soares Martins (1970).

does not necessarily mean that the government has been "controlled" by the rural aristocracy, whose political expression has actually been decreasing steadily during the last forty years. The country benefitted from periods of intense industrialization under Getúlio Vargas after 1937, under Juscelino Kubitschek after 1955, and again in recent years. Nobody would say, however, that these were industrial-bourgeoisie-dominated governments.[10] Military groups have always been active in Brazilian politics and, since 1964, the national government has been controlled by the military establishment. Some attempts have been made to link the military with the "middle classes," but this concept almost always functions as a convenient residual category which explains away the lack of correspondence between the military establishment and specific socioeconomic groups[11].

The second very impressive and disturbing fact about Brazilian politics is that the main state within the Federation, São Paulo, has never played a political role commensurate with its sheer economic and population size. The autonomy of the Brazilian states has never been as great as that of their North American models; moreover, they differ greatly and have had quite unique political developments. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, São Paulo has become the biggest, richest, most industrialized, and most modern section of the country. Evidence abounds, however, that this social and economic development is accompanied by relative political deprivation. One indicator of this is the small size of the Brazilian national parties in the state of São Paulo during the 1945-1964 period; this situation is corroborated by the fact that, since 1930, only the short-lived Jânio Quadros government of 1961 had its political origins in that state. The so-called "Old Republic" (1889-1930) is usually considered a period during which São Paulo shared with Minas Gerais the control of national politics. But, as I will try to show later, evidence is beginning to indicate that the pre-eminence of São Paulo was much smaller, even in that period, than its economic importance suggests.

Brazilian political analysts, working within the group or class-interest representation model, have had difficulty interpreting this startling political deprivation of the country's economic center. One of the best-known analysts of the populist movements in Brazil, for instance, recognizes that

> It is evident that Paulista conditions are specifically those of a large industrial city occupying a unique position in Brazil,

but then goes on to say that

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10 Some would, as a matter of fact. Most of the debate on the class interpretation of Brazilian politics revolves around the 1930 revolution, which brought Getúlio Vargas to power. Octávio lanni, for instance, says that “despite the fact that the Revolution of 1930 was not predominantly supported either by the rising financial and industrial bourgeoisie or by the incipient proletariat, it should be interpreted as a super-structuralmoment of primitive accumulation [of capital] which forms the basis for later industrialization”. [Translated from Octávio Ianni (1965), pp. 135-36.]. In other words, it was "objectively" (which actually means, subjectively) a bourgeois revolution, since, *ex post facto*, it led to industrialization. No empirical study is necessary to support this kind of interpretation.

11 For a discussion and, ultimately, a defense of the interpretation of the military in Latin America as representatives of the "middle classes," cf. José Nun (1965).

> Precisely because it is a metropolis, it becomes a "model" for the analysis of mass politics in Brazil.[12]

The fact that São Paulo represents the only and atypical case of rapid urbanization and simultaneous industrialization in the country's states does not seem to affect its role as "model" for the rest of the country. This is not an occasional misperception; it is a conceptual difficulty of the theoretical model. Another author tries to link, within the same perspective, the development of the city of Belo Horizonte (an extreme case of urbanization without industrialization) with the development of São Paulo:

> The population of Belo Horizonte grew at a rate slightly lower than that of São Paulo - 6.8% - which reveals the considerable impetus gathered by its industrialization.[13]

Later on, in trying to explain how the city of São Paulo continued to grow despite the decline of its industrialization rate, he says that "the growth of industry brings on a strong expansion in the tertiary sector of the economy." The implicit theoretical model seems to make it impossible for the author to accept urbanization and the growth of the tertiary sector without an industrial impulse at their origin or perceive that, in the case of Belo Horizonte, the dynamic element of growth is social and administrative, leading to a situation where industry is only a secondary activity.[14]

The alternative to taking São Paulo as a model has often consisted in considering it as a "deviant" case in the national picture; but this is certainly difficult to do when we deal with the economic center of the country.

2. The structural framework: western capitalism and Patrimonialism

In the following, I will try to approach the problem sketched above at two different levels. One is more structural, and has to do with how society is organized for the production, distribution and political reallocation of wealth. The other is more specifically political, and refers to the way in which different groups in society are called to, permitted or refused the right of participation in the process of reallocation of scarce resources.

The structural approach is based on the notion that there is a specific line of historical development which originated in feudal Europe and led to the modern, developed, western capitalist societies of today. Another line of development, however, originated from another variant of traditional domination, patrimonialism, and led to a different kind of modern, contemporary societies--some underdeveloped, some socialist, some with a vivid experience of

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12 Francisco C. Weffort (1965).

13 Paul Singer (1968). The lags between industrialization and urbanization are, on the contrary, the basis of explanations offered by Neuma Agúiar Walker, for differences in levels of political mobilization among Brazilian workers. Cf. N. Aguiar Walker (1969).

14 For a broader discussion of the theoretical questions involved, see chapter VI

authoritarianism and fascism. This is certainly a very rough distinction, and reality is, of course much more complex than this. But I still contend that this distinction, rough as it is, has not led to a full reappraisal of the dominant theoretical paradigm which, even though derived from the first historical tradition, is applied, with great losses of understanding and explanatory power, to the second historical situation.

It may be convenient to illustrate this idea for greater clarity. It is possible to think of political development in terms of a continuous increase in political participation, enfranchisement, and so on, within a given society. Problems of political instability emerge, according to this point of view, when the speed at which the ability to fight for a better share of the national wealth increases at a higher rate than the speed at which this wealth is growing; or in a slightly different conceptual version, when the process of nation building, and what it implies in terms of incorporation of marginal groups, diffusion of modern values, spread of mass communication means, and so on, is more intense than the slower process of state building and institutionalization of political structures. The end result is Political instability and, later, political authoritarianism.

What this type of theoretical explanation fails to see is that, very often, the causes of the imbalance are on the other side; that instability and authoritarianism are not necessarily the consequence of excessive demands in a context of little institutionalization and reduced resources, but, more often than not, the consequence of too little capacity for interest articulation and representation in a context of "excessive" concentration of power in the hands of the State. When this occurs, all attempts toward higher interest representation are either suppressed or co-opted, and the result is the continuous weakness and dependency of articulated social groups with regard to the political center.

The reason why this simple and striking fact is so often disregarded also has to do with the dominant paradigm of political representation. From this viewpoint, the state is by definition the representative of a given group or class “in society," and the notion of a state which represents essentially “itself," with no well-defined social class as power holder, is therefore impossible to conceive. The analysis of the political system as dependent upon the structure and behavior of the government and the state bureaucracy therefore appears to have no actual social content; it is considered a formalistic exercise concerning a nameless and faceless political entity.

I would, however, strongly deny that this framework implies a notion of a political structure which functions "up in the air," independent of and unconcerned about economic motivations and interests. In societies where the state apparatus is large and multi-functional, the access to political power is not simply a matter of interest representation, but one of direct control of substantial sources of valuable goods.

The following chapter is concerned exactly with the discussion of this point, within a context of regional differentiation. The fact remains that, as a complex and organized structure able to produce or extract resources from other social units, the state organization is a social unit with as good a sociological standing as, for example, merchants, agriculturalists or financial capitalists. All this depends, of course, on the relative size of the state structure, its relative strength and dependency upon other social units, and the type of activity it performs in the society's productive system. All these are empirical questions, and historical variations go from the extreme

of "hydraulic societies" studied by Wittfogel, where all the society's productive system is controlled and directed by the state, to the relatively "stateless" societies of nineteenth-century Western Europe. The division between "civil society" and "state," which puts all productive activities on the society's side and all political events on the state's, is a particular event in historical terms, which should certainly not be generalized.

3. The political perspective: co-optation and representation

The second level of analysis is more specifically political. There is no denying that the political system, understood in the more strict sense as an arena in which scarce resources are disputed by classes and groups, has importance and consequences of its own which cannot be understood simply through the class identification of the power holders, even in the classic context of interest representation politics. In other words, there is a big difference between a western, democratic regime dominated by a bourgeois party and a fascist political system in the same country dominated by essentially the same "bourgeoisie." There is a basic empirical proposition here, which is that the political system depends in its basic organization, on the more structural characteristics of society. But this empirical relationship should not be used to disqualify the level of political analysis as a simple analytical exercise derived from the understanding of society's structural features. In the following, I will be suggesting a strong relationship between "patrimonialism" and "'political co-optation," the strength of which is conveyed by the expression "political patrimonialism" Once this general relationship is established, what is important is to see how it varies, how it relates to other forms of political participation, and how it affects the process of political change.

The expression "political co-optation" is suggested to convey the notion of a dependent, weak or hierarchically controlled system of political participation. The first necessary condition for the existence of a system of political co-optation is that some people or some social groups, previously outside the government, try to participate or influence the political system. There is no political co-optation where there is no possibility of participation, as in the very traditional or very authoritarian regimes. The second condition is that the power holders have the means to buy out these efforts towards participation, in such a way that a bond of dependency is established between the power holders and the emerging political leaders. As any ideal type, this kind of arrangement occurs all the time in all open political systems, and is not a Brazilian peculiarity. But it tends to be dominant within the context of strong, well-established governmental structures which historically antecede the efforts towards political mobilization of social groups. When this situation occurs, governmental positions are sought, not so much as resources for implementing interests, but rather as a means of social mobility. This means that public administration is seen as an asset in itself, functioning more as a patrimonial than as a goal-oriented organization. Since positions are more important than functions, the public sector tends to swell. This type of patrimonial administration tends to be incompatible with active political participation; however, when the need arises, it creates forms of political participation which are organized, patronized, and conducted from above.

There are two essential ideas behind the concept of political co-optation. First, the weight in this kind of political arrangement is on the side of the central administration, the city, the "modern's' side of the country. Surely enough, an important fraction of the political elite in Brazil

has historically been recruited in the country's rural areas, but they are not merely the representatives of agricultural interests.[15] A symbiotic relation of dependency exists between central administration and local power: power and dominance are usually imposed from the top down, and seldom from the bottom up. The Old Republic, which was, in many ways, the period of political domination by local and regional bosses, was also a period during which electoral outcomes were forged almost openly by the dominant parties, and the central government elected whom it wanted. What is usually called "traditional" politics in the Brazilian context was not rural, but urban, "modern"; it was led by a fairly sophisticated elite which controlled a fairly complex governmental apparatus.

The other essential idea behind the concept of political co-optation is that there is not much place in the system for interest representation in the more classic--i.e., European--version of the term. According to this version, the emergence of a more aggressive capitalist economy in the country tends to generate interest politics on the two sides of the class cleavage. This type of politics is usually more concerned with governmental policies than with governmental jobs; when the politician grows in power and prestige, he tends to be responsible to his constituency, from whom he gathers his strength. He might become a party bureaucrat, but seldom a government bureaucrat; when he does, he tends to lose his political basis of support. In the co-optation system, on the contrary, the higher his participation in the government bureaucracy, the higher his control of his political basis.

It is possible to show that, if this kind of representation politics ever existed in Brazil, it emerged in the São Paulo area. It never became strong enough to shape the overall political picture of the country, but it was important enough to set the state apart as a separate political entity within the country. Both the co-optation and the representation systems have their conservative and liberal or right and left sides, and this fourfold combination is probably the best standpoint from which to interpret the developments of Brazilian politics through time.

This image of the Brazilian political scenario as a clash between two "styles" of political participation does not correspond to the general view of how the system developed, especially after 1945. In fact, the 1945-64 period, which was an era of multi-party competition, was a time of increasing participation, political mobilization and ideological oppositions. If one considers the period which extends from 1945 to 1960, one's first impression is that of a development process along the traditional-modern line, as suggested by Lerner or Germani. A more careful look will indicate, however, that this process occurred within the framework of a co-optation - representation polarity, leading ultimately to the collapse of the representative system in 1964.

Basically, interest group (or class-interest) politics is at the root of most modern versions of political democracy, and one of the conclusions which could be drawn from this type of analysis would be, for instance, that there is only one way to lead Brazil to a more open system of political participation: increase the role of São Paulo in national politics, at either or both ends of its

15 It is interesting to notice that agrarian political parties are not to be found in Latin America; this has to do with the fact that the agriculturalists never were a distinct and differentiated interest group in these countries. Cf. Simon Schwartzman (1966).

stratification structure, opposing it to the role played by urban non-industrial and rural states. To acknowledge the limited role of representation politics in the country would lead, ultimately, to new visions of how the political system should be organized in the future, ranging from a Hobbesian anti-utopia to models of democratic organization which would necessarily have to be intra-bureaucratic and intra-organizational.

What so far has not explicitly entered this picture is the military establishment. I share with Huntington the idea that the political behavior of the military must be seen and understood in terms of the characteristics of the military institution and its relationship with the political system as a whole, rather than as a more or less direct representation of class interests.[16] This does not deny, of course, that sometimes the class component of a given military group cannot be located or that it has no important explanatory weight.[17] In the case of Brazil, however, it seems that, besides institutional factors, what characterizes the active military elite is not so much its class extraction as its regional origins. It is possible to show that a disproportionate group of Brazilian military personalities come from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state of the country, bordering Uruguay and Argentina. I will not deal with the role of the military in Brazilian politics as such, but I do intend to throw some light on the peculiarity of its regional origin.

4. Final remarks

There are two kinds of intellectual procedures which recur in the text and might leave some of the readers uneasy, if not outright in opposition to whatever is said afterwards; I believe it is convenient to spell them out at once.

The first has to do with the use of regional entities, states, as units of analysis. It has been argued that this is a way of substituting the concrete reality of social classes by the abstract formalism of geographical entities, thus covering up the actual political realities under study.

This objection can be answered at several levels. The first and simpler is that social classes are not the only “"real" aspect of the social system. Moreover, social events of all kinds, including those related to social stratification, tend to be unevenly distributed in space, and information tends to be gathered and presented according to geographic units. This information gives sociological, political and economic content to geographic categories, in such a way that, when references are made to these units, they emerge loaded with significance. At this level, then, geographical or ecological units are merely shorthand and a convenience, given the lack of direct observation of social units.

At another level, however, it can be argued that geographic units can have a sociological relevance of their own. The obvious example is the nation-state, necessarily bounded by territorial limits. The situation of states in federative nations such as the United States, Brazil and Argentina

16 Samuel P. Huntington (1957).

17 An example of a clear identification between the military establishment and class origins is of course Prussia. Cf. Hans Rosemberg (1966).

can vary a great deal. In the Brazilian case, it can be argued that the political role of the main states, Minas, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, was more explicit during the Old Republic than in the Empire or nowadays. This is certainly reflected in the legal order which granted much more autonomy to the states in the Old Republic than in the two other periods. What really matters, however, is that this autonomy corresponded to a very active role by these geographic units. The explanation for this activity at the regional level must certainly be given in sociological, political, and economic terms, and not in terms of the constitutional arrangements of the time; but these arrangements did have a well-known cause and fairly well defined consequences. In other words, the question of the "reality's' of regional and ecological units is not a matter of conceptual or legal definition; rather, it should be evaluated and decided empirically in every case.

More generally, there is the idea that regional variables and processes are to be seen not in opposition to, but in addition to other elements of the social structure, including its class and group differentiations. The recent developments in the fields of regional economics, the widespread concern with problems of income distribution and concentration of wealth among northern and southern Brazilian states, the known relevance of center-periphery relationship problems in all areas of social behavior--all should be enough to make justifications for a regional approach unnecessary. But, very often, regional analysis encounters the same kind of problems that made it so difficult for early twentieth century internationalists to perceive the relevance of nation-states. They had discovered an important truth--that economic realities often cross national boundaries--but this seemed to blind them to the realities of nationalism which were to dominate in the years to come. There is a new version of internationalism which places the international lines of class cleavage not within the countries, but between them, making it compatible with contemporary nationalism. When applied to the analysis of regional processes within the country, this new perspective seems to allow only for the perception of regional oppositions which could be translated in terms of classes (rich and poor, exploiter and exploited states, and so on), but little else.

In short, an approach which takes regions into consideration, when properly performed, adds to the traditional view of political systems, in terms of classes and groups, the notions of spatial distribution, boundaries, differences in historical development, and all kinds of spatial discontinuities which are bound to have some influence on large-scale social systems. Moreover, as in the Brazilian case, regional analysis brings into focus historical phenomena of paramount importance which have been shielded from view by the standard, undifferentiated image of “the nation" as a whole.

The second kind of intellectual procedure is more difficult to describe, and is potentially more damaging in the reactions it could bring about. It consists of attempts to discuss theoretical stands in terms of what I believe to be their implicit paradigms, rather than their explicit formulations. For instance, no Brazilian social scientist ignores the profound differences between São Paulo and Minas Gerais, or is unaware of the special role played by São Paulo in the country's political history. However, as I try to show, this knowledge does not seem to have permeated the analysis of several of these social scientists, since they seem to be unable to incorporate their factual knowledge into their theory. Another example is the reference I make to the Marxist notion of political systems as "superstructure” and some of its theoretical consequences. I am perfectly aware that several authors, who call themselves Marxists, have offered new, complex and

sophisticated versions of this, which I cannot fully account for in my discussion. What matters in this context, however, is the prevalence of a particular view of the political system as a predominant paradigm in several authors' interpretations, regardless of their Marxist orthodoxy or their awareness of the problem. Again, I am concerned with the conceptual difficulties that this paradigm can bring to the proper understanding of the role of the state in the political system, and not with a discussion on the orthodoxy of a given theoretical stand, which may eventually emerge as a by-product when questions such as these are approached.

It should be clear, after this introduction, that this will not be an interpretation of Brazilian "uniqueness," but rather an attempt to show how the complexity of Brazil's political reality can be tackled by means of a well-articulated and general analytical framework. This means that the basic aim is to explore the limits of this framework, its suitability, and its explanatory power. This leads to a second point: I will seldom be presenting new data, or using information based on original field research. Recent years have produced several important works in contemporary Brazilian history, politics, and sociology, and I will rely heavily on these sources.[18] The value of this work- if it has one - lies in the way I believe all this information should be brought together.

18 The nature of the sources demand a great number of quotations in the text. I have decided to translate all the Portuguese quotations into English. When the translation was particularly difficult, or when it was impossible to keep the historical flavor of the reference in the English version, the original text is transcribed in a footnote. References in French or Spanish are not translated.

CHAPTER 2: PATRIMONIALISM AND REGIONALIZATION: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

If one wants to go deeper into the study of a given political system, it is obvious that one should move from the analysis of the overall political system into the study of regional differences and subsystems; and the larger the population and geographical area covered by the national system, the more important this analysis becomes. In other words, the closer and deeper we look into something we are trying to understand, the better. In this chapter, however, the idea goes much further than that. The proposition is that the analysis of regional subsystems, when properly performed, implies a profound shift of theoretical perspectives, in such a way that the kind of knowledge which is acquired is not simply "better" than before, but qualitatively more adequate. The gain is not simply a matter of added knowledge, but a new way of understanding.

This notion of a new theoretical approach stemming from an analysis of regional differentiations has already been indicated in the introduction, in reference to the role of the state of São Paulo in the Brazilian national system[19]. It was suggested that São Paulo should neither be considered a "deviant" case in the national picture, nor a representative of a "more advanced" stage of development in the country. Two facts suffice to illustrate this point. One is the weakness of the national political parties in the state of São Paulo during the 1945-1964 period; this reflects the relative marginality of the country's economic center as regards the national party system[20]. The other is the relative equilibrium between the processes of urbanization and industrialization, which the state underwent during this century. This differs markedly from the process of urbanization without industrialization which occurred in other metropolitan areas of the country. To consider São Paulo a "deviant" case would mean explaining away the historical role of the country's most important area in terms of its economy and population: this is obviously not admissible. And there are no reasons to believe that the present metropolitan areas of the country, such as Rio, Belo Horizonte, Recife and others, will eventually replicate the Paulista pattern of intensive industrialization, leading a process of urban concentration.

Nor is São Paulo the only deviant case. The state of Rio Grande do Sul, bordering Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, has historically played in the national system a political role quite out of proportion to its size and economic weight.[21] Rio Grande do Sul is not a region of traditional politics, based on local bonds and loyalties in a stagnant economy. It has never been a dominant economic pole, or the administrative center of the country; on the contrary, it is a frontier state, thousands of miles away from the country's capital. But this geographical marginality seems to have placed the state in the very center of national politics since at least the end of the nineteenth century. The special role of Rio de Janeiro, as the seat of the national government, is probably

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19 For São Paulo's role in the Brazilian political and economic systems, especially before 1945, see Warren Dean (1969), and chapter IV and V, below.

20 See chapter vi, below

21 For the role of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazilian regional politics, see Joseph L. Love (1971). For a scholarly account of the social and political fabric of Rio Grande do Sul in the nineteenth century, see Fernando H. Cardoso (1962).

easier to understand; the same applies to the state of Minas Gerais, which is closer to what "traditional" politics is supposed to be, in historical terms.

We have, in short, at least four main regional actors in the political system, which behave in quite different ways, and have important but sometimes unexpected impact on the national system: the economic center (São Paulo), the urban and administrative center (Rio de Janeiro), the traditional countryside (Minas Gerais) and the frontier state (Rio Grande do Sul). To describe the theoretical framework of their interaction is the objective of this chapter.[22]

1. State and society

Stein Rokkan has presented us with a highly sophisticated and complex framework for the study of nation building and the development of political and party cleavages in Western Europe.[23] It would probably be unwise to apply his whole analytical framework directly to the study of the Brazilian political system; but it is essential to bear it in mind as we try to unfold the variables which characterize Brazil's regional differences and national integration process in a more inductive and, as it were, "natural" way.

The point of departure is the classic distinction between state and society. It is well known today that there are substantial differences between the meaning of the word "state" in the Anglo-Saxon and in other intellectual traditions; these differences reflect real historical differences, and explain the relative "statelessness" of Anglo-Saxon political theory. J.P. Nettl has argued in favor of using the "variable degree of stateness" as a central variable in cross-national studies[24]; Reinhardt Bendix, in an earlier paper, made a similar suggestion[25].

The essential idea is that the State is not only a concept referring to the integration and sovereignty of a given population in a given territory - in which case the notion of different levels or "degrees of stateness" would be meaningless - but is also a specific institution within a country which not only performs the functions of boundary maintenance and sovereignty, but can also be

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22 It is important to note that I am leaving two important states, Bahia and Pernambuco, out of the picture: these states were national, political and economic centers in the colonial period, but have suffered a marked process of political "atimie." I am assuming that they fall into the traditional pattern typified by Minas Gerais, but this is certainly a simplification which should be accepted only with caution.

23 Stein Rokkan (forthcoming), and (1967). Charles Tilly has suggested an extremely interesting framework for the analysis of Western European nation-building which is within the same perspective. Cf. Charles Tilly (forthcoming).

24 J. P. Nettl (1968). The relative "statelessness" of American social science coincides with the relative statelessness of the United States, with the long period during which the egalitarian and pluralistic society predicted with sensitive fingertips by Tocqueville was becoming institutionalized over a vast continent. One has only to read Lipset or Mitchell to see that an American socio-political self-examination simply leaves no room for any valid notion of state.

25 Reinhard Bendix (1966).

smaller or bigger, stronger or weaker, independent of or controlled by other social groups and institutions. In other words, there is here a shift from a functional to a more structural perspective, that is, the State is considered as an institution endowed with a changing structure of its own.

Both Bendix and Nettl place these different conceptions of the State in historical and theoretical perspectives. Bendix emphasizes the existence of two main approaches in political theory since Machiavelli. The first and older of these approaches is Machiavelli's own: he thinks of political facts and events as functions of the abilities and virtues of the political leader, the Prince. Generally speaking, this tradition leads to a perception of the State as a unit which organizes the will and aspirations of the society as a whole, defining and working towards society's goals. The ruler is not responsive to the ruled, whereas the social structure seems to offer no resistance to the Prince: the only limitations to his will are his own fancy and wit. This, of course, is an extreme conception, which has the absolutist state as its implicit empirical reference.

The other theoretical tradition stems from Rousseau: the power of the State is a delegation of "the people" and the government must act in accordance with an explicit and well- limited social contract. The idea of a social contract has a meaning which is ideological and normative, since it appeared in the struggle against absolutism: but it also has sociological value in that it is an empirical statement on how politics is performed, when social groups are strong and the government is weak. The contractualist notion of the State was equivalent to a Copernican revolution in political thought, leading to a shift in perspective which led, quite often, to the very obliteration of the State as an autonomous variable worthy of the political analyst's attention. As a matter of fact, in this extreme view, the State is nothing but the locus through which the dominant groups or classes exercise their will: it has no political texture of its own.

As seen through the criticism which Marx addresses to his *Philosophy of Law*[26], it is Hegel who opens the way for the analysis of the relationships between the State and civil society as separate and often contradictory structures. Hegel distinguishes between civil society, which is the state of necessity, and the State, which represents the general will, the unity of political life. More specifically, civil society is for Hegel the Phenomenon of the State, while the State is the Idea of society. The Idea is incorporated in the Sovereign and the Constitution, and the mediation between the Idea and society is performed by several intervening institutions, such as public opinion, civilian group representation in the State, the bureaucracy, and so on.[27]

One of the main points of Marx's criticism is the stress he places on the private character of bureaucracy. For Hegel, bureaucracy is the soul of the State, and the private activities of civil servants perform a universal function. In Marx's opinion, however, the bureaucrat ends up making this universal function his private business. For Hegel, bureaucracy has, as its first assumption, the autonomy and organization of civil society in private corporations. The choice of civil servants and public authorities is conceived as a mixed choice, initiated in the private sector and approved

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26 Cf. G. W. Hegel (1940), especially after page 255.

27 I am here following the discussion of Jean Hippolyte (1965) which refers to the classic work of G. Luckacz on the young Hegel.

by the Sovereign. The fact is, says Marx, that this kind of penetration by civil society into the State leads to nothing but the creation of another kind of private corporation, the bureaucracy:

> The corporations are the materialism of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy is the spiritualism of the corporations; but the corporation is the bureaucracy of civil society, and the bureaucracy is the corporation of the State.

And, later on:

> The bureaucracy keeps in its power the being of the State, the spiritual being of society: it is its private property. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is its mystery; this mystery is kept inside the bureaucracy by its hierarchy, and kept from the outside because the bureaucracy has the characteristics of a private corporation. To make the spirit of the State known to everybody is thus perceived by the bureaucracy as a treason to its mystery. The principle of bureaucratic science is thus *authority* and the idolatry of authority its *sentiment*. Kept within the bureaucracy, this spiritualism becomes a *sordid materialism*, the materialism of passive obeisance, of faith in authority, of the *mechanicism* of fixed formal activities, of fixed principles, ideas and traditions. For the bureaucrat taken as an individual, the goals of the State become his private goal, which is *the hunting for higher positions, the push on the way up.* [28]

This notion of a bureaucracy with private interests includes, of course, the conception of the State as the political arm of a given social class, but it is more general than that. Nettl discusses this in some length, and shows how "Marx partially lost interest in the problem of the state when he moved intellectually as well as physically from Europe to England and when, in writing Das Kapital, he concentrated on the much more "English" analysis of economic forces and consequent class relations rather than on the problems of ideological consciousness and revolution in a state-dominated Europe."[29]

Bendix shows how Machiavelli himself recognized the existence of two types of government, one carried on by "the Prince and his servants" and the other by "the Prince and his Barons".[30] While, in the first type, the Prince is the only source of power, in the latter there are rights of political influence which are obtained through heritage and do not depend on the Prince's favor. This second type of political power characterizes a state of equilibrium between the central power and what would later be called "civil society"; each has some autonomy of decisions and initiative, and tries to limit and direct the behavior of the other. The fact that the "Barons" are just a tiny group of aristocrats is less important, theoretically, than the notion that their sources of power do not come from the Prince.

Once this duality of power sources is established, it expands and differentiates in several directions. What is important is the idea that this is not simply a matter of functional differentiation, in which the State performs the political functions of vertical authority and domination, while "the

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28 This is a free translation of the French version of Karl Marx (1937)

29 Nettl (1968), p. 572. The main reference here is Eugene Kamenka (1962).

30 N. Machiavelli (1940), p. 15, quoted by R. Bendix (1960), p. 360.

Barons" retain the horizontal functions of solidarity, interest aggregation, and articulation. What happens, in fact, is that aggregation and articulation of private interests are carried on within the structures of authority, while systems of authority develop within the "private" sector of society and reach towards the control of the state. The actual balance between these two tendencies varies, and has to be determined empirically. The more significant theoretical point here is that the characteristics of a given state' s structure cannot be fully deduced from the characteristics of its "civil society" (or, in contemporary terms, its class structure), just as society cannot be fully understood from the formal characteristics of its governmental organization.

2. Patrimonialism and the growth of the state

In the contractual model, the government does not have power of its own: civil society delegates it power and provides it with resources. In fact, as demonstrated in Marx's criticism of Hegel's *Theory of Law*, the organization which performs this delegation develops private resources and private interests. This occurs when the State acts by delegation of the "whole society," as well as when it behaves more or less clearly as "the instrument" of a given class. One of the reasons for this is, of course, the sheer growth and differentiation of the government. From the theoretical role of a simple gendarme and mediator, the "stateless" state of the nineteenth century, referred to by Nettl, develops into a giant which makes the simple interest-group approach to political analysis little more than a historical relic. E. E. Schattschneider stressed this point very strongly:

> While we were looking the other way, the government of the United States became a global operation a decade or two ago. The budget is about 250 times as large as it was seventy years ago (. . .) In a purely formal sense we can say that the government of the United States is the same one that was established in 1789 - in about the same way in which Henry Ford's bicycle repair shop is the same as the Ford Motor Company today.[31]

What is most remarkable about the American system is not so much this development in itself, as the fact that it did not lead to a more thorough annihilation of independent power sources. American liberalism, according to one of its critics, Theodore J. Lowi, means just the opposite, since it leads to the privatization of the public sector.

Referring to the agricultural sector, for instance, Lowi sees it as an extreme case of "private expropriation of public authority." "This is the feudal pattern," he continues, "fusion of all statuses and functions and governing through rigid but personalized fealties. In modern dress, that was the corporativistic way."[32] The difference between this neo-corporatism of the Liberal State and the Corporative State as such is that, in the latter, the State behaves explicitly and legitimately on behalf of a group which has control over the state apparatus as the basis, rather than as an instrument, of its social, economic, and political power.

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31 E. E. Schattschneider (1960), pp. 116-117.

32 Theodore J. Lowi (1969), p. 102.

The idea of economic power based on the State, and not the opposite (that is, political power based on economic resources) is difficult to accept in "stateless" political theories, and this helps to explain the odyssey of the "Asian mode of production" in Marxian literature.[33] As it appears in the relatively recently rediscovered *Grundrisse*,[34] this concept applies to some pre-capitalist forms of economic organization, which are characterized by the partial or total existence of private property, or at least by the existence of a predominant public sector in the economy:

> Étant le véritable propriétaire et la véritable condition de la propriété collective, l'unité peut elle-même sembler distincte et au-dessus de la multitude des communautés particulières: l'individu est alors, en fait, sans propriété.[35]

Marx distinguishes two subtypes of these pre-capitalist forms: one generally based on the large-scale organization of rural economies, usually through nationally-integrated systems of water irrigation works, and another based instead on urban centers, where

> La guerre est donc la grand tache collective, le grand travail commun, exigés soit pour s'emparer des conditions matérielles d'existence, soit pour défendre et perpétuer l'occupation.[36]

There is no need to go further into the expanding debate which still revolves around the concept of "Asiatism." It is enough to keep in mind that this type of economic and political organization does not fit the evolutionary model which goes from slavery to serfdom to wage labor and capitalism, a model in which the interest-group-politics concept belongs, and which is more or less implicit in the "stateless" theories of social development.[37] It is a fact that the Western states which attained high levels of development during this century have more or less followed that pattern, and there is a high correlation between a decentralized and feudal-like system in the past and high economic development in this century. "Hydraulic societies," bureaucratic and centralized empires of the past were way ahead of medieval Europe, according to almost any standards of development, but they did not seem to have been able to adapt themselves to modern industrial society; whereas countries with a feudal past (the only one in Asia which comes close to it being Japan) were much more able to adopt modern and efficient forms of economic organization. Thus--and contrary to what is sometimes held--feudalism does not seem to have been a factor of underdevelopment; on the contrary, it was its absence, and the dominance of a

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33 For a lengthy discussion of the concept and its history and fate in the Marxist literature, cf. Karl A. Wittfogel (1957), chapter IX.

34 First published in Russia in 1939. Translated into French by Roger Dangeville. The reference is from

Karl Marx (1967), Vol. I, p. 437.

35 Marx (1967), p. 439.

36 Marx (1967), p. 439.

37 This model is explicit in Engel's *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State*. See its discussion in K. Wittfoge1 (1957), p. 382 and ff.

bureaucratized and overgrown state, which seem to have been the determinants of underdevelopment. Having arrived late in a world developed through capitalist initiative, these underdeveloped countries have only their own inflated states to bring them into the world of industrial development.[38]

3. Cleavages in patrimonial states

The concept of "patrimonialism" acquires its full characterization in Max Weber, who refers to a type of traditional domination where the government "is an extension of the ruler's household." It is essential to recall that this concept is used as an alternative to another major type of traditional domination, feudalism.[39] There are a few characteristics of patrimonialism which lead more or less directly to the political cleavages which are bound to appear in states with this type of domination.

First, patrimonial states tend to be urban-based, and to develop urban civilizations. These urban centers can be either the capital of an empire, or a city-state with trade and military interests abroad. These centers tend to have a sizable floating population, and an aristocracy which has to be fitted somehow into the governmental bureaucracy. The first political problem of patrimonial states is keeping the urban masses content, and keeping the government jobs open to the urban aristocracy.

Second, there is the classic tension between the ruler and his officers: "All patrimonial states of the past have involved a pattern of decentralization that has been determined by the struggle for power between the ruler and his retainers and officers."[40] As the patrimonial realm grows, so grows the need to delegate power and authority, and at the same time the feasibility of central control is reduced. Moreover, retainers of patrimonial delegation tend to receive their posts as political prebends, and to use them as their private property. When the patrimonial state is based on military conquest and occupation, this pattern leads to the development of private, or praetorian military bodies, which have more loyalty to their own captains than to the ruler. When the patrimonial state is based on agriculture, regional atomization occurs and semi-autonomous satraps emerge.

The third type involves a pattern of continuous belligerency between the patrimonial state and other states at its borders. It is reasonable to suppose, in fact, that military occupation and direct exploitation are simply extreme cases of patrimonial military expansion. The history of the old empires, including the Roman Empire, shows a clear pattern of expansion which includes, first, military occupation, looting and enslavement of part of the local population; afterwards, the establishment of some kind of federation between conqueror and conquered, very often

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38 The classical reference for the role of the State in the development of latecomers to the industrial world is, of course, Alexander Gerschenkron (1962). See chapter VII, below, for a broader discussion.

39 R. Bendix (1960), p. 360.

40 R. Bendix (1960), p. 348.

maintaining the local ruling class in its positions. The rationale for this arrangement is obvious, since the maintenance of the local economic and political structure assures a continuous flow of revenue towards the patrimonial state, through levies and taxes of all kinds, which cannot be kept flowing in predatory conquests. The maintenance of this kind of local autonomy means that some power remains outside the state, and that tensions and conflicts are bound to arise.

A not altogether different situation occurs when some forms of autonomous activity emerges within the patrimonial dominion, with or without the ruler's consent and intention. One pattern here is the emergence of some industry or agriculture for the foreign market, which is heavily taxed by the state. The state stimulates this activity, but at the same time functions as a parasite, which limits and eventually kills autonomous activity. In the "hydraulic" type of society, the situation is different: here the government plays a direct and active role in the organization and administration of the economy. In the pattern above, however, all the initiative comes from the private sphere, and the role of the state is almost purely fiscal. In absolutist Europe, this process was evidenced in the emergence of strong trade and industrial centers, which paralleled the progressive decay of feudal power. Eventually, it led to the emergence of bourgeois aspirations and values, which brought about the destruction of the patrimonial state. Actually, in his analysis of Weber's theories on the emergence of legal rationality, Bendix shows that "in Western Europe patrimonial power eventually promoted the formal rationality of law and administration, and this conflicts with the tendency of patrimonial rulers to promote substantive justice and personal favoritism." This process is explained by Weber, among other things, as a consequence of the central government's need to restrain the power pretensions of vassals and office-holders. This was done through the establishment of a "centrally-controlled officialdom," and "in the struggle against the entrenched position of the states, patrimonial rulers were frequently supported by the rising bourgeoisie."[41]

It is fairly clear from the foregoing discussion that patrimonialism of the Western European kind, as it existed in absolutist regimes, was very different from other versions. The main difference consists in the fact that Western European patrimonialism was strengthened together with the emergence of the bourgeoisie; at the end of the process, the system of legal domination, which succeeded the absolutist regimes, was mostly contractual and most suited to modern capitalism. It would certainly be possible to trace the differences between the "state" and "stateless" societies, suggested by Nettl, back to the varying balance between bourgeois and patrimonial powers in the struggle against the remains of the feudal, corporatist society. It is remarkable that Weber himself does not seem to have elaborated on the structural conditions which could have explained the differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental European systems of legal rationality and authority. These differences are minimal, nevertheless, when compared to the systems of those states which evolved from an original patrimonial system to a modern centralized state, without the mediation of a "bourgeois" revolution. These states are certainly capable to modernizing and rationalizing their bureaucracies, but their power bases and political systems must necessarily be quite different from those of Western democracies. And these make up, of course, the bulk of today's non-western countries.

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41 R. Bendix (1960), pp. 405-406.

4. A fourfold regionalization

The previous discussion presents a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the four types of Brazilian regions, suggested at the beginning. The gap between the theoretical discussion and the Brazilian case can now be filled by showing how the Brazilian system of regions belongs to a more general type, a species related to the historical presence of a patrimonial state.

That Portugal did not fit the classic European type of feudal organization is a fact which seems to be agreed upon by most historians:

> [Portuguese] nobility, according to Antonio de Souza, never plunged its roots into the countryside, nor had it ever had a civilizing, directive and protective role for the local population; it was rather a parasite living off the population and the central power.[42]

Power was concentrated in the House of Avis, and this helps to explain the remarkable entrepreneurial push which fifteenth and sixteenth-century Portugal showed. The centralized, bureaucratic and patrimonial structure of the government was transplanted in Brazil, first with the establishment of the General Government in 1548 and, much later, with the migration of the whole Portuguese court to Rio in 1808.[43] Since Brazil's independence was declared in 1822 by a member of the Portuguese royalty, the line of continuity was never completely broken; this is important for an understanding of the stable institutionalization of the Brazilian government, during the colonial period and later) during the second half of the nineteenth century. It is worth noting that, prior to the establishment of the General Government in 1548, a system of feudal-like captaincies was promoted, without success. These captaincies were transmitted from father to son, and the Portuguese Crown had to buy one of them back when the General Government was created.[44] The system of captaincies did not work out, the historians say, but two of them enjoyed some success. One was Pernambuco, where the sugar culture flourished as the colony's main product during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The other was São Vicente, later known as the Province and State of São Paulo.

This brief overview sketches three of our main region-types. One of these is the government capital, Rio de Janeiro. This is the country's most modern area: it has more direct contact with European life, and its culture and consumption are more conspicuous. It has also tended to be an area of marginal population and underemployment. According to the 1890 Census of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, about 50 per cent of its employees were in "domestic services" or had "undeclared" professions. Race was obviously related to this, since slavery had been abolished only two years earlier. But the differences are not that great: 76 per cent of the blacks and 53 per

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42 S. Buarque de Holanda (1960), p. 18 (my translation).

43 The main source for the analysis of Portuguese patrimonialism in Brazil is Raymundo Faoro (1958). For an overview of Spanish patrimonialism, see Magali Sarfatti (1966).

44 E. Bradford Burns (1970), p. 24: “Those inalienable land grants transmitted by inheritance to the oldest son brought to the New World some of the residues of feudalism long on the wane in the Iberian peninsula.”

cent of the mulattoes were in this group, but also 43 per cent of the whites, which represented 62.5 per cent of the whole "employed" population.[45] This mass of marginal population was certainly a nuisance to the elite, which had to reckon with them occasionally when they became restless.[46] Usually, however, Rio presented a picture of popular politics and mass participation which had little to do with how things were actually decided. In this sense, it did not differ much from the other administrative capitals of non-industrial societies. Its economic resources were derived from trade and governmental employment, and its political life was characterized by some degree of tension between the urban bureaucrats and tradesmen, on the one hand, and a dependent regional gentry on the other, with occasional mobilization of the populace. Election turnout never went above 5 per cent of the total population before 1930: this gives us the overall pattern of political participation.

Nineteenth and early twentieth-century Rio de Janeiro could be broadly described as a "pre-industrial city." This concept was used by Gideon Sjoberg to characterize those urban structures which, according to him, had developed in feudal societies, where industrial development had not yet begun. In a footnote, Sjoberg tries to reduce the difference between European and non-European pre-industrial towns:

> Henri Pirenne, in *Medieval Cities*, and others have noted that European cities grew up in opposition to and were separate from the greater society. But this thesis has been overstated for Medieval Europe. Most industrial cities are integral parts of broader social structures.[47]

The main difficulty with the notion of pre-industrial city is, of course, the theory of unilinear development which it implies, and which considers the feudal system the sole predecessor of modern societies. This point is taken up in a rebuttal to Sjoberg's book written by Oliver C. Cox[48], who states that even in medieval Europe the cities developed outside the feudal structure; he considers Sjoberg' s notion of pre-industrial city little more than a residual concept.

Cox's criticism of Sjoberg's argument is convincing, but has little to offer in return. The best theoretical clue, not surprisingly, can be found in Max Weber's distinction between occidental

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45 Data recalculated from Herbert S. Klein (1969), p. 50. The original source is the Diretoria Geral de Estatística (1895).

46 Rio has traditionally been the place for popular mobilization on political issues. One of the most well-known examples is the abolitionist campaign in the late nineteenth century; another was the rebellion of the Rio population in 1904 against compulsory smallpox vaccination. Edgar Carone gives a good example both of public proximity and public impotence in political issues in a quotation from an eyewitness of the 1889 coup, which established the Republic“For the time being, the Government is purely military, and will remain this way. Theirs was the event, only theirs, because the cooperation of the civilian element was almost non-existent. The people followed all this stupefied, surprised, without knowing what it meant. Many believed that it was a military parade. It was something worth seeing. The enthusiasm came later . . . [From a letter of Aristides Lobo, a newsman, quoted in Edgar Carone (1969), p. 288. My translation]

47 Gideon Sjoberg (1960).

48 Oliver C. Cox (1964).

and oriental cities.[49] For him, "the residence of the ruler or of any administrative body being the focal point for the whole country or region is the most important feature in the structure and functioning of oriental cities." In contrast, occidental cities are endowed with "corporate autonomy and autocephaly."[50] The theoretical consequences of these differences are innumerable, and have to do with differences in social stratification, the role of the army, the existence of autonomous economic activities, education, and so on. These differences are not, of course, a matter of geography, but have to do with the differences between the patrimonial and the feudal variants of traditional domination. City politics in Rio de Janeiro was most certainly "local," in the sense that its bearing on national events was minimal; but the same cannot be said of the politics of its elite, which was eminently national.

The second region is the so-called "traditional" reverse of the bureaucratic and urban capital. Brazilian "traditional" regions have little in common with what appears as "traditionalism" in the standard literature on underdevelopment and modernization. This literature usually considers as "traditional" those peasant or otherwise non-industrial societies which suffer the impact of modernization and industrialization.[51] These traditional societies are, supposedly, in a primitive stage of social and economic development, and the corresponding sociological literature deals with the cultural, emotional and social obstacles to modern values, life-styles and patterns of behavior.[52]

In Brazil, as in some other countries, "traditional" areas are not areas which have not modernized, but, on the contrary, tend to be those which have had a period of progress in the past, and then suffered a process of economic decay. The old sugar culture area of the Northeast and the former mining areas of Minas Gerais are probably the best examples of Brazilian traditionalism: both have a past of wealth and national economic pre-eminence. One of the most obscure, but more interesting questions about Brazilian economic and political history is what happens with these areas when they lose their export capabilities and recede into the shadow of history.[53] In the case of Minas Gerais, the exhaustion of the mining activities by the second half of the eighteenth century left the province with the largest population in the country, mostly centered in urban

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49 Max Weber (1958).

50 Vatro Murvaer (1966).

51 Classic references here are E. Banfield (1958), and Daniel Lerner (1958). Implicit in Banfield's work is the assumption that, as people become less backward, their frame of reference expands from "amoral-familism" to "public regardiness" (the presence of "public-regardiness"in the North American upper strata was tested, quite unsuccessfully, in J. Q. Wilson and E. C. Banfield (1964).) Lerner's relevance in the sociology of development also should not be minimized. According to Bendix (1970), "the great merit of Lerner' s study consists in its candid use of Western modernization as a model of global applicability," p. 250.

52 For instance, Lucien Pye (1962).

53 This process of economic decay and the mechanisms of adjustment are the subject of Antonio Barros de Castro (1971). For an analysis of the economic mechanisms behind the growing inequalities between the Northeast and the Southwest of Brazil, see Nathaniel H. Leff (1972).

settlements, and with no major economic activity of high profitability The other thing that remained was, most probably, the bureaucratic structure of the Portuguese administration, and this was certainly the means through which the political vocation of the Minas Gerais elite was born.

V. 0. Key's *Southern Politics* is probably the best description of a political system which survives a process of political decay - in this case, the period after the South's defeat in the Civil War (the eleven states studied by Key are also those of the Southern Confederacy). He shows that these states have at least one common trait with the Brazilian states of the Old Republic, namely the one-party system. Key's analysis of the behavior of Southern senators suggests a very consistent pattern: they unite whenever the state's autonomy is at stake, whenever the racial *status quo* is threatened, and whenever the national Democratic government needs their support. The arrangement is fairly clear: the Southern Democrats support the government in exchange for control in their own states. In spite of these well-defined patterns, Southern politics is usually "issueless," since even the racial question tends not to be raised. One-party systems, oligarchic control of the state political machinery, little popular participation, large rural properties in a decaying economy - all these similarities with traditional Minas Gerais are not purely coincidental. The main difference, of course, is that whereas the Confederate states had been defeated by the industrialized North, in Brazil, the political hegemony of the industrial center was never the case[54].

The smallest unit in traditional politics of this kind is the local community in the countryside, where the local chieftain (in Brazil, the *coronel*) exerts his power. A sizable portion of Brazilian political literature has been devoted to examining the patterns of political traditionalism at the grassroots.[55] The most successful theoretical attempts are those that interpret local and regional political preeminence as a function of the brokerage roles played by the political leaders in local, state, and national governments.[56] It is important to note that this interpretation does not imply that control of the land, family ties, loyalties, and personal allegiances had no role in politics. All of these "traditional" elements were certainly present in different degrees, but they worked within a context of economic decay and a predominant bureaucratic government at the state and national level.

The third region, São Paulo, displays most important differences. Since the very beginning of the country's history, the former Captaincy of São Vicente developed independently of the central administration. São Vicente was the first settlement which moved from the coast to the hinterland, in open contradiction to the general settlement policy of the Portuguese Crown.[57] The

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54 3V. 0. Key (1949), especially chapter xvi, "Solidarity in the Senate."

55 For a review of this literature, see José Murilo de Carvalho (1968). Glaucio Soares, in a forthcoming book on the 1945-64 period, has shown in a typology of Brazilian grassroots politics that the traditional "colonel" type of local politics is just one kind of local power, more typical of Minas Gerais than of São Paulo. Cf. Glaucio A. D. Soares (1971).

56 The best theoretical interpretation of local politics in "traditional" Brazil is certainly Antonio Octavio Cintra (1971). See also chapter IV, below.

57 Sergio Buarque de Holanda (1960), pp. 129-30: “But São Paulo's case where the colonos and their descendants - white or mestizo - preferred the interior to the coast is, in any case an exception. In the rest of Brazil,

history of the expansion of São Vicente includes Indian-hunting expeditions, which penetrated further and further South, resulting in a military clash with Spanish Jesuit missions; expeditions in search of gold and gems, which ended in a clash with other immigrants from Rio and the North in the mining areas, during the Emboabas war;[58] and a conspicuous absence of the Province of São Paulo from the forefront of national events, until the explosion of coffee plantations in the nineteenth century.

This is not the place for a history of the spectacular development of São Paulo from the late nineteenth century onwards, nor for a discussion of its political role within the national picture. It is enough to recall that, after the 1940 census, it was the largest Brazilian state in terms of population, and had for a long time been the main source of taxes for the central government and the center of the country's industrialization. Politically, São Paulo has been less important than its size and economic weight would suggest; and, in 1932, it was the last Brazilian state to rise in arms against the central government.[59]

This pattern of relationships between administrative and economic centers is not a Brazilian peculiarity; it is a more general phenomenon shared by those countries which experienced some industrial development in the setting of a strong patrimonial-like state.

Juan Linz finds in Spain the same "paradox" that we find in Brazil:

> Paradoxically, in the recent history of Spain, the most developed regions have felt alienated from the nation-state. Having "economic power" and well-being, they felt, rightly or wrongly, deprived of "political power."[60]

The differences between Madrid and Barcelona, as expressed in the table below, are strikingly similar to those we might find between Rio and São Paulo:

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for a long time, the rule was to follow the classic settlement patterns of Portuguese colonizing activities which had been dictated by mercantile convenience and by the African and Asian experiences.

58 For a description of the Emboabas War against the Paulista explorers in Minas Gerais around 1700, see S. Buarque de Holanda (1960), pp. 297-369, and chapter III, below.

59 Actually, after 1932, Minas Gerais rebelled twice against the central government; once, through a "Manifesto dos Mineiros," against the Vargas dictatorship, and later with the government of Magalhães Pinto against Joao Goulart, in 1964. In both cases, the central government was soon to be overthrown by the army. The São Paulo governor, Adhemar de Barros, also threatened to set his state against Goulart in 1964. This attempt, however, was less consonant with the national civil-military movement, and his own political survival was not maintained. The differences in the patterns of success and failure are significant.

60 Juan Linz (1966), p. 278 ff. See the tables comparing Brazil and Spain, below. Juan Linz gives some "soft" data which cannot easily be reproduced for Brazil. Alfred Stepan, nevertheless, makes an explicit parallel between Madrid - Barcelona and Rio - São Paulo when referring to the recruitment of cadets for Brazilian military school. He shows that, in the 1964-66 period, São Paulo had 18.3 per cent of the Brazilian population but only 8.26 per cent of the Army cadets, giving a ratio of about 5 to 10. The ratio for Rio de Janeiro was about 90 to 10, and for Rio Grande do Sul, 19 to 10. The ratio for Rio Grande in an earlier period is much higher. Alfred Stepan (1971), p. 38.

TABLE 1 SPAIN: BARCELONA AND MADRID		
	"Bourgeois" Spain (Barcelona)	Madrid
Population (1960)	24.20%	7.67%
Per capita income (national average=100)	16.4	131
Recruitment of Cabinet members in Franco regime	.85	6.25
Judges (1958)a	.58	3.24
University professors	.95	2.87

aRatio of the proportion born in each "Spain" and the proportion of the population living there in 1910 (taken as a date close to the birth year of the elites).

Source: Juan Linz, "The Eight Spains," in Rokkan and Merrit, Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press) 1966.

TABLE 2 BRAZIL: REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN FOUR STATES						
	% Population (1970)		% Income			
	urban	total	from industry	from agriculture	from the public sector	total
São Paulo	27.3	19.0	56.8	19.5	23.5	35.3
Minas Gerais	11.7	12.3	7.5	12.2	8.3	10.0
Rio de Janeiro (Guanabara)	8.2	4.6	9.7	0.6	25.2	11.4
Rio Grande do Sul	6.8	7.1	5.9	12.6	8.9	8.5
Sum of Four States	54.0	43.0	79.9	44.9	65.9	65.2
Brazil	100.%					

Source: Fundação IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Anuário Estatistico do Brasil, 1971.

Italy seems to be another case in point, with differences among the industrial Northern area, the urban and administrative Center, and the rural South, as can be seen in the table below:

TABLE 3 ITALY: RESIDENT FAMILIES BY BRANCH OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY AND BY REGIONS (%).				
	Population	Number of families with had of family working in		
Regions:		Industry	Agriculture	other activities
Settentrionale	44.8	56.4	35.5	47.1
Meridionale	18.5	17.5	16.0	22.4
Insulare	12.2	8.0	16.7	10.3
Total	100%			

Source: Calculated from Instituto Centrale de Statistica, *Compendio Statistico Italiano* (Roma), 1971, pps 21, 28-29.

A. F. Organski is aware of the regional discontinuities in Italy, and links the emergence of Fascism with them:

> Some regions modernize faster and further than others because of advantages in resources, available skills, communications with the outside world, or other reasons. Some nations modernize politically and remain backward economically. Other nations are highly urban before they are economically developed or politically modern . .. . In the degree of symmetry and the degree of continuity in the changes of these three sets of variables (social, economic and political modernization) lies a very large portion - certainly a major portion

- of the explanation for the appearance of fascist systems, the duration of their tenure, the variation in fascist political attitudes and behavior, and the manner and timing of the termination of the system.[61]

The assumption of unequal, but nevertheless unilinear development is probably the main weakness of this notion. Indeed, if "no nation develops in such a fashion that all regions and all aspects of national life keep in step with all the rest," it remains to be explained why only a few of these nations fall into the fascist pattern of political organization. The fact is that the differences are not just a matter of varying regional and functional rates of growth, but mostly a question of regional structural differentiation, which the imbalances of development reflect.

The fourth region is Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state in the country. Its history starts with the establishment of the Portuguese Colony of Sacramento at the border of the Rio de la Plata, followed almost immediately by an attack from the Spanish governor of Buenos Aires. During most of the eighteenth century, the region is the main point of friction between the Portuguese and the Spanish empires in America. After Brazil's Independence, the military nature of the province remains because of the conflicts between Brazil and Argentina concerning the control of what is today Uruguay, as well as because of the separatist revolutionary movements in Rio Grande, which always involved dealings with Argentine and Uruguayan rulers and *caudillos*.[62]

Stein Rokkan has captured an important aspect of European nation-building which, to some extent, parallels the process undergone by Rio Grande. He shows essentially two types of city-states developing in Europe: "The Swiss and Dutch confederations were essentially defensive in character: there was no strong conquest centre . . . , but a network of strategically placed cities willing to poll their resources in defense of their trading privileges.[63] To these typical "occidental" cities, he opposes another type, developed "at the edges" of the Old Roman Empire. "Paradoxically," he says, "the history of Europe is one of the centre formation at the periphery," and, more specifically:

> These power centers at the southeastern and northeastern corners of the territories of the Roman Church built up crusading frontier empires against the rival world region of the South. This helps to explain the very close symbiosis of Church and State in these empires: the military might of the State was a decisive instrument in the struggle for the expansion of Western Christendom . . . . The Iberian empires brought the same fervor of orthodoxy across the ocean to the New World: the conquest of Latin America produced an even stronger fusion of religious, political and economic institutions.[64]

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61 A. F. Organski (1969).

62 The best study on Rio Grande do Sul's political history in the twentieth century is certainly Joseph L. Love (1971). The Brazilian bibliography on the early period is quite extensive. For a detailed account of the conflicts with the Spanish colonies since the establishment of the Colonia de Sacramento, see Alcides Lima (1935). See chapter iv, below for a more extensive account.

63 Stein Rokkan (forthcoming), p. 21.

64 Stein Rokkan (forthcoming), pp. 23-24.

As in a system of Chinese boxes, Rio Grande seems to have played in Brazil the same role that Portugal and Spain did in Christian Europe: as a frontier military outpost, it developed its own orthodoxy, Positivism--a peculiar combination of military tradition and cattle-raising culture - and a strong state oligarchy, which gathered strength for the fights against the Spanish and "porteño" enemies in defense of the autonomy of the Brazilian Empire. The region was (and still is) the basis for the most important wing of the Brazilian Army and has historically furnished a sizable part of the army's cadres. It played a very active role in national politics since at least the creation of the Partido Republicano Riograndense in 1882, during the fall of the Empire in 1889, and thereafter. It came to national power in 1930 with Vargas, who was formerly the Governor of Rio Grande in behalf of the state boss Borges de Medeiros; with Vargas the "gauchos" literally hitched their horses to the national capital.[65] Vargas came to power again in 1950, Goulart in 1961, Costa e Silva and Médici after 1964; all these "gaucho" presidents testify to Rio Grande's remarkable vocation for national power, either through its civilian or its military sons.

This brief outline is too short to account for other important aspects of Rio Grande's role in Brazilian history. It would be important to take into account the state' s internal cleavages, and its special economic role as a supplier of goods to the national market, as well as the importance which early European immigration to the state had on the development of a highly productive agricultural system.[66] But the fact seems to remain that Rio Grande's political role at the national level has much more to do with its military, caudillo, revolutionary and oligarchic tradition than with the modern and European-like aspects of its economy and society.

5. Conclusion

Granting that the fourfold regionalization suggested here is relevant to the study of Brazilian political history, one might still wonder about its usefulness in the analysis of future outcomes in Brazilian politics.

The Brazilian political picture suffered a drastic change after 1945, with the granting of political suffrage to the entire adult literate population. The system of mass politics, which emerged after 1945, was superimposed on the regional cleavages, creating a rather complex pattern which I analyze elsewhere.[67] To the cleavage between the patrimonial and the capitalist areas of national politics, and the cleavages among center, periphery and frontier in the patrimonial state, another, involving issues of popular participation, was added. Basically, two dominant types of political participation emerged: one, along the Minas-Rio axis; the other, in the industrial areas of

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65 For the relationships between the Rio Grande "caudillos" and the army, see Sylvio Romero (1912). J. Love gives a detailed account of the role of Rio Grande in the "military question," which eventually led to the fall of the Empire. He also reproduces a photo of the gauchos hitching their horses to the obelisk on Rio's Avenida Rio Branco on November 1, 1930.

66 For the economic role of Rio Grande as a supplier of the internal market, see the chapter on "Extremo sul - o precoce desenvolvimento voltado para dentro," in Antonio Barros de Castro (1971), II.

67 See chapter VI, below

the country. The first was what can be called a "co-optation system," which is defined as a system of political participation in which governmental positions are sought, not so much as resources for implementing sectoral interests, but as a means of social mobility in themselves. The second, on the other hand, was closer to the classic concept of interest- group politics. There are rural and urban, as well as capitalist and working-class cleavages in each of these systems, making the simple number of possible combinations quite high. I believe that the regional context of the emergence of mass politics in Brazil is an essential clue to the understanding of this experience of representative democracy, if one intends to go deeper than the simple concepts of modernization, mobilization, massification or radicalization would allow.

Furthermore, the correct understanding of the 1945-64 system is indispensable if predictions about the political future of the country are to be made. It is clear, for instance, that this discussion shows the naivete of expecting a new party system to emerge in Brazil, in terms of interest-group representation. The present restrictions on political activity in the country cannot be taken as a simple consequence of the ideological preferences of the government: rather, they should be seen as the development of a historical tradition of governmental centralization and weak autonomous organizations. This means that, if the restrictions on political participation and mobilization were to be lifted, any workable political arrangement would have to be based on newly created forms of political organization, more in accordance with the realities of the country, and less as a function of the old-fashioned interest- group imagery. Once the search for these new forms begins, a correct view of the history of political cleavages in the country will be indispensable.

PART II - CONTEXT

CHAPTER 3 - HISTORICAL ORIGINS: CENTER AND PERIPHERY UNDER PORTUGUESE RULE

1. The public and private realms

Brazilian historiography on the colonial and imperial periods is extensive, and a detailed reconstruction of the territorial occupation of the country and its political implications would simply restate what can easily be read in several authoritative textbooks[68]. Instead, this chapter will deal with this period only insofar as it bears consequences on the system of regional cleavages which was to dominate the country's history thereafter. There is a clear link between the way one looks at the past and the perceptions one has about the present, as I will try to make explicit.

Nestor Duarte, a noted Brazilian publicist, represents one of the extreme interpretations of the country's system of political organization during colonial times. For him, the concept of power decentralization, embodied in a rural aristocracy scattered throughout Brazilian territory, is nothing but a first approximation of the essence of things. He quotes Oliveira Viana on the power of the rural aristocracy:

> They are the ones who govern, legislate, judge, wage wars against the barbarous in the interior, defending the population which inhabits the surroundings of their houses, which are like feudal castles and their lord's courts.

Nestor Duarte not only accepts this description of the rural aristocracy as feudal landlords, but goes further, saying that:

> Under closer inspection, however, we can see that the phenomenon to be stressed is not this decentralization, but a change in the very nature of power which ceases to be a political function and becomes a private function.[69]

This privatization of political life is, of course, nothing but the establishment of the patrimonial variety of political domination, which Weber calls feudalism. For Nestor Duarte, as for a sizable number of Brazilian experts on the subject, this was the unchanging basis of the Brazilian political system until the end of the nineteenth century:

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68 One standard textbook in English is E. Bradford Burns (1970). This book includes, in the appendices, a list of Brazilian chiefs of State since 1549 and a useful chronology of significant dates in Brazilian history, as well as a concise bibliographical essay.

69 Nestor Duarte (1939), p. 169: "São eles que governam, que legislam, são eles que justiçam, são eles que guerreiam contra as tribos bárbaras no interior, em defesa das populações que habitam as co-vizinhanças de suas casas fazendeiras, que são como os seus castelos feudais e as cortes dos seus senhorios." And afterwards: "Se atentarmos melhor, porem, veremos que o fenômeno a salientar aqui não é o desta descentralização, mas o da modificação da índole do próprio poder, que deixa de ser o da função politica para ser o da função privada."

> The great peace of the Empire, its equilibrium and its support lie in this territorial lordship which is the economic strength and the material power of the state . . . this lordship is also the only "political" section of the Brazilian population.[70]

This vision does not go without its opposite, of course. The best representative of the alternate view is Raymundo Faoro[71], who goes back to the history of the Portuguese state to trace the origins of a centralized and patrimonialist state; in 1808 it was transplanted in Brazil under British protection, after the occupation of Lisbon by Junot, but it had already been in the country for several centuries, during the colonial administration.[72] For him, there was a basic difference between the British and the Portuguese colonizing enterprises in the New World. This difference derived from the state's varying structure in each country; Portugal, in the seventh century, had already been consolidated into an absolute state, governed by a bureaucratized and centralizing *stände.* England, on the contrary, arrived at a compromise between industrial capitalism and feudalism, thus avoiding bureaucratic centralization, the continental historical trend.

After a long discussion on the control mechanisms of the economy and the limits of the political autonomy of the local aristocracy, he concludes that "our feudalism was just a figure of speech"[73] He is aware of the centrifugal tendencies towards decentralization which always existed, and goes into a detailed study of the colonial administration's progressive centralization, a process which increased up to the end of the nineteenth century.

Faoro's analysis is compelling since, in the eighteenth century, Brazil witnessed both the shift of the colonial economy from the sugar plantations in the Northeast to gold and diamond mining in the center, and an increasingly tight control of the colonial administration over this booming, but short-lived, mining economy. The initial colonization policy in Brazil was indeed, as it was said before, the creation of hereditary "capitanias" given away for private exploitation; but this system never developed fully, and was followed almost immediately by a process of

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70 Nestor Duarte (1939), p. 118-19: "A grande paz do Império, o seu equilíbrio e o seu esteio estão neste senhoriato territorial que é a força econômica e o poder material do Estado . . . É ele também a única parcela 'política' da população Brasileira."

71 Raymundo Faoro (1958).

72 The subject of Portuguese patrimonialism was briefly referred to in chapter ii. Celso Lafer has made an interesting content analysis of Os Lusiadas, a Portuguese epic about the period of the discoveries, shoving how it implied a value system which was much more related to the Renaissance spirit of experimentation and inner truth than to an imagery of medieval order, stability, and a hierarchy of well-defined values. He has also called my attention to the importance of the Portuguese Inquisition as a mechanism of centralized and patrimonialist appropriation of resources, derived from a system which decentralized the creation of wealth. This role of the Portuguese Inquisition appears in Antonio José Saraiva (1909). Cf. Celso Lafer (1965).

73 Raymundo Faoro (1958), p. 53 to 65: "Decorria da diversa constituição do Estado, em uma e em outra nação. Portugal, na era seiscentista, já se havia consolidado em estado absoluto, governado por um estamento burocrático, centralizador. A Inglaterra, ao contrário, discrepando da orientação histórica continental, definiu-se numa transação capitalista industrial e feudal, repelindo a centralização burocrática". And afterwards: "nosso feudalismo era apenas uma figura de retórica" .

growing administrative centralization. As Faoro accurately notes, there was never a political pact through which the higher echelons of the political system represented and governed in behalf of some sectors of society, as is typical in the feudal model. This situation was not without obvious tensions, and much of Brazil's history is a history of conflicts centered around the centralization-decentralization issue.

The first of these conflicts evolved around the issues of colonization, territorial occupation, and control, and a survey of the historiography on the subject shows how interpretations of the nature of Portuguese colonization are at the heart of the way these issues are approached. It is certainly inadequate to think of sixteenth and seventeenth century Brazil as an integrated unit. It was a string of outposts along the coast with a very fragile system of communications; they often had much more direct contact with Lisbon than with each other. No wonder they developed independently, and very often in contradiction to each other. A closer look at some of these developments is necessary.

2. The Pattern of Colonization: "Bandeirantes" and Pioneers

In a book which became famous two decades ago, Vianna Moog tried to explain the different outcomes of Brazilian and North American colonization in terms of the differences between the English pioneer, who came to the New World to settle down with his family, and the Portuguese *bandeirante*, who crossed the Brazilian hinterland in search of Indian slaves and gold. The *bandeirante* was an adventurer and a predator whose only concern, supposedly, was to make a quick and fabulous profit and retire to Europe. Starting out from São Paulo, the bandeirantes covered about half of the South American continent, in what Bradford Burns describes as the "first Brazilian epic":

> The land challenged the bandeirantes. They traversed inhospitable mountains and forded turbulent rivers. Swamps and dense forest mocked their effort. Arid stretches taught them to bless those numerous, troublesome streams they had so recently cursed. And everywhere they encountered hunger, their only certain traveling companion.[74]

Viana Moog, however, was not willing to accept this idealized image of the Paulista explorer. For him,

> Because of the bandeiras, and as long as it remained bandeirante, the great state [of São Paulo] was one of the poorest and most backward of the country's areas. São Paulo comes to the fore in the Federation only much after the period of the bandeiras is effectively closed, when the coffee cycle begins, bringing in a pioneer type of immigration which, at the end of the nineteenth century, disembarked more than 100,000 immigrants per year in the port of Santos.[75]

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74 Burns (1970), p. 51. According to Burns, *bandeirante* is a term derived from the Portuguese word for flag, *bandeira.* In medieval Portugal, a *bandeira* signified a group of soldiers equal in size to a company and designated by a distinctive banner. The militia of São Paulo adopted the term and by extension it came to mean an expedition departing for the interior. Participants in such expeditions were called *bandeirantes*. [Burns (1970), p. 50]

75 Viana Moog (1954), p. 235: “Enquanto bandeirante e por causa das bandeiras, era o grande Estado de São Paulo um dos mais pobres e atrasados do Brasil. Somente depois e muito depois de efetivamente encerrado o ciclo

According to Viana Moog, the ambition and restlessness of the bandeirante led him away from his original settlement on the coast, leaving the captaincy of São Vicente (S. P.) unattended and backward, while the sugar settlements in the Northeast prospered. He certainly has a point in that the colony which began most of the discovery and original occupation of the country's territory was also one of the most backward at a given point in time, to become much later--from about the end of the nineteenth century--the economic pole of the country. The geographical pattern is disturbing in itself. Why, during the seventeenth century, was the political center of the country in Bahia, the center of economic activity--the sugar industry - further north in Pernambuco, while the center of territorial expansion into the hinterland was further south, in São Paulo?

3. The expansion of São Paulo

What is most puzzling about the expansion of São Paulo[76] is exactly the relatively small size and insignificance of the original settlement, as compared with the entire Portuguese colonizing enterprise in America. The administrative center of the colony was Salvador, in Bahia, and its main economic pole was the sugar plantations in the Northeast. Roberto Simonsen estimates that, in 1690, Brazil had a total free population of about 100,000, of which 15,000 were located in São Paulo, 20,000 in Rio, and the remaining 70 per cent in the Northeastern areas.[77] Estimations provided by Simonsen show a total population of as little as 3,000 inhabitants in the whole province as late as 1653, and only in 1777 does the figure go above 100,000. Data for the city of São Paulo show a population of about 20,000 in 1836, and of about 30,000 at the time of Brazil's first general census in 1872. At that time, other Brazilian cities were well above 100,000, as Table 4, below, shows.

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das bandeiras é que São Paulo, com o advento do ciclo do café e de imigração de tipo pioneiro que em fins do século dezenove desembarcava anualmente no porto de Santos para mais de 100.000 imigrantes, passa para a vanguarda da Federação."

76 The words "São Paulo" refer to the whole province, and are used as shorthand when referring to earlier periods. The first settlement, São Vicente, was located on the coast in an area subject to periodic floods. After some time its population moved to Santos, which is today Brazil's most important port. In 1554, the Jesuits created their "Colégio de São Paulo" up in the hinterland, in an area known as Piratininga. The village and afterwards city of São Paulo developed in its vicinity. The expansion of São Paulo is an important item of Brazilian historiography, especially among historians of Paulista origin. The most important, even if old-fashioned, of these is Afonso E. Taunay. Roberto Simonsen gives an excellent summary of the expansion of São Paulo in his classic *História Econômica do Brasil* [Simonsen (1962)]. An extensive account of the development of the city of São Paulo is Richard M. Morse (1970).

77 Simonsen (1962), p. 203 ff. The population estimates for the province in the text are from Brigadeiro J. J. Machado de Oliveira, Revista do Instituto Histórico de São Paulo, 1913, as quoted by Roberto Simonsen. Figures for the city itself are from Paul Singer (1968), pp. 19-20.

TABLE 4 THE GROWTH OF BRAZILIAN CITIES, 1872 - 1970			
	1872	**1920**	**1970**
São Paulo	31395	579033	5978977
Rio de Janeiro	274972	1157873	4315746
Belo Horizonte	. .	55463	1255415
Recife	116671	238843	1084459
Salvador	129109	283422	1027142
Porto Alegre	43998	176263	903175

Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Anuário Estatistico de 1971, p. 42.

The explanation for the entrepreneurial push of the Paulista settlers towards the hinterland tends very often to be geopolitical. Caio Prado Jr., in spite of being a noted Marxist historian, tends to explain away the entrepreneurial role of São Paulo in terms of its geographical position at the cross-roads of the country:

> As a zone of passage, São Paulo never achieved a life of its own in the colonial period. The main sources of Paulista life were the traffic in native slaves, captured in the heat of the Sertão, and sold in the agricultural centers of the litoral; the trade of cattle passing through on their way from the southern grasslands to the coastal centers, especially Rio de Janeiro; and, finally, when gold was discovered in Minas Gerais, São Paulo was for a long time the sole or the principal route of travel to the mining towns.[78]

Although dominant,[79] this interpretation tends to attribute a passive role to the settlement, leaving aside its dominant function. The fact is that São Paulo became a commercial post after the Paulistas opened the roads to the hinterland, and it is difficult to imagine that its role as an entrance to the gold area was merely a result of geographical contingencies. During the search for gold and slaves, several dozen towns appeared in the vast area of the hinterland which is today Minas Gerais; the South and Center were conquered, and, because of its continuous movement towards the hinterland, the population of São Paulo often shrank in size.[80]

One wonders about the reasons which could drive someone from Europe to such a remote place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A few facts seem to be clear: this kind of settler was not very willing to stay too close to the surveillance of colonial administration, and was interested in getting the highest possible profit for his effort. A few factors seem to have determined the choice of the different locations: first, the existence of a suitable harbor, and second, the presence of Indian populations which could be used and exploited. São Vicente and

78 Caio Prado Jr. (1967), p. 68.

79 This interpretation is accepted as definitive by Paul Singer (1968), as well as in the chapter on "As Bandeiras na Expansão Geográfica do Brasil," in Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1960), pp. 273-306.

80 Sergio Buarque de Holanda (1966). For the creation of *Paulista* towns in Minas Gerais and the reflux to São Paulo after the decline of gold, see Mario Leite (1961), which lists about sixty towns in Minas Gerais, which were founded by *Paulistas*.

later Santos seem to have fulfilled these conditions, and later became the "natural" pathway towards the countryside.

São Paulo's economy benefitted from the Dutch occupation of Pernambuco and the African Portuguese colonies (Luanda and Angola) during the period of the unification of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns. Other areas for sugar plantation had to be created outside Pernambuco, and the trade of African slaves had to slow down, because of Dutch domination of the seas. The value of the Indian slave increased accordingly, and the Paulistas became for a while the major suppliers of slave manpower for the plantations in Bahia, Rio and São Paulo itself.

Afonso Taunay wrote a fascinating summary of the accounts of several travelers who had visited São Paulo since 1565: what they reveal is a picture of the town' s independence, autonomy and insubordination with regard to the Portuguese Crown--a picture which did not change as time passed. At the end of the seventeenth century) one of these travelers, a French engineer named Froger, wrote,

> The city of São Paulo pays taxes; it is not a subject of the King of Portugal. It is located ten leagues from the coast, and began as a bunch of bandits from all nations which, bit by bit, created there a large city and a kind of Republic whose main law is, above all, not to recognize any Governor whatsoever.[81]

This image of a republic of bandits seems to have been widespread and appears in several other contemporary writers' works. For some, it is difficult to reconcile this image with the fact that an important component of the Paulista settlement was a Jesuit mission established in the area as early as 1554. Actually, both Jesuits and Paulistas seemed to have been after the same thing, the Indian population, even though for different purposes. The Jesuits' efforts to establish the Missions, autonomous colonies of natives, conflicted with their enslavement by the Paulistas. The conflict between the two groups came to a climax in São Paulo when the Jesuits were expelled in 1640. Much further south, in the first decades of the seventeenth century, bloody clashes between Jesuit missions and bandeirantes had long been under way.[82]

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81 Afonso E. de Taunay (1924): “A cidade de São Paulo é tributária, não súdita do Rei de Portugal. Situada a dez léguas da costa, teve como origem uma corja de bandidos de todas as nações que pouco a pouco ali formou uma grande cidade e uma espécie de Republica cuja lei é, sobretudo, não reconhecer Governador nenhum.” It is important to notice that, during and after the period of unification between the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns, the autonomy of São Paulo was established within a context of great autonomy of the local city councils regarding the Iberian powers. C. R. Boxer describes in detail the Rio Revolt of 1660 against its Captain General, Salvador de Sá, during a period in which the authority of the Bragança crown was still unstable, that is, after the restoration in 1640. The Brazilian revolt against the Dutch occupants in the Northeast, which will be discussed below, was also mostly a local enterprise, without any support or encouragement from the Braganças. Only in 1661, after a peace treaty was signed between Holland and Portugal, did the authority of the Portuguese Crown begin to impose itself. Cf. C. R. Boxer (1952). (I am indebted to Eulália Maria Lahmeyer Lobo for calling my attention to this point.)

82 For a comprehensive study of Jesuit activities in southern South America and their conflicts with the Paulistas, cf. Magnus Mörner (1953). A detailed account of the Company of Jesus in Brazil is given in a monumental work by Serafim Leite (1938- 1950). The conflict between the Jesuits and the Portuguese was widespread, and came to a climax in 1759 when they were finally expelled from Brazil, during the administration of the Marquis of Pombal.

The history of the Paulista expansion can be roughly divided into two parts with the year 1695, when gold was first discovered in the Minas Gerais area. The previous period was one of isolation and relative independence: it was characterized by long marches into the hinterland, and by an Indian slave trade with agricultural settlements on the coast and in the Northeast. During the second period--that of the frantic gold-rush--the administrative jurisdiction of São Paulo reaches, at a given moment, more than half of the present Brazilian territory, only to begin diminishing shortly thereafter.[83]

4. Barefeet in the South: The Emboabas War

A look at the map may be useful in understanding the rise and fall of Paulista supremacy during the gold-rush. At first, the only known routes to the mines were from São Paulo or from Paraty, a harbor a little farther north. Only in 1699 was a more direct route discovered which linked Rio de Janeiro with the mines. Trade routes from Bahia through the São Francisco River were also used, and conflicts between the original settlers and newcomers started to build up.

The newcomers were known as "Emboabas," a word of Indian origin which referred to the boots the newcomers wore, which distinguished them from the barefoot Paulista. The differences between boots and bare feet corresponded to other differences in resources and skills. The Paulistas were Brazilians of several generations, often of mixed blood, while the newcomers tended to be Portuguese and according to Diogo de Vasconcellos,

> They had an advantage over the Paulistas in being known and supported by their rich compatriots from the maritime centers, who gave them credit to buy instruments and African slaves, who were the only workers that could endure the terrible exhaustion of working in the mines.[84]

For greater details cf. Dauril Alden (1969). A reference to the conflicts with the Jesuits in Northern Brazil can be found in Mathias C. Kienen (1954).

83 The territorial jurisdiction of São Paulo reached its peak in 1709, when the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Antonio de Albuquerque, was designated an area which included Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Parana, Santa Catarina and part of Rio Grande do Sul. Roberto Simonsen calls our attention to this, stating that "Os primeiros governadores paulistas viram-se forçados a fixar suas residências em Vila da Nossa Senhora do Carmo, hoje Mariana, para ficarem mais próximos a zona de mineração." The first governors of São Paulo were forced to establish their residences in Vila da Nossa Senhora do Carmo, which is today Mariana, so they could be near the mining zone. The fact is, however, that Antonio de Albuquerque's mission was to resolve the conflict and ultimately to reduce the Paulista's control of the area. Interpretations of the role and administrative authority of Antonio de Albuquerque vary. Pedro Calmon, for one, considers 1709 the year during which Minas Gerais and São Paulo separated. Simonsen' s version is supported by Sergio Buarque de Holanda and for them, the separation only became effective in 1720. Cf. Roberto Simonsen (1962), p. 229; Pedro Calmon (1959); Diogo de Vasconcellos (1948); and Buarque de Holanda (1960), p.306.

84 Diogo de Vasconcellos (1948), p. 29: “Acima dos Paulistas, gozavam da vantagem de serem conhecidos e amparados pelos compatriotas opulentos das praças marítimas, que lhes forneciam a crédito instrumentos e escravos africanos, obreiros estes únicos, que podiam suportar as fadigas medonhas como foi a das minas.” A system of retrieving gold in the river beds had to be established almost immediately, as the more exposed deposits were quickly exhausted. This new system required skill, capital and Negro slaves, which the Paulistas lacked (at that time the enslavement of the Indian native had long been over). Cf. also C. Boxer (1962).

This identification of the Emboabas, who rebelled against the original settlers, with the Portuguese became clearer as time passed. The leader of the rebels, Nunes Viana, elected by his followers as Governor of the Province (and considered because of that, as the first Latin American dictator), soon became an ally of the Portuguese Crown. Several years after the war, he was to declare that the rebels

> forced him to accept the government [of Minas] and the command of the army created for the fight against those [Paulista] people; and compelled them with the strength of his weapons to obey his Majesty's laws and Royal Orders.[85]

One of the main issues of the conflict was related to the monopoly of the meat market in the mining area, which the Portuguese administration gave to two outsiders. One of the Paulista leaders was accused of

> Not being loyal to his king, because he was one of those who resisted and vetoed the meat contract in these Mines.[86]

It would be too simplistic to suggest a close identification of outlook and intent between the merchants and the Portuguese patrimonial bureaucracy. Historical evidence shows a series of continuous conflicts between the local merchants and the administration on the issues related to the Portuguese administration's preference for seventeenth century foreign and aristocracy -owned trade companies instead of small tradesmen[87]. The prohibition to trade in gold powder was also a blow to the small tradesmen in Rio, but it is also evidence of the fact that, in the conflict, the will of the government prevailed. Trade had to be carried on through the urban administrative centers, and had to go out in ships controlled and protected, or at least chosen, by the Portuguese government. Thus, in fact, the penetration of trade in a given area ultimately meant an increase in governmental centralization.

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85 Pedro Calmon (1959), p. 970: “O obrigaram a aceitar o governo delas (Minas), e o mando do exército que se formou contra aqueles povos (paulistas); e pelo castigo das armas os reduziu à obediência das leis de Sua Majestade e de suas Reais Ordens.”

86 J. Soares de Melo (1929) as quoted by Calmon (1959), p. 968: "Não ser fiel ao seu rei pois foi um dos que resistiu e impugnou o contrato das carnes nestas Minas."

87 An important example of this conflict was the fight of the merchant guilds, the *Mesa do Bem Comum dos Mercadores*, against the trading monopoly which had been given to the General Company of Commerce by the Portuguese: “Na luta contra a Companhia que se reflete nas consultas do Conselho Ultramarino observa-se que a Companhia do Comércio dá vantagens aos navios estrangeiros de Gênova, Hamburgo e Inglaterra que eram contratados para a armada e tinham preferência no transporte dos gêneros coloniais na viagem de retorno, percebendo fretes exagerados e postergando as caravelas de capitalistas portugueses que só podiam carregar depois das embarcações de maior porte’. (In the struggle against the Company, which is reflected in the consultations to the *Conselho Ultramarino*, one can see that the Company of Commerce gives preference to foreign ships from Genova, Hamburg and England. These ships were contracted for the navy and received preferencial treatment when transporting colonial goods on their return trips. They received exaggerated freight fares whereas the caravelas of the Portuguese capitalists were only permitted to load after the bigger boats had done so.) Eulália Maria Lahmeyer Lobo (1965).

The obvious social differences between the Emboabas and the Paulistas gave rise to interpretations of the conflict in terms of class differences, according to which the Paulistas were the traditional feudal, peasant (and shoeless) aristocracy, and the Emboabas were the rising bourgeoisie fighting for freedom of trade.[88] This kind of interpretation is not very convincing, however, if the issues of territorial occupation and the relations between social groups and the Portuguese Crown are to be taken into account: when the Paulistas organize themselves for the final assault against the Emboabas, in 1709, this was decided and planned by the local chamber of the city of São Paulo, in a demonstration of local autonomy and popular participation, which many would consider unlikely to occur in the Brazilian plateau so early in the eighteenth century.[89] The picture of a war planned in São Paulo to be fought in Minas, in conflict with the administration in Bahia, provides the proper scenario for this chapter of the establishment of Brazil's territorial integration.

5. The Integration of the Northeast

As Paulistas and newcomers clashed in the center's mining area, a parallel conflict developed between Olinda, an aristocratic, traditional city, and Recife, a rising trade center. The two cities face each other in the Northeastern state of Pernambuco. This was the Mascates war ("mascates", the derogatory name for peddlers, was given by the local residents to incoming Portuguese tradesmen.)

The parallel between the Emboabas and the Mascates wars is not usually found in the literature, mostly because the former was one of the first chapters in the rising gold economy, whereas the latter was one of the later episodes of the decaying sugar economy. But both were, unmistakably, important events in the establishment of patrimonialist control over the Brazilian territory, although with quite different outcomes.

The history of the sugar industry in Brazil is inextricably related to the history of the economic and political relation- ships among European commercial powers of the time. Probably the best overview of the sugar economy during the colonial period was written by Celso Furtado, who stresses the Dutch role in refining and commercializing the product throughout Europe.[90] According to Furtado, the sugar industry in Brazil was from the beginning a joint venture of Dutch and Portuguese interests, which nevertheless had quite different objectives. For the Dutch, the sugar industry was essentially a commercial enterprise. They not only took charge of refining and distributing the product in Europe, but also financed Brazilian installations and the importation of African slaves, and controlled transportation of the product. Furtado quotes Noel Deer in saying

88 Cf. Isaías Golgher (1956) and the comments by Paula Beiguelman (1958), and Francisco Iglésias (1957).

89 For the description of this meeting cf. Pedro Calmon (1959), pp. 972-73.

90 Celso Furtado (1968).

that, if one takes all this into account, it becomes clear that the sugar industry in Brazil was more of a Dutch than a Portuguese business at that time.[91]

The main concern of the Portuguese seems to have been the political and military control of the new territories. Lacking the entrepreneurial capabilities of the Dutch, as well as the good luck of the Spaniards, the Portuguese clung to the hope of finding gold and to the relatively small benefits which could be derived from their relatively minor role in the sugar industry. The political control of the territories was their basic end, some military outposts and the sugar plantations - their means, and the prospect of finding gold - their incentive.

The arrangement between the Portuguese and the Dutch functioned well until the union Portugal and Spain in 1580, under Felipe of Spain; thereafter, the Dutch were formally prohibited from participating in the sugar trade and the Spanish started seizing Dutch vessels in Portuguese ports. In 1621, the Dutch West India Company was created to promote colonization and commerce through conquest. The Dutch made several attempts to effect a military control of the sugar areas. After failing to control Salvador in 1624-25, they established a firm hold in the Pernambuco area from 1630 to 1654, fourteen years after the Portuguese restoration and independence from Spain in 1640[92]

6. Bare feet in the North: The Mascates War

The conflict in Pernambuco emerged as a fight over the administrative status of the town of Recife. This town started to develop under Dutch administration, which used it instead of Olinda - the traditional seat of the sugar aristocracy - as its administrative capital.[93] The war against the Dutch occupants was carried on independently, and often against the will of the Portuguese authorities and, in 1654, it seemed that Olinda could be restored to its ancient dominance and independence. Recife, however, became the pole of attraction for a population of newcomers who

91 Noel Deer (1949) p. 453, as quoted by Furtado.

92 The literature on the Dutch presence in Brazil is extensive; the best text in English is C. R. Boxer (1957).

93 A detailed, anthropological study of the sugar aristocracy is found in Gilberto Freyre's classic Masters and Slaves. It is important to note that the conversion of cane into sugar was carried on not in the plantations but in the sugar mills, which could process the production of several plantations. The highest position in the sugar economy was thus occupied by the owner of the sugar mill ("Senhor de Engenho"), an activity which demanded capital and led to some concentration of population and manpower. In other words, the sugar aristocracy was not completely rural and was based on control of the land. The city of Olinda was not a simple urban outgrowth of the sugar economy, however. As Nelson Werneck Sodré summarizes it, “Olinda, ao cair nas mãos dos Holandeses (em 1630), possuía cerca de 2 mil moradores. Os bens religiosos, na cidade, eram consideráveis. Contava com cerca de centena e meia de clérigos, um colégio Jesuíta, um convento beneditino, um carmelita, duas igrejas e cinco ermidas. Eram numerosos - a crônica refere duzentos - os comerciantes abastados . . .” (Olinda had approximately two thousand residents when it fell into Dutch hands in 1630. Religious properties in the city were considerable. The orders had about 150 clergymen, a Jesuit school, a Benedictine and a Carmelite convent, two churches and five hermitages. Rich tradesmen were numerous; according to documents of the time, there were about 200 . . .). [N. W. Sodré, 1944)]

started as peddlers and ended up responsible for the financing and commercialization of the sugar production. As an observer remarked:

> These foreigners or *Mascates* held in their power all trade; they were therefore the ones who supplied the sugar mills, and were also the only ones who received the boxes of sugar. At the end of the harvest, each *Senhor de Engenho* owed a considerable sum to the *Mascate* who had sent him supplies, and this inflexible creditor would then pressure him immediately . . . Thus, in a few years, the *Mascates* became big capitalists and, instead of following the steps of the first ones to arrive in Pernambuco (who restricted themselves to trade), they infiltrated public business, penetrated the Palace of Governors, and finally prepared themselves to accomplish their goal, which was to annihilate the nobility of the country.[94]

The local aristocrats were known by the newcomers as "Pés Rapados," meaning barefooted - a resemblance to the Paulistas in Minas Gerais, which was not mere coincidence. The increasing economic role of Recife's newcomers, from peddlers to moneylenders, was related to the progressive deterioration of the sugar economy since the second half of the sixteenth century.[95] Recife eventually won the conflict and acquired the administrative status of a city but, at that time, the contacts its elite had in the "Palace of the Governors" were certainly more important than its exploitation of a hopeless industry.

Little is known of the process through which the old sugar aristocracy and the businessmen intermingled and lived during the period of decadence, but it can be taken for granted that the value of access to the sources of bureaucratic power became dominant, as the market economy shrank in size and perspectives. Possibly the local aristocracy in the Northeast underwent a process similar to what later happened to the Minas Gerais elite at the end of the eighteenth century with the decadence of the gold economy.

The difference in outcome of the two conflicts between Portuguese newcomers and barefooted locals is that, although in both cases the locals lost their autonomy, the Paulistas were cut off from the rest of the country, and therefore did not develop in their own state a structure of patrimonialist dependence on the central administration as the sugar elite did. The pattern of

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94 Pe. Antonio Gonçalves Leitão, as quoted by Mário Melo (1941): “Em poder destes forasteiros ou Mascates residia todo o comércio; eles portanto eram os que supriam os engenhos, e também os únicos que recebiam as caixas de açúcar. No fim das safras cada Senhor de Engenho devia uma soma considerável ao Mascate que tinha suprido, e então este inflexível credor instantaneamente o apertava . . . . Desta sorte em poucos anos tornaram-se os Mascates grossos capitalistas e em vez de seguirern as pisadas dos primeiros que para Pernambuco vieram (que só do comercio cuidavam) intrometeram-se nos negócios públicos, introduziram-se nos Palácio dos governadores, e finalmente predispuseram-se para levarem a efeito o seu intento, isto é, aniquilar a Nobreza do País.” Mário Melo takes sides with the local aristocracy against the Portuguese newcomers. There is at least one Portuguese historian who takes sides with the Portuguese, but his view of the situation is the same: “Nas duas grandes comoções por que passou Pernambuco, em 1654 e 1710, a nobreza sempre procedeu por motivos subalternos e para ela até desprimorosos sendo em ambos o principal não pagar aos credores.” (During the two big commotions experienced by Pernambuco in 1654 and 1710, the nobility always proceeded according to questionable and even dishonorable motives, of which the most important was not to pay debts [Vicente Ferrer (1914), p. 44]

95 Celso Furtado links the decadence of the sugar economy in Brazil with the beginning of the sugar industry in the Caribbean, leading to an expansion of the world production and a decline of international prices. Cf. Celso Furtado (1959), chapter VI.

isolation was thus preserved, and this was certainly important in the developments which were to occur a century and a half later.

7. Political consolidation and economic decadence

São Paulo and Pernambuco seem to have been the only major attempts of essentially economic, non-governmental, territorial occupation of the country. A third economic activity, which was responsible for the exploration of the Brazilian hinterland, was the cattle economy; it was, however, usually secondary and dependent on some dynamic center.[96]

This picture of the occupation of Brazilian territory can be completed with the history of the establishment of military outposts at the borders. The most important of these outposts was certainly the Colony of Sacramento, on the Rio de La Plata, created in 1680. It was the beginning of a protracted war with the Spaniards in Buenos Aires, which gave the population of the state of Rio Grande do Sul the unique experience of continuous bloodshed and military mobilization.[97] A look at the map shows that Rio Grande is the only truly frontier region in the country; this becomes more evident as we go back into the country's history. The northern and western frontiers were determined, by and large, by the bandeirante's capacity to explore the hinterland; however, they were also determined by the Andes and the continental jungle, which functioned as barriers to the expansion of the Spanish settlers on the Pacific coast. The Portuguese settlements tended to remain on the Atlantic coast, and it was only in the area which is now Uruguay that the two colonial enterprises continually clashed.

The social and economic fabric of Brazilian society along the Southern border was strongly dependent on this situation. Fernando Henrique Cardoso makes a thorough survey of Gaucho society historiography; he points out two basic elements which recur and characterize it most properly. The first is the pervasive influence of military experience on the psychology, economic structure, and social organization of the South. According to him, the psychological pressures of a state of continuous warfare, combined with the specific battle conditions on the frontier, led to the need for a kind of strong personal leadership, endowed with qualities of personal courage and audacity. The consequence was a military order which was not necessarily too rigid, since it was not prone to abide to standard procedures and routine; but it was certainly centralized around strong, personalistic leaders.[98] Economic life was for a long time based on predatory activities

96 See Caio Prado Jr. (1967), for an analysis of the expansion of the cattle-raising economy in Brazil.

97 Joseph Love (1971), p. 8: "In 1680 . . . the Portuguese took a bold step to extend their New World empire southward, pushing down to the eastern bank of the River Plate to found Colonia do Sacramento, which they defiantly planted across the estuary from Buenos Aires. For the next 150 years the territory between Laguna and the mouth of the Plate was the scene of continual warfare as first Spain and Portugal, and later Argentina and Brazil, fought over the limits of their domains. Since Colonia staked out the southernmost limit of Portugal's claim, it had to be defended . . . . Colonia was destroyed four times by the Spaniards and rebuilt three times by the Portuguese; with the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777, it definitively passed over to Spanish hands." A detailed account of the conflicts on the southern border can be found in Alcides Lima (1935).

98 Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1962), p. 85: "Ao lado da tensão constante em que viviam as populações sulinas em face das guerras, guerrilhas e acordos infindáveis, que por si só seriam suficientes para tornar mais vigorosa a

against the Spaniards, the capture of cattle which ran freely in the Pampa, attacks against Jesuit missions, and the smuggling between Spanish and Portuguese domains. Gradually, the land was distributed among the military chieftains and caudillos, and an industry of dried beef (charque), which soon exported in great quantity to the North of Brazil, began to develop.

The second basic element, besides the militarization of all aspects of life, was the privatization of the military and other administrative forms of authority. Military caudillos had their private armies, which were used in private raids against Jesuits, Spaniards or other settlers in times of peace, but which could be mobilized by the Portuguese Crown in times of formal warfare. Land grants were distributed according to military power and influence, as were the privileges of tax collection and the administration of justice.[99]

This “privatization" of military activities meant that economic and social power was derived from military status, but this status was in turn based on independent sources of wealth and power. As in a typical Weberian situation, the tension between the privatization of political and military status and the making public of private power was constant; this helps to explain why the tradition of warfare remained as a means of settling internal conflicts even after the wars with Spain--and later with Argentina - were settled. In other words, what became decisive was how much the local caudillo's power depended on governmental sanction or support. In 1801, after the twenty four years of peace which followed the San Ildefonso treaty between Spain and Portugal, the governmental expenses of the captaincy were more than three times its revenue and, according to a historian,

> This bad economic outcome was mostly due to the low quality of governmental administration, the centralization of the metropolis, and the excessive expenditures made on the maintenance of the army.[100]

Rio Grande's political relevance to the Portuguese, and later to the Brazilian Crown, made it inadvisable to allow the state to be ruled by its own bosses. Most of the military manpower used in the frontier wars was locally recruited, and Love notes that, as late as 1852, in the conflict against the Argentine dictator Rosas, three-quarters of the Brazilian troops were composed of gauchos. Several decades later, Rio Grande supplied between one-fourth and one-third of Brazilian land forces, and its share of high-ranking officials was out of proportion with the size of its

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pressão da ordem militar sobre a ordem civil, as condições da luta naquelas fronteiras . . . tornavam a própria ordem militar não diria mais rígida porem mais dependente, para a sua preservação, da existência de pessoas com qualidades e incentivos (como a coragem pessoal e a ousadia diante do inimigo) que as tornavam, ao mesmo tempo, pouco aptas para a submissão aos regulamentos e à rotina.”

99 Cardoso (1962), p. 107 ff., describes the relationships between the colonial administration and private power in Rio Grande do Sul in terms of patrimonial rule.

100 Alcides Lima (1935), p. 108: “Grande parte deste mau resultado econômico era devido sobretudo à péssima administração governamental, à centralização da metrópole, e aos excessivos gastos que se faziam no sustento do exercito.”

population.[101] The net outcome of this situation was that the patrimonial and "private" politics in Rio Grande was always politically oriented, and related to the national center of power. This relationship was not always amicable and, as a matter of fact, Rio Grande made the only serious attempt of political secession in Brazil during the nineteenth century (the Farroupilha Revolution, 1835-45).

Life in Rio Grande was not limited to the adventures of its men on horseback. Love distinguishes three different regions of colonization and settlement in the area, the Coast, the Mountains, and the ranch country--the Campanha, "which gives the state its image elsewhere in Brazil." An important group of settlers in the coastal area came from the Portuguese island of Açores, and were responsible for a blooming economy of wheat. The fact is, nevertheless, that the ranching country not only provided Rio Grande with an external image, but also gave it a political leadership and style, which was strongly imprinted in the state's other colonization areas. Cardoso, for instance, shows how the Azorian settlers gradually changed from the old peasant habits of their land of origin to a very hierarchical and military-oriented form of patriarchal patrimonialism, which pervaded the whole area.

The second, or rather first, area of military settlement in the country was Rio de Janeiro, where the French attempted to establish their "France Antartique" in the first half of the sixteenth century. The area was rich in brazil wood; contacts with the local Indians were possible, and the French were able to control the area for a while. In 1560, their settlement was destroyed by a fleet commanded by Mem de Sá, and three years later the first Portuguese military outpost was created by Estácio de Sá.[102]

It is remarkable to notice that the adventure of the Colonia de Sacramento in the south was financed and supported, not directly by Portugal, but by the city of Rio de Janeiro.[103] For a while the City Council of Rio was interested in the possible trade opportunities of the new frontier but,

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101 Love (1971), p. 15.

102 A year by year account on the formation of Rio de Janeiro is Vivaldo Coaracy (1965).

103 V. Coaracy gives several references to the role of Rio de Janeiro in the maintenance of the Colonia de Sacramento. In 1680 the new governor of Rio de Janeiro, Manuel Lobo, was given the assignment of establishing the Colonia with local resources at the borders of the River Plate. Six years later, a new governor, João Furtado de Mendonça, "representou ato soberano sobre Os pesados encargos que para a população eram constituídos pelos constantes auxílios enviados à Colônia do Sacramento, desfalcando a praça de mantimentos e de elementos da guarnição." (Complained to the King about the heavy burdens which the continuous supplies sent to the Colonia de Sacramento represented for the population: it deprived the local market of supplies and the local garrison of manpower). According to the author, “Ainda por muitos anos foi mantida a politica de conservar e sustentar a Colônia do Sacramento exclusivamente com os recursos fornecidos pelo Rio de Janeiro. É verdade que fora a Câmara do Rio quem, com o objetivo de fomentar o comércio com o Prata . . . , havia insistido anteriormente pela fundação da Colônia, que tão caro lhe havia de custar, sem produzir os resultados esperados. “ (The policy of supplying and supporting the Colonia de Sacramento exclusively with resources from Rio de Janeiro was carried on for still many years. It is true that it was the Chamber of Commerce of Rio de Janeiro which had previously insisted on the founding of the colony, as a way of boosting the trade with the Rio de la Plata area; but this was to cost them dearly, without producing the expected results). [V. Coaracy (1965), p. 212-13.]

after a while, complaints started to arise about the burden created by the military adventure in the south. Gradually, it seems that the burden in terms of manpower was shifted to the local population, which was mostly of Paulista origin, that is, bandeirantes who had arrived for the campaign against the Jesuit missions.

8. Political life in the nineteenth century

Nineteenth century Brazil is known for its economic stagnation[104], but also for the establishment of a stable and smoothly running monarchy which lasted from 1840 to 1889.

The preceding period, from 1808 to 1840, was a time of internal consolidation, during which Brazil gained its independence from Portugal (formally declared in 1822).

This first period was characterized by a conflict between "Brazilian" and "Portuguese" factions, soon translated into a struggle between the "liberal" and the "conservative" parties. The dissolution of the Assembly of 1823 was a victory for the Portuguese, and the abdication of Dom Pedro I, a victory for the Brazilians.[105] After the abdication, the country went through a period of regional rebellions, which took it to the brink of fragmentation. The central government had to consolidate its military capability, which was relatively independent of the regions where they were quartered, and a Brazilian regular army began to develop.

Both the navy and the army in the early days of independent Brazil were composed of Portuguese and mercenaries, but the nationalization of the army seems to have occurred most rapidly. A decree reorganizing the army in 1831 put its strength at about 10,000 men, and the actual number of men in arms remained between 15,000 to 20,000 for the whole century, with the exception of the period of the Paraguayan War. There were 35,000 men in arms in 1865 and 83,000 in 1869, a figure which dropped again to 15,000 in 1873. These figures hide what was in fact the development of a professional and organized army, following the instability of the regency period.[106] As Table 5 shows, only Rio Grande do Sul was not completely pacified by 1845, and it

104 Economic stagnation was a characteristic more of the first than of the second half of the century. The lowest period occurred during the Napoleonic wars, but, in the second half of the century, a new product, coffee, had already entered an expanding international market.

105 See note 41 below.

106 A brief account of the creation of the Brazilian army is given by Euripides Simões de Paiva, "A organização do Exército Brasileiro," in Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1960), p. 265-77. A detailed account of the creation of the Brazilian navy is given by Prado Maia (1965) who shows its Portuguese origins. For military effective in the nineteenth century, see the data collected by Luis Werneck (n.d.) and by Olavo Brasil de Lima Júnior (1970). The national army was never in complete harmony with the civilian political elite, who sought to check its power with the creation of the National Guard in the nineteenth century, and the maintenance of a military police in the states during the Old Republic and even afterwards. This side story obviously has deep implications for the understanding of civil-military relationships in Brazil since the Regency period.

is not by chance that the man in charge of subduing the rebellions would also be considered the founder of the Brazilian army.

TABLE 5 ARMED REVOLUTIONS IN BRAZIL FROM 1831 TO 1845						
	Pernambuco	**Pará**	**Bahia**	**Maranhão**	**Rio Grande do Sul**	**Total**
1831	2		3			5
1832	1					
1833			1			
1834						0
1835		1				2
1836		1				2
1837		1				3
1838		1				4
1839		1				3
1840		1				3
1841				1		2
1842					1	
1843					1	
1844					1	
1845					1	
Total:	3	6		4	11	30

Source:Lucia Maria Gomes Klein and Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr., "Atores Políticos do Império," Dados, 7 1970, pp. 62-88.

Military expenses were not reduced immediately after the rebellions ceased but much later, in spite of the growing complexity and weight of the governmental apparatus:

TABLE 6 BRAZIL: AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES OVER TOTAL GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES, 1823-1845		
Period	Percentage of military expenditures	Total expenditures (1840 = 100)
1823–29	48.12%	42
1831–35	37.50%	59
1836–40	453.00%	86
1841–45	43.70%	116

Source: Lúcia Maria Gomes Klein and Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 62–88.

The end of the regional rebellions and the creation of organized armed forces were just some of the governmental achievements during this period. The federal budget tripled in the first ten years after the independence, and rose steadily throughout the century as Table 7, below, shows.

TABLE 7 GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES AND EXPORTS IN BRAZIL DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY			
Year	**Government Expenditures (1,000 contos)**	**Exports (1,000 contos)**	**GEX/EXP**
1823	4,702	20,623	22,8%
1831/2	12,836	32,431	39,79%
1840/1	19073	41,672	45,76%
1852/3	29,368	73,645	39,87%
1860/1	45,950	123,171	37.30%
1870/1	83,435	168,000	49.66%
1889	138,108	259,095	53.30%

Source: Data collected by Sergio da Rocha Souza and José Luis Werneck da Silva.

This was not just a nominal increase, since the value of Brazilian money was in stable relation with the British pound during most of the nineteenth century[107] The increase of governmental expenditures closely followed the recuperation of the Brazilian economy in the second half of the century, which was due mainly to coffee; this increase also reflected greater governmental skill in allocating resources to itself. Governmental expenditures held a stable but increasing relation with foreign trade, and Table 8 below is an indication of the increasing relevance of this source of income for the central government:

TABLE 8 SOURCES OF PUBLIC REVENUE		
	1831/2 - Total income: 11.1 million contos	**1888 - Total income: 145.2 million contos**
Imports	25.50%	61.00%
Interior	42.70%	10.00%
Exports	6.00%	28.00%

Source: Vera Maria Cândido Pereira, "A Sociedade no Período Colonial," (IUPERJ), unpublished paper, 1969.

Who participated in this huge and ever-growing governmental structure? Income and property conditioned the exercise of political franchise throughout the Imperial period, and Faoro gives a detailed analysis of how the Charter of 1823 intentionally reduced the relevance of land ownership as the main criterion for voter eligibility[108]. The total number of voters in 1872 was about 1,000,000, 9 per cent of the country's population.[109] This figure is only a very general indication of the limits reached by the political system, and Brazilian political folklore is full of stories about all kinds of irregularities and electoral frauds (the party in power always won the elections it called for and organized).

107 Data for the equivalence between Brazilian and British currency can be found in Oliver Onody (1960).

108 Raymundo Faoro (1958), pp. 141 ff.

109 Maria Antonieta de A. G. Parahyba (1970).

The first Assembly of 1823 is supposed to represent the more liberal) centrifugal tendencies in the country, as opposed to the centralizing tendency of the Imperial government. If this is so, one could expect that the Brazilian Congress would never become a fully institutionalized body; this is reflected, although indirectly, by data on the budgetary allocations to the legislature.

TABLE 9 COMPARATIVE GROWTH OF THE SIZE AND THE BUDGET OF THE BRAZILIAN CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES - (1826-1858)

Period	Deputies	Budget (contos)	contos per capita
1826-29	76	..	
1830-33	97	338	35
1834-37	106	..	
1838-41	98	271	28
1842	96	216	22
1845-47	98	280	29
1848	129	285	22
1853-58	123	228	18

Source: Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr., and Lucia Maria Gomes Klein, "*Atores Politicos do Império.*" Dados, 7, 1970, p. 80.

The legislature's budget was part of the total budget of the Ministry of the Empire, being always much smaller than the expenses of the royal family, the main expense item. Governmental expenditures on the legislature never went above 1.6 per cent of the total budget, and tended to increase slightly from the first to the second half of the Empire: the average for 1837 to 1864 is 0.75 per cent and the average from 1864 to 1889 is 1.10 per cent. This slight relative increase did mean a real improvement, in terms of the general growth of the state, but it was not enough to compensate for the gradual absorption of the liberal opposition by the political establishment. If the party affiliation of the holders of executive and legislative power does not tell us who they represent, their regional origins may be a better indicator:

TABLE 10 PROVINCES OF ORIGIN OF THE CABINET MEMBERS DURING THE SECOND EMPIRE (PERCENTAGES)

	1840 to 1853		1857 to 1871		1873 to 1889	
	Prov.	Region	Prov.	Region	Prov.	Region
Pará	1.75		1.59		.	
NORTH		1.75		1.59		
Maranhão	. .		1.59		7.50	
Piauí			6.35		5.00	
Ceará	. .				2.50	
Paraíba	. .				2.50	
Pernambuco	12.28		14.28		10.00	
Alagoas	. .		3.17		2.50	
NORTHEAST		12.28		25.39		30.00
Sergipe		. .				
Bahia	26.32		34.92			
M. Gerais	19.30		7.94			
R. Janeiro	31.58		19.05			
EAST		77.20		61.91		6500
São Paulo	7.02		7.94		2.50	
Sta. Catarina	1.75		1.59			
São Pedro (Rio Grande).			1.59		2.5	
SOUTH		8.77		11.12		5
BRAZIL		100.%				
(N)		57		63		40

Source: Data collected by Lucia Maria Gaspar Gomes, in O. Brasil de Lima Jr., and L. M. Gomes Klein, "Atores Políticos do Império", Dados 7, 1970, p. 81

The picture could hardly be more striking. While the center of economic and demographic gravity shifted to the South, the political basis of the government moved to the North. São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul were clearly underrepresented, and it is not by chance that these two states became the main Republican strongholds. The decline of Rio de Janeiro's participation probably reflects the progressive "Brazilianization" of the political elite, which tended to be recruited from the more traditional northern aristocracy. The political alienation of the emerging sources of wealth paralleled the resistance met by the army in striving for a more active political role. The end of the Empire occurred by means of a bloodless military coup, which opened the way for political decentralization and a closer correspondence between political power and socioeconomic development.

CHAPTER 4 - THE OLD REPUBLIC: REGIONAL IMBALANCES AND DECENTRALIZATION

1. From Provinces to States

With the end of the imperial regime, in 1889, the regional provinces of the country, now states, were able to play a more active role in the shaping of the national power system. Once consolidated, the new Republican regime was said to be based on what was called the "Política dos Governadores," the politics of the governors, according to which the state oligarchies of the two main states, São Paulo and Minas, decided between them- selves who the Presidents should be. Several scholarly works on the Brazilian "Old Republic" have been published recently, and there is no point in reconstructing its history here.[110] What matters, however, is a discussion of this period within the theoretical framework developed thus far. This discussion will help to overcome several conceptual difficulties in understanding that period, and, consequently, later periods.

In what is probably the only comprehensive study of a provincial administration during the imperial period, Francisco Iglésias offers in a study of Minas Gerais' administration an overview of what political government at the state level was like at the time[111]. The first element to be noticed is the hierarchical and centralized system of authority. The provincial President, as he was called, was nominated by the Emperor; his loyalty and allegiance was therefore directed entirely to the central government. He did not have to be born in or somehow related to the province under his government, and it was common to have the same man occupy the presidency of several provinces throughout his political career. "During the Monarchy," says Iglésias, "one does not feel the spirit of the regions influencing the government, as it does in the Republic. The statesmen of that time were national men: although identified with their lands, carrying with them the traits of Pernambuco, Minas or Rio Grande do Sul, they did not play the game of regional interests in public life."[112]

This extreme centralization, however, was combined with high turnover, undefined tasks, and the absence of explicit policies of any kind. Figures for Minas Gerais show that during the 65 years of this regime, the province had 122 administrative periods, an average of a little less than seven months for each administration. These short periods were steps in the political career of the politicians of the time; these men belonged to one of the parties which alternated in the imperial cabinets, and their main task as governors was to assure the victory of their party in the Congressional elections of their provinces.[113]

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110 The most comprehensive work on the 1889-1930 period is the trilogy by Edgar Carone (1969, 1970, 1971).

111 Francisco Iglésias (1958).

112 Iglésias (1958) , p. 39.

113 Iglésias (1958), p. 47.

This system was inefficient in terms of administrative proficiency, and Iglésias gives abundant evidence of the criticism it received throughout the imperial regime. However, it was efficient enough for what mattered most to the centralized and patrimonialistic imperial state, that is, keeping the Central State free from regional demands, assuring the smooth alternation of the two-party system which worked so well within a tiny section of the population, and so on. No effective command over the social and economic life of the provinces could be exerted, but this was not necessary; no function of interest aggregation or even effective brokerage between local and central interests could be performed, but this was exactly what was needed to assure the autonomy of the central government.

This means that systems of local, autonomous leadership, based on the property of land and family ties, could flourish, but could seldom organize and articulate themselves into effective regional political bodies. The lack of communication between political authority and local leadership led, sometimes, to violent clashes, typified by the celebrated Canudos rebellion of the late nineteenth century.[114] In terms of political theory, this led to a serious misunderstanding concerning the nature of the Brazilian political system: namely, the notion that the local bosses were the basis and source of political power at the regional and national levels, through a pyramidal series of cumulative aggregation of interests and political articulation. According to this view the local bosses were represented at the regional and national political levels by their educated sons and relatives) lawyers and doctors trained in Rio, São Paulo or abroad, who could absorb all the rhetoric of European liberalism without relinquishing their rural and traditional origins. The consequence was supposedly a kind of political schizophrenia, which separated what was said and written in laws of the political system from the locus where political power really rested. The well-known rhetoric and abstract traits of the country's constitutional and legal systems, as well as the country's dominant political discourse, tended to be attributed to this kind of discrepancy between a façade of political integration and institutionalization, and an actual dispersion and atomization of power. The political system thus appeared to be based on the national integration and centralization of power, but this was only a "tiny superstructure" veiling a system of familistic and private power.[115]

The theoretical mistake underlying this notion is that it tends to dismiss the national political structure as practically insignificant. Nevertheless, this political structure maintained the territorial integrity of the country and subdued all attempts of local autonomy and rebellions,

which occurred in the country since its independence. The alternative notion that power was actually centralized and concentrated in the executive accounted for these facts, but excluded from the picture the evident manifestations of local private and familistic power. In short, the debate between theory of centralization and that of decentralization seems to be misplaced. It would probably make more sense to consider that the gap was not as much one between apparent centralization and actual local and private power, but rather one between a supposedly European - type representative political system and an actual patrimonial and hierarchical system of authority.

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114 Euclides da Cunha (1944).

115 Cf. A. O. Cintra (1971); M. I. Pereira de Queirós (1956-57); Nestor Duarte (1939).

The fact that the scope of the political system was limited to a small elite of enfranchised voters and politicians does not mean that some kind of political representation could not have worked within this limit, providing the political system with a real, even though limited, system of interest representation. The end of the Imperial regime in 1889 can be seen as the consequence of Imperial government's inability to accept and integrate a progressively active local and regional leadership.

2. Regionalism and centralization in the Republican movement

The first Republican regime, which lasted until 1930, did not lead to an enlargement of the scope of the political system, in terms of an increase in political participation. It is remarkable that the political participation system was able to remain stagnant while practically all other indicators of social and economic development increased exponentially, as can be seen in the graph below.[116] Before 1930, the percentage of voters over the country's total population never went above 3.5 per cent and the figures on Congressional elections in imperial times were not much lower; only in 1945, as a matter of fact, did around 15 per cent of the country's population vote in a national election[117].

This fact, combined with countless tales of fraud and electoral corruption, led to the notion that the Republican period represented a full implementation of the oligarchic, state-based power system, as a substitute for the centralization of the monarchy. Edgar Carone, in his scholarly study of the First Republic, is well aware of the role of the military and the old monarchists in the affairs of the Republic, but seems reluctant to include these important actors in his generalizations on the nature of the system. He refers to "the people" as the most "outstanding absence" in the Old Republican period, but seems to marginalize the military as well:

> The establishment of the Republic is the gesture of a class, the demand of an ascending group . . The First Republic is a period in which the coffee lords rise to power, reach their climax, and later decline . . . The government is the representation of only one [class]; the others live in a marginalization process.[118]

Carone is well aware of the difficulties of linking a straightforward class interpretation to well-known facts, such as the presence of the military and the monarchists in the political life of the time. His answer tends to be historiographic and casuistic. He says, for instance, that the military "despises civilians" (Part XIII), that they were divided between those who wanted to respect the constitutional rules of civilian power and those who aimed to "co-participate" in power; he finishes by considering the military a segment of the "middle classes." (Part XVI).

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116 Maria Antonieta Parahyba (1970).

117 Figures from Guerreiro Ramos (1961), p. 32; Joseph L. Love (1971), p. 119; and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (1964).

118 E. Carone (1969), p. 288.

The fact was that military participation in politics, at that time, had more to do with regional cleavages and changes in the government structure than with the incorporation of middle sectors into the political process. When considered in terms of the Republic opposition to the old monarchic establishment, these regional cleavages appeared as two clearly differentiated and conflicting Republican ideologies. It would be worthwhile to delineate these ideologies and their regional implications in some detail.

FIGURE 1

BRAZIL, GROWTH OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, 1872–1920



Source: Maria Antonieta de A. Parahyba, Tabela Social e Participação Política no Brasil (1870 a 1920), Dados 7, 1970. Based on the Brazilian Censuses of 1872, 1890, 1900 and 1920.

The formal beginning of the Republic movement in Brazil can be situated in 1870, when a Republican Manifesto was issued in Rio de Janeiro.[119] The Manifesto blamed the monarchic regime for all the country's ills and, of course, stated that the Republican system was the solution for all of them. Besides the substitution of the Emperor by a president, however, it proposes little in terms

119 The following analysis is mostly based on materials gathered by George C. A. Boehrer (1954). This is a detailed, state-by-state account of the organization of the Republican movement in Brazil, followed by an analysis of the main issues and points of conflict in the Republican platforms. It is curious how the author assumes, from the beginning, that the Republican movement was to become a national party, which was not to be true, even after the Republican regime was inaugurated.

of specific changes of the country's political and social structure. The only item which did appear, and which became central to most of the Republic movement, was the issue of federalism, that is, of granting more autonomy and independence to the provinces, according to the North American model.

The "Manifesto" was, from the beginning, an effort to bring maximum possible support to the movement; therefore, it avoided the most controversial issues. But these issues, which were latent in the differences among the Republican movements in the different region of the country, were to emerge in a series of crises suffered by the Republican movement from its very beginning .

The Republican movement in Rio, as expressed by the newspaper *A República,* tended to absorb all the rhetoric of the political elite at the time, according to which things were conceptually good or bad, proper or improper, but never convenient or inconvenient for a given interest or group. Thus, the monarchic government was, supposedly,

> So bad that, no matter how good the man, royalty forces him to lose whatever qualities he has; monarchy is bad for the country, spoils men, ties their hands, corrupts the King himself.[120]

This seemed to be reason enough to set one against the monarchic regime, but the Republican opposition was in fact much more specific and concrete than that.

A content analysis of newspapers in Rio and São Paulo during the last five years of the Empire gives initial evidence of two very different types of opposition to the Imperial government.[121] One of the newspapers was *A Província de São Paulo*, the leading paper in that state; the other was *0 Paiz*, from Rio de Janeiro. The patterns of opinions against the monarchic regime were very similar in both opposition papers, but the political models suggested by them were quite different. The Rio newspaper, which, according to the author, "was connected to some elements of the urban elites (businessmen, military and intellectuals)," tended to favor a military solution, and actually called for army intervention against the Empire; the São Paulo newspaper, connected with "Republican intellectuals and rural proprietors of São Paulo," was explicitly against a military solution.

The reason for this difference is simple: São Paulo had at that time strong regional interests related to the expansion of coffee, and a capacity for interest aggregation which was much higher than in other provinces. A change from a monarchic to a military regime would not enhance the political autonomy they sought, and could actually reduce their chances of getting it. When a military solution came, the conflict between the Paulista Republican Party and the military government broke out immediately, and a pattern of conflict was to reappear intermittently in the years to come.

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120 *A República*, December 13, 1870, as quoted by Boehrer (1954), p. 37: “O governo monárquico é tão mau, que por melhor que seja o homem, a realeza força-o a perder o que ele tem de bom; a monarquia é má para o país, estraga os homens, ata-lhes as mãos, corrompe o próprio rei.”

121 Cf. Irene Maria Magalhães (1970), p. 173-178.

The Republican ideology, which appears in the content analysis *of A Província de São Paulo*, can be spelled out in a series of well-known traits of the Republican movement in that province. First, the issue of federalism was central, and sometimes even more important than the Republican banner itself. One of the Paulista's Republican leaders, Prudente de Morais, was elected to the Provincial Congress by the monarchist Liberal Party in 1877 and, to justify his acceptance of the nomination, he stated that, once elected,

> I will be a truthful Paulista in the first place, only accepting or suggesting those acts which lead to the satisfaction of actual needs and contribute to the grandeur and prosperity of our province . . . [122]

Second, the Paulista Republicans sidestepped the abolition issue, an explosive topic among the more radical Republicans in Rio and other more urbanized areas. In a formal declaration issued in 1872, the Republicans of São Paulo stated very clearly that they would not push forward a banner such as the end of slavery, which was not "inspired by the nation itself," the "nation" being, of course, the economic and political establishment at the state level.[123] Coffee plantations in São Paulo were moving very rapidly from slave to free labor, and the issue of abolitionism was not so sensitive in the State as it was in other areas of the country. But a careful, non-conflictive attitude prevailed. In a statement issued in 1873, at the First Congress of the Paulista party, the principle of regional autonomy was established in order to deal with the slave problem "according to the varying facility of substituting slave with free labor,"[124] with due respect to property rights. Third, the Republican movement was well-behaved and non-violent, and it accepted the rules of the political game at the time. They not only disputed positions in the legislative houses of the provinces and the country, but even entered into alliance with the Liberal and Conservative parties. We have seen how Prudente de Morais joined the Liberal ticket in 1877; in 1881 several conservative candidates were elected with Republican support,[125] and in 1884, Campos Sales and Prudente de Morais, both leaders of the Republican Party, were elected to Congress with conservative support.[126] This type of electoral participation continued, and it is estimated that the Republicans had about one-fourth of the electoral votes in the province when the Republican regime finally began.

The other type of Republicanism, which was probably best typified by Silva Jardim, a politician from Pernambuco, was drastically different. This was a Republicanism inspired more by

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122 Open letter published in *A Província de São Paulo*, August 4 1877, as quoted in Boehrer (1954) p. 86: "Se for eleito, na assembléia provincial, procurarei antes de tudo ser verdadeiro paulista, só aceitando ou indicando medidas que importarem a satisfação de necessidades reais e que forem tendentes ao engrandecimento e prosperidade de nossa província . . .

123 From the 1888 manifesto transcribed in Boehrer (1954), p. 266: "O partido republicano, cujas tendências não são autoritárias, está bem longe de executar reformas que não sejam inspiradas pela própria nação."

124 Boehrer (1954), p. 267.

125 Boehrer (1954), p. 98 ff.

126 Boehrer (1954) p. 103.

August Comte than by Jefferson, and what it took from positivism was the notion of a centralized, rational, modernizing and dictatorial regime. The legitimation for this kind of regime was to be essentially plebiscitarian. In a manifesto issued in 1889, which opposed the Republican Party, Silva Jardim advocated "a strong presidency created by acclamation of popular will, subjected afterwards to universal suffrage . . ." In another manifesto, it was said that

> The Republican regime works in practice through the concentration of political forces, that is, by dictatorship, which is as strong as it is responsible . . . . In the Republican dictatorship, the ruler is a representative of public opinion, which elects or sanctions him.[127]

There was no place for regional federation and decentralization of power in this type of political model; since it was free from the direct influence of land-owners and coffee-growers, it could easily agree with the abolitionist movement, which was burning in the country's capital in the 1880s. Silva Jardim was in favor of the immediate termination of the slave system.

It was only natural that this kind of radical republicanism did not find support among the majority in São Paulo's or Minas Gerais' Republican movement; as a matter of fact, Silva Jardim entered into open conflict with the party. But he had another powerful ally, which became more important than the regional Republican parties in the events that followed: the national army.

Positivist ideas had been taught in the Military School of Rio de Janeiro since about 1850[128], and notions such as the value of scientific knowledge, rationalization, anti- clericalism, political centralization and effective government were widespread among the military intellectuals of the 1880's. Silva Jardim did not miss this connection when, in 1888, in a

meeting at Santos, he openly asked for military support for the Republican cause.[129] More important than Silva Jardim was the role of Positivist Republicanism in Rio Grande do Sul: the province was under the direction of Julio de Castilhos, a confirmed positivist himself, and the connection between civilian and military leadership in the province was much closer than in the remaining parts of the country. The Republic began in Rio Grande, establishing a pattern of regional cleavages closely related to the issues of centralization, regional autonomy and civilian vs. military politics, which were to pervade the country's political life in the decades to come.

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127 From the 1888 manifesto, transcribed in Boehrer (1954), pp. 233-34: ". . . O regime republicano exerce-se no campo da ação prática pela concentração das forças políticas, isto é, pela ditadura, tão forte quanto responsável . . . na ditadura republicana quem governa é um representante da opinião pública. por ela instituído ou sancionado."

128 Boehrer (1954), pp. 229, 283.

129 Boehrer (1954), pp. 279-80, gives evidence of widespread support for military action among civilian Republicans, and describes the activities of Silva Jardim on behalf of Sena Madureira, an officer who was to become the pivot of the "military question" (see section III, below).

3. The regional basis of militarism: Rio Grande do Sul

The military tradition of Rio Grande do Sul did not fail to have a decisive influence on the establishment of the First Republic and its development. This military tradition, which had its roots in the establishment of the Sacramento colony near the Rio de la Plata in 1680, was clearly visible in the nineteenth century. The country's biggest secessionist movement, the Farroupilha War (1835-45), and three foreign confrontations - the Cisplatine campaign, 1817-28, the Platine Campaigns of 1849-52 against Rosas and the Paraguayan War of 1864-70 - all took place either in Rio Grande or near it. Joseph Love gives some estimates of Rio Grande's share in the military efforts at the time: about three-fourths of the military men in the conflict against Rosas were from Rio Grande, and 34,000 men from that state were mobilized for the Paraguayan War - more than one-fourth of the total Brazilian effort. About 15,000 men, more than one-fourth of the Brazilian army in the pre and post-Paraguayan campaign, were regularly stationed there. Still according to sources quoted by Love, "more officers holding the rank of Brigadier general and above were from Rio Grande than from any other province."[130]

The close relationships between the civilian and the military elites in Rio Grande is personified in the leading political figure of the state during the nineteenth century, Manuel Luis Osório, who was also one of the most prestigious military leaders in the Farroupilha, Cisplatine and Paraguayan campaigns. His successor in the leadership of Rio Grande politics, Silveira Martins, was not a military man, but ran his Rio Grande Radical Liberal Party in a tight military fashion: "'The Riograndense Liberal Party moves like a regiment of Frederick [the Great]."[131] When the Republican movement began in Rio Grande, under the leadership of young lawyers trained in the São Paulo Law School, (Assis Brasil, Julio de Castilhos, Borges de Medeiros and Pinheiro Machado),[132] it almost immediately assumed the characteristics of Silva Jardim's radical Republican wing--strong opposition to slavery, Comtian positivism, revolutionary rhetoric, and military involvement. Only on the issue of political decentralization did they join the Paulistas and the remaining Republican movement: they followed the Farroupilha tradition of regional independence, and actually proclaimed the Farroupilha revolution as the root and inspiration of Rio Grande's Republican tradition. This secessionist inclination should not be taken, however, as a federalist ideology; once in national power, the Gaucho Republicans became strongly favorable to governmental centralization and intervention in other states.

The relationships between Rio Grande's Republicanism and the military establishment can be seen very clearly in the sequence of events which led to the end of the Empire in 1889. A disciplinary matter involving a lieutenant-colonel soon became a national crisis involving

130 Joseph L. Love (1971), pp. 15-16. Much of the following analysis of Rio Grande's political role is based on this excellent historical study.

131 Love (1971). p. 24.

132 Love (1971), p. 28: "All four of these men had graduated between 1878 and 1885; and all came from ranching families; three of them would govern Rio Grande and the fourth, Pinheiro Machado, was to become the state's foremost representative in the federal senate."

questions of military honor, subordination of military to civilian leadership, and so on. The "military question" of 1883 arose during a period in which the conservatives were governing, and a series of political cleavages were superimposed - Liberal vs. Conservative, military vs. civilian leadership, military professionals vs. military political leaders, and finally, Republicans vs. Monarchists. It is difficult to outline the full picture, since the old notion that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" does not seem to hold when institutional, regional and generational cleavages converge into a single crisis. The Republican movement led by Julio de Castilhos and his newspaper, *A Federação*, was in open conflict with the state's Liberal leadership, represented by Silveira Martins; but, at the same time, it was on Silveira Martins' side, strongly supporting military officialdom against civilian monarchic authority. Rio Grande's bearing in the whole "military question" was remarkable. Visconde de Pelotas, a liberal Senator from Rio Grande and an army marshal, took a strong stand on the issue, in a speech on the Senate floor in 1886; Sena Madureira, the military man who began the whole affair in 1883, spoke out again in 1886, while serving in Rio Grande, condemning the Minister who had punished him in 1884. In late 1886, the governor of Rio Grande, also a military marshal from that state, took a public stand in defense of Sena Madureira; this man was Deodoro da Fonseca, who was to lead the military coup against the Empire in 1889. Julio de Castilhos and his newspaper were present everywhere, giving support and setting fire to the conflict between the military establishment and the civilian government; an engraved plaque given to him by the officers of the Porto Alegre garrison honored him for his "unsurpassable patriotism in the defense of the sacred rights of the military class."[133]

It is important to stress that the close relationships between military and civilian leadership in Rio Grande did not mean that the two sectors were merged and fully integrated. The Brazilian army, since at least the Paraguayan War, was taking on all the characteristics of a professionalized and institutionalized body within the government, and the whole "military question" should not be explained away as simply a matter of conflict between Rio Grande Republicans and the monarchy. According to Boehrer, the more extreme Republican propagandists, including Silva Jardim and Julio de Castilhos, were excluded from the movement which placed Deodoro at the head of the Provisional Government in 1889[134]:; after all, this was a military affair, in which civilians should not interfere. Once the new regime started, however, civilians would have to be listened to; but this turned out to be a difficult and complicated task.

Republican history in Rio Grande is marked by a protracted and bloody conflict between the successors of the old Liberal Party, who organized a new Federalist Party under the leadership of Silveira Martins, and the Republican Party led by Julio de Castilhos Julio de Castilhos came to power in Rio Grande under Deodoro' s government, thanks to his faithful support of the central government. He fell when Deodoro was ousted in 1891 by Floriano da Fonseca (another general, also born in Rio Grande); but Floriano was soon to give his support to Castilhos, who came back to power in the state, thanks to the passive support of Porto Alegre's military garrison. Strong control of the state government, organized along the more authoritarian dimensions of the positivistic model, and continuous support of the Federal government in exchange for political and

133 Quoted by Love (1971), p. 31.

134 George C. A. Boehrer (1954), p. 286, and (1966) pp. 43-57.

military backing on the internal front are the main items of Castilho's political strategy and his source of strength. On the other hand, the Federalists, or *Maragatos*,[135] had their political base in the rural cattle-raising frontier area of Bagé. Having been left out of power, they developed. the more radical, caudillo-like and independent-minded traits of the Gaucho tradition. In general, however, the two sides of Rio Grande's political elite shared a tendency towards constant appeal to armed insurrection, close civilian and military ties, and a drive towards centralization and strong control, when in power, and towards decentralization and federalism when out of power; whoever had a given political stand at any given point depended very much on who was in power. In spite of the heavy European migration into Rio Grande, which made it one of the most modern and Europeanized states in the country, the line of political cleavage ignored ethnic boundaries and did not incorporate in any significant way the German or other immigrant groups.[136] In this aspect, Rio Grande's political experience is similar to what occurred for a long time in Argentina, and differs sharply from the North American experience, which brought immigrant groups into political life as soon as they were settled.

The details of Rio Grande's influence during the Old Republic need not be given here, but a few highlights are useful to complete this picture. Joseph Love has calculated the number of years spent in all ministries by natives of each Brazilian state during two periods: from 1889 to 1910 and from 1910 to 1930. During the first period, Rio Grande's participation was insignificant: only 2.56 years, as opposed to 12.64 for Minas Gerais, 9.73 for Bahia and 9.02 for São Paulo. After 1910, Rio Grande jumps from twelfth to first place with 18.13 years, as opposed to 16.09 for Minas Gerais and 12.37 for São Paulo. When he considers only the three major ministries - treasury, transportation and justice - Rio Grande falls to second place (15.14, as opposed to 15.45 for Minas Gerais), while São Paulo, still in third place, falls far behind with only 6.71 years.[137]

The first competitive presidential election in the country's history was held in 1910 and during his political campaign, the opposition candidate carried the banner of civilism. This was also the first time that a military man, Hermes da Fonseca, presented himself as a regular candidate for the presidency. Hermes da Fonseca was, of course, from Rio Grande, where he got 48,000 of the 64,000 votes cast. Ruy Barbosa, a prestigious civilian from Bahia, won in his own state with 75 per cent of the vote, and in São Paulo with 74 per cent. These figures should not be taken as truly representative of popular preference, because of their manipulation by all kinds of legal and

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135 The nickname "Maragatos," given to the Federalists, seems to have originated in a place called Maragataria, which was a passing point between Brazil and Uruguay. It implies that the Federalists had strong connections with Uruguay (Silveira Martins himself was born in that country) and moved quite freely between the two countries, where they could get supplies or find a sanctuary and an often illegal market for their cattle. For a description of the conflict between Republicans and Federalists, see Love (1971), chapter iii.

136 Love (1971), p. 131: “Despite the increasingly active role cf the colono population in the state's economic affairs, the colonos played a minor role in politics. The traditional estancieiro’s economy has its analogue in politics. The vast majority of the establishment. and opposition leaders of Rio Grande were members of the landowning class. The close ties between these landowners and the military elite is what makes of Rio Grande's politics something quite different from what a political system based on large land properties is usually supposed to be.”

137 Love (1971), p. 123, table 3.

illegal techniques.[138] But they do indicate where the central government controlled the electoral process, and where an opposition was able to show up. In spite of his indisputable personal prestige, Ruy Barbosa lost in all other states except Rio and Maranhão. Once in power, Hermes da Fonseca worked closely with the civilian political leader of Rio Grande, Pinheiro Machado, structuring a strong regime and a new political organization, the Conservative Republican Party.[139]

In São Paulo, Pinheiro Machado and Hermes da Fonseca worked together to curb the state's political leadership. In other states, they clashed in what became known as the politics of "national salvation" - intervention in the state's internal affairs on behalf of military leaders or politicians loyal to Pinheiro Machado.[140] After Hermes' term as president, only Minas Gerais - which had supported him from the very beginning - Rio Grande and São Paulo continued to play a meaningful role in the country's national politics.

4. São Paulo and Minas Gerais

The standard interpretation of Brazilian politics in the Old Republic holds that power was under the oligarchic control of the *café au lait* axis, that is, the coffee state of São Paulo and the state of Minas Gerais. In fact, the political role of São Paulo was always less significant than its ever growing economic weight suggests. In spite of the fact that the Partido Republicano Paulista supported every winning presidential candidate since 1898, except Hermes da Fonseca, only Campos Sales (1898-1902) Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906) and Washington Luiz (1926-1930) were from that state. To this absence from central power in the period from 1910 to 1926 corresponds a relatively reduced participation in the ministries, as shown by Love in the figures quoted above.

There are two ways of accounting for this apparent marginalization of São Paulo. One is saying that indicators such as holding the presidency, or cabinet offices, are not good enough as a measure of political marginalization; because if politics is about class interests, the only good indicators are those reflecting actual policy decisions related to economic interests. Thus, Valéria Pena quotes the fact that, at a given point in time, the Brazilian Bank used about 70 per cent of its resources to support the coffee economy in São Paulo: this is supposed to indicate that São Paulo did not really lack political power.[141] The other possibility is to argue that, considering the

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138 For election figures from the Old Republic I am relying on information gathered by Irene Moutinho from several sources, but mostly in the *Annaes do Congresso Nacional* ("Apuracão da Eleição de Presidente e Vice-Presidente realizada a 1º de Março de 1910"). Election outcomes had to be confirmed by Congress, and the criteria for this confirmation are strictly partisan. On the whole, the analysis of election outcomes during the period suggests that electoral fraud is probably a better indication of political strength than the votes themselves. Ruy Barbosa, after his defeat., was able to draw a picture of the outcomes according to which he actually had won the election throughout the country. Correct figures, in short, seem to be difficult to get and are not too meaningful politically.

139 Carone (1969), p. 256.

140 Carone (1969), p. 265. Pinheiro Machado is a central figure in the analysis, which Love makes of Rio Grande's role in the Brazilian Old Republic. Cf. Love (1971), chapter vi, "Pinheiro and His Party."

141 Maria Valéria Junho Pena, (1971), p. 43. The reference is from an article by Juarez Távora published in *O Estado de São Paulo* as quoted by Boris Fausto (1970), p. 76. Juarez Távora was a young lieutenant of the

decentralization of the political system at the time, the control of the national state was relatively unimportant for the economic purposes of São Paulo's economic and political elite. Mario Wagner Viera da Cunha, for instance, argues that the autonomy of the states is very high in the beginning of the Republic, but decreases sharply after the First World War. In the beginning, the states were free to contract loans abroad, to tax exports, to establish customs barriers among themselves and to keep their own armed forces. When the economic ascendency of the United States substituted former British preeminence in Brazil, the tradition of foreign economic dealings with private banks was substituted for direct dealings among states. The national government became thus a necessary broker and its control, a necessary support for state-based economic interests.[142]

It is certain that São Paulo interests controlled much of the economic mechanisms having to do with coffee interests.[143] The taxes on exports were laid by the states themselves, and represented more than 40 per cent of the states' revenues in the 1915-1929 period. Imports, however, were taxed by the central government, and used to represent between 40 and 50 percent of the federal revenue up to 1929.[144] Since the ability to import is a function of the ability to export, the difference between the two types of taxation actually represented a process of income transfer from the export areas to those states where political power could influence the allocations of federal resources. This situation was certainly felt in São Paulo, and the notion that the state alone was feeding a dependent and parasitic country was pervasive.

In the early twenties, there were a series of military outbursts against the central government in the states; the first, of course, occurred in Rio Grande do Sul. In 1924, a military revolt, loosely articulated with military groups throughout the country, was started in São Paulo.[145] This military rebellion received the full support of the São Paulo Chamber of Commerce, whose President, José Carlos de Macedo Soares, gave a clear picture of the state's grievances regarding the political system:

> Did São Paulo have the right to abandon the Federation to the often exclusive dominance of lesser statesmen? Did it have the right to allow the utilitarian politicking of "empreguismo" discouraging all civic courage through its systematic support of regional bosses and unjust expropriation of political mandates? The fact is

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revolutionary movement, who brought Vargas to power in 1930, and his article was meant as an attack on São Paulo"s power pretensions at the time. As we shall see later, the 1930 Revolution and its aftermath, the unsuccessful 1932 insurrection in São Paulo, are further confirmations of the political marginality of the country"s economic center.

142 M. W. Vieira da Cunha (1963), pp. 19-20.

143 The first governmental institution treated for intervention in the coffee economy was the Instituto Paulista de Defesa Permanente do Café, which controlled the flux of coffee towards the Port of Santos and the supply, and financed the stockage of surpluses. This Institute existed from 1924 to 1931, and from then on, there was always a national organization with increasing power to interfere in the coffee economy: the Conselho Nacional do Café (1931-33), the Departamento Nacional do Café (1933-46), the Departamento Econômico do Café (1946-52) and finally the Instituto Brasileiro do Cáfé, which still exists. Cf. Elisa Maria Pereira Reis (1972), p. 13 passim.

144 Fernando Antônio Rezende da Silva (1971), pp. 235-282.

145 For an account of the 1924 Revolt in São Paulo cf. Carone (1969), p. 373 ff.

> that São Paulo's absence was not limited to "nominating positions," which have been the goal and the ambition of almost all the country's political men. We totally lost our influence in the legislature, both in the Federal Chamber and in the Senate. We were completely excluded from one of the Republic's powers, since there is not one Paulista in the Supreme Court at this moment . . . We do not have a single representative in the Superior Council of Trade. In diplomacy, as in the judiciary, in the Navy as in the Army, in the powers of the State, everywhere, São Paulo is systematically excluded from all positions of influence and authority.[146]

What is remarkable about this statement is the clarity with which it distinguishes the two types of politics which coexisted in the country. One, "the goal and the ambition of almost all the country's political men," was the power to employ people, to hire friends in the civil service, to distribute favors and bring benefits to supporting groups. In other words, this was the power to use the state machinery as something to be had, to be profited from, and to increase one's own prestige and wealth - a kind of private patrimony. What São Paulo's leading businessmen wanted was not that, but the control of the decision mechanisms of the country, in other words, the power to use government resources in support of their own independent economic pursuits. For the Paulistas, politics was a way to improve their business; for "almost all" others, politics was their business.

Another expression of São Paulo's discontent appears in a book published in 1930, by a high official of São Paulo's Secretary of Finance.[147] Based on abundant statistical information, he claims that, during the period 1922-1924, São Paulo contributed about a third of the country's federal budget, whereas Minas was the state which most cost the Union. Going into great detail, he shows, for instance, that in 1928 the State of São Paulo was responsible for 88 per cent of the state's railroad system, whereas the railroad system in Minas Gerais, slightly bigger than the Paulista, was 70 per cent government-owned. In that year, Minas Gerais had 28 per cent of the federal railroads in its territory, as opposed to São Paulo, which had only 4 per cent. His analysis covers federal expenditures on the postal system, health, and education; and for all items, the conclusion is the same: Minas' share of federal expenditure is out of proportion to its contribution to the Union's income. In an appendix to his book, the author even challenges the figures that placed Minas Gerais ahead of São Paulo in terms of population. Indeed, he says, considering the great differences in productivity between the two states, the only explanation for the census differences would be the ability of the Minas politicians to increase the figures in order to get more

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146 José Carlos Macedo Soares (1925), p. 12: "Tinha São Paulo o direito de abandonar a Federação ao domínio -- por vezes exclusive -- de estadistas menos adiantados, de permitir a politicagem utilitária do 'empreguismo,'desanimando todas as coragens cívicas, pelo apoio sistemático aos mandões regionais, pela expropriação injusta dos mandatos? Pois bem: a abstenção de São Paulo não se limitou aos cargos de nomear, que tem constituído o alvo e a ambição de quase todos os homens públicos do país. Perdemos totalmente a influência legislativa, tanto na Câmara Federal quanto no Senado. Fomos completamente excluídos de um dos poderes da República, pois no Supremo Tribunal Federal, a esta hora, não há um único juiz de São Paulo. Entretanto, deles dizia Ruy Barbosa: "Podemo-nos consolar da fraqueza de seus políticos., ao menos, com a serenidade impoluta dos seus magistrados. Não temos um só representante no Conselho Superior do Comércio. Na Diplomacia, como na Magistratura, na Marinha, como no Exercito, nos poderes do Estado, por toda parte, em todos os postos de influencia e de autoridade, São Paulo está sistematicamente excluído."

147 Manuel Olympio Romeiro (1930).

benefits for their own states. "There is no way out of the dilemma, " says he; "either the population in Minas Gerais is smaller or, if it is bigger, it has an unfortunate inertia."[148]

Brazilian historiography is particularly poor in its analysis of Minas Gerais as a region within the context of the country's political system. In an often-quoted study of some twenty years ago, Cid Rebelo Horta showed how the social and economic elite of the state was interwoven in a tight net of about thirty families.[149] These thirty families controlled state politics from the local to the national level, and extended their influence into the national sphere. Valéria Pena joins Julio Barbosa and other analysts of Minas politics in considering that the bargaining power of the Minas Gerais' political elite can be explained by the "firm organization and institutionalization of their local power sources " and by the state's relatively high demographic density, whose cause can be traced to the gold period of the eighteenth century.[150]

In other words, institutional and demographic factors seemed to be more important than simple economic explanations. The close familistic structure of the Minas Gerais elite, and its active participation in national politics are an argument against the theories that explain their political influence by their control of land and the political system at the local level. Politics in Minas Gerais was always very centralized, and a small committee of notables, known as the "Tarasca, " used to make all important decisions within the Partido Republicano Mineiro in the days of the Old Republic.[151]

5. The 1930 Revolution: Facts and Ideologies

Brazilian society and politics become increasingly more complex and are studied less as we move beyond 1930. In this year, a revolutionary movement brought Getúlio Vargas, a civilian and former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, to the presidency. Vargas was to remain in power until 1945, and be elected again to tile Presidency in 1950. The year of 1930 is usually taken as a landmark of the beginning of modern Brazil, and, as a matter of fact, during the 1930's, there is a significant increase of several indices of social modernization. Hard data are difficult to obtain, since there was no general census in Brazil in 1930, and the censuses of 1920 and 1940 are not quite comparable. It has been estimated, however, that the country's urban population increased from 10 to about 30 per cent from 1920 to 1940; this percentage kept rising as time passed.[152]

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148 Olympio Romeiro (1930), p. 102.

149 Cid Rebelo Horta (1956).

150 M. Valéria Pena (1971), p. 45: “O alto poder de barganha politica das facções mineiras na estrutura do poder nacional parece poder ser explicado em virtude da firme organização e institucionalização de seu poder local, que não se apresentava fracionado em nível externo, além de sua alta densidade demográfica originaria do ciclo do ouro.”

151 For a summary of Minas Gerais' politics during the Old Republic, cf. David V. Fleischer (1972), chapter iii.

152 For a summary of the country"s development since 1930, see Schmitter (1971), chapter ii, pp. 20-46. This estimate of urbanization is taken from Pedro Pinchas Geiger (1962).

Government expenditures, which remained stable in value per capita from 1907 to 1943, showed nevertheless a substantial increase in absolute terms after 1930.[153] After 1930, social expenditures started to appear in the federal budget as separate items: they added up to about 10 per cent of the budget around 1940.[154] The occupational structure of the population did not change much: employment in agriculture went from 69 to 65.1 per cent from 1920 to 1940, whereas employment in manufacturing increased only 1 per cent, from 13 per cent to 14 per cent.[155]

Interpretations of the 1930 Revolution tend to be a central concern of Brazilian historians and political scientists, since there is a shared belief that it is important to know how modern Brazil started if one wants to understand how it is today and why. The actual facts, which are, of course, very complex, can be summarized in a few items. First, the revolution came about after a crisis in the arrangement according to which the presidency should belong to Minas Gerais; that year, the outgoing president, Washington Luis from São Paulo, wanted to pass the presidency to fellow Paulista, Julio Prestes. The leading states were split: Minas Gerais and Rio Grande rallied against São Paulo and the federal government. The official candidate won, but the opposition candidate, Getúlio Vargas, finally got the presidency after a series of military clashes. The victory was not a direct result of the military campaign, which lasted 21 days, from the 3rd to the 24th of October, 1930. In that year, the high military command finally decided to ask President Washington Luis to step down. Secondly, there was a climate of military rebellion which had started years before, a movement known as "tenentismo." Luís Carlos Prestes, a Gaucho army captain who was to become years later the head of the Brazilian Communist Party, was the leader of a famous military column which, in 1925, swept the country in open rebellion against the government, marching several thousand miles from Rio Grande to the Northeast and entering, two years later, into Argentina. In 1930, Prestes had already split ideologically with his former military colleagues, and refused to join the military movement in support of Getúlio Vargas. The young officers who gathered around him, however, were to become the strong men of Vargas' regime after 1930.[156] Third, the electoral campaign in 1930 was carried on by the "Liberal Alliance" which, for the first time, presented a political platform opposing the state oligarchies and government inefficiency.[157] Fourth, the revolution of 1930 came about in the midst of a very difficult economic situation, because of the effects suffered by the coffee trade during the 1929 world crisis.

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153 Rezende da Silva (1971), p. 245.

154 Rezende da Silva (1971), p. 256.

155 Cf. Table 2.1, Schmitter (1971), p. 23. For detailed figures on industrialization in the twenties and thirties, see Boris Fausto (1970), pp. 19-28.

156 The bibliography on the revolutionary movement of 1930 is quite extensive. On the “Tenentismo" movement, cf. Virgilio de Santa Rosa (1933); R. J. Alexander (1956); J. D. Wirth (1964); Hélio Silva (1968). This list is far from complete.

157 The radical wing of the revolutionary movement was embodied in several efforts of political organization and mobilization, such as the Legion of October, the October 3rd Chub and the Revolutionary Legion. For an overview of these movements, particularly the latter, cf. Peter Flynn (1970), pp. 71-106.

There are two leading interpretations of the 1930 movement in Brazilian literature, according to Boris Fausto. The first follows the standard Marxist-type model of development: it begins with a feudal system and a weak and dependent central government; this traditional system enters into contradiction with an emerging urban bourgeoisie, and ends with a bourgeois revolution, which in turn paves the way for working class access to the political arena. Adapted to the context of an export economy, this theory identifies, in its simple form, the "feudal" with large-scale export farming of a colonial or semi-colonial kind; the "bourgeois" revolution is also seen as a nationalist and anti-imperialist movement. Many Brazilian writers have tried to see in the 1930 revolution the bourgeoisie's arrival to power, if not directly, at least in terms of its "objective" consequences.[158]

A typical example is given by Octávio Ianni, who says that

> The 1930 Revolution should be interpreted as a superstructural moment of "primitive accumulation" which provides the basis for the country's subsequent industrialization, and this is so, in spite of the fact that it was not predominantly led or nourished by the emerging industrial and financial bourgeoisie.[159]

This statement is based on the fact that there was a surge of industrialization in Brazil after 1930. This kind of *ex post facto* explanation leads him into trouble, however, when he has to explain why the strongest center of opposition to the Vargas regime after 1930 was located precisely in São Paulo, which was also the state which benefitted most from the country's industrialization: he is led to say that this opposition, and especially the 1932 Constitutionalist Revolution in São Paulo, "was only against the ideals of the non-bourgeois components of the 1930 Revolution."[160]

A second, and seemingly similar model switches the explanation from the bourgeoisie to the middle classes. But this switch is not just an alternative to the former one, since it has deeper connotations. Middle-class theorists think less in terms of an economic process of industrialization than in terms of a social process of modernization, and the "middle class," or "middle sectors," is too inclusive a concept, covering all the emerging groups which were neither part of the landed aristocracy and/or the political elite nor completely subordinated to them. The growing unrest of young military men after 1920 is seen by many authors as an indication of a rising middle sector,

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158 Boris Fausto's work is a very convincing demonstration of the untenability of the classist interpretations of the 1930 movement, either in terms of a bourgeois or of a middle-class revolution. Theoretically, however, he turns his careful historiographic study into a not. too clear discussion of the "dualist" theories of political development, and it becomes quite difficult to understand the links he establishes between the "dualist" and "classist" interpretations of the Brazilian political process. One example of the mistakes created by the class interpretation of the 1930 movement, quoted by Boris Fausto, is André Gunder Frank, who tries to link Rio Grande's political role in the episode to the presence of European migration and the beginnings of a rudimentary industry in the area. Cf. Boris Fausto (1970); Celina do Amaral Peixoto Moreira Franco, Lucia Lippi Oliveira and Maria Aparecida A. Hime, (1970); André Gunder Frank (1967).

159 Octávio Ianni, (1965) pp. 135-36.

160 Ianni, (1965) p. 138.

which had so far been out of the political system and now demanded more political participation. The 1930 revolution was then, for these authors, essentially a middle- class movement, which opened the doors of the political system to new middle groups.[161]

What strikes one as the main difference between these two models is not only that they point to two different social groups as the main actors in the 1930 Revolution, but that they also have a very different image of the role of the political system in the process of change In the first case, political power is nothing but an epiphenomenon, which is explained and modified by the clash between two sectors of the country's economic system. In the second case, however, the middle sectors are seen less as a socio-economic class than as a social stratum which has consumption, political participation and political power demands. Political participation and political power are sought not as a means of fulfilling the economic interests of a given sector of the economy, but as a goal in itself, from which other forms of social and economic participation follow.

Since neither of the explanations has either empirical support or much theoretical relevance, their interest lies less in what they explain than in what they suggest.[162] They indicate two different intellectual and ideological approaches to the understanding of Brazilian history; more important than this, they reflect two tendencies in the development of Brazilian society which are often pointed out as alternatives, but which are never seen as parts of a simultaneous process of contradictory development. In other words, the differences in the interpretations of Brazilian political history are not just a matter of intellectual disagreement; they lead to quite different evaluations and propositions about the country's political experience and political future.

The details of these ideologies are a chapter in the history of Brazilian social thought, which cannot take much of our attention here. It is enough to note that, whereas the theorists of the "bourgeois revolution" tend to come from a Marxist tradition, which shares with liberal ideologies the image of a passive state, the inspiration of the "middle-class" theorists comes from the fascist experiences and ideologies of Europe. Virgílio de Santa Rosa, one of the more lucid contemporary analysts of the 1930 Revolution, himself a middle-class theorist, considers the Bolshevik and the Fascist experiences examples of the creation of an efficient and rational state structure, directed by the intelligentsia and the middle sectors and concerned with breaking down the traditional power structure in their countries. Azevedo Amaral, one of the most outstanding ideologists of the Vargas regime) explicitly denies the relevance of both the fascist and the bolshevik experiences to Brazil, and does not speak of middle sectors. He goes still further, however: he sees in the

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161 The theorists of the middle class include Virgilio Santa Rosa (1963), Guerreiro Ramos (1961) and Hélio Jaguaribe (1962). A summary of their theories is given by Boris Fausto, C. Moreira Franco and others.

162 As lanni's example above typifies, these theses are not subject to empirical falsification. Short of the very top and very bottom of the social structure, everyone else is "middle class," a truism which has not much explanatory power. The insistence on "middle class" theories as an explanation of social movements in Latin America, and mainly as an explanation of the military presence in politics, is probably a hangover from a conceptual framework which cannot be freed from the few alternative explanations based on three or four classes and their permutations. "Middle classes," or better still, "middle sectors," is a residual category which can be used when the others obviously cannot. But this type of explanation often comes from something deeper than this conceptual difficulty, as I am trying to show.

countryside's local agrarian leadership the tellurian sources of national strength, and blames the regional oligarchies for plaguing the country with an exotic and fictitious liberal state. The 1930 Revolution is seen, in this context, as an effort to approximate the nation to its authentic sources, the beginning of a new era. This romantic component is absent from other authors in the same line of thought, but all share the idea of a central state which could recuperate its autonomy after decades of control by the regional oligarchies.[163]

The Vargas regime was established as a compromise between some of the traditional regional oligarchies and a group of young military, modernizing intellectuals; it appeared in the wake of a general increase in the levels of political participation in the country. But the Vargas regime soon alienated a very significant sector of the Brazilian intelligentsia, who joined the fascist "*integralista*" movement and even tried to overthrow the regime in 1937, in an effort to push the "middle-class" revolution still further. In spite of individual differences and diverging views about the historical origins of the country's problems and possible solutions, it is not too difficult to see how the "middle-class" ideologists share the notion (and the ideal) of a governmental structure, free from class and regional constraints, which could lead the country's life according to the will of its leadership.[164]

6. The new centralization

Placing ideological disputes aside, the fact is that the political regime, inaugurated in 1930, signified a radical departure from the previous one in terms of its much stronger centralization and concentration of power. Their leaders were not representatives of the "bourgeoisie," nor of "rising middle classes." They could clearly be linked to the political and military tradition of Rio Grande,

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163 Azevedo Amaral (1934). Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos has called my attention to the fact that neither Amaral nor his contemporaries in the thirties (Nestor Duarte, Oliveira Vianna, Francisco Campos) show in their work the presence of a direct and strong German influence. In this book, as a matter of fact, the only German author which appears is Spengler, quoted from a Spanish translation. The indirect influence, however, is some- times very obvious. In a given point, Amaral says that "as fases áureas do Estado em todos os tempos e em todos os países têm sido sempre as épocas de predomínio politico dos elementos sedentários recrutados da classe agrícola," (1934), p. 151. It is from the land that the true and best nationality emerges, and the future lies in the dialectic process by which the nation will recover its authentic roots. For a comprehensive bibliography and analysis of Amaral's work see Aspásia Brasileiro Alcântara (1967). For an overview of names and subjects in the history of Brazilian social thought, cf. Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (1967).

164 To establish linkages between substantive interpretations and normative evaluations is a necessary and important task in the sociology of knowledge, even if it runs the unavoidable risks of all generalizations. Bolivar Lamounier, in an unpublished paper, made a lengthy criticism of the analysis above, saying, for instance, that Raymundo Faoro perceives the Brazilian political system as centralized and authoritarian; he does not have a class interpretation of the political process, although he is ideologically anti-authoritarian. However, he says it is implicit in my discussion above that he should not be so. I am certainly not responsible for all the stretching that can be done with the general links which I am suggesting exist between substantive analysis and ideological preferences. The fact, however, is that an author such as Raymundo Faoro, who is a strong critic of the patrimonialist and tutelary political structure which he studies, does not seem to suggest a meaningful political alternative. Other authors prefer to accept the centralized and hierarchical system of authority as something to be supported and stimulated. What remains to be seen is whether they have really a substantively different approach to the political issues involved, or if they are simply two sides of the same coin.

and they responded in a diffuse, uncertain and undecided way to the demands of urbanized sectors of the country for some elements of social welfare, an increase in the efficiency of the central state and in its administrative, military and economic strength.

Presidential elections during the Old Republic often had no competition (Rodrigues Alves in 1902, Afonso Pena in 1906, Epitácio Pessoa in 1918, Washington Luis in 1926). When competition existed, cleavages were essentially regional. Ruy Barbosa, twice defeated in competitive elections, had his political base in the state of Bahia, and Getúlio Vargas in 1930 drew his support from Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Paraíba Table 11 presents data for a comparison of these competitive elections.

TABLE 11 COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST REPUBLIC			
	1910	**1914**	**1930**
States in the opposition	São Paulo, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and Distrito Federal	Bahia	Minas, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Sul
Average per cent votes for candidate winning presidential election in states where he won.	87.8 (15 states)	95.6 (19 states)	85.4 (only 9 states)
Average per cent votes for candidate losing presidential election in states where he won.	71	62.1	84.8
Per cent of voters of total population	1.64%	2.14%	5.10%

Source. Data gathered by Celina Moreira Franco, Lucia Lippi Oliveira and Maria Aparecida Hime, "O Contexto Politico da Revolução de 30," Dados 7, 1970; complemented by information collected by Irene Moutinho from the Annaes do Congresso Nacional and other sources.

The year of 1910 witnessed the first competitive election in the Republic, with a turnout of about 1.6 per cent of the total population. In 1914, the turnout was 2.14, but in 1926, not shown in the table, there was a single candidate, and the turnout figure fell to 2.06. Only in 1930, at the brink of the Vargas revolution, did the turnout rise to above 5 per cent. The 1930 election was more competitive than the previous ones at the state level, and most evidently so in the city of Rio de Janeiro, where the winning candidate received only 51 per cent of the vote. In general, however, the pattern is the same both in the winning and in the losing states, with one additional characteristic: the level of turnout generally increased in the opposition states. This supports the general proposition that political competitiveness tends to amplify the scope of political conflict; it signifies a departure from the previous pattern of extremely limited enfranchisement.[165] The political system based on the dominance of the more traditional states could not sustain itself anymore, but power did not shift to the more modern São Paulo, which lost out once again. The Vargas regime transferred the source of power still further from the states to the central executive, and increased the participation of the military and the dependence of the regional oligarchies upon the central government.

Benedito Valadares, a legendary politician from Minas Gerais who became the living symbol of "traditional" politics in Brazilian political folklore, gives a candid account of how his political career was started and implemented under the shadow of Vargas, after 1930.[166] The essential element of his political strategy was his almost absolute personal loyalty to Vargas. In this, he was in open opposition to the leading Mineiro politicians from the pre-Vargas period, such as Antonio Carlos, who attempted to exercise Minas Gerais' right to the presidency under the old agreement of the "politics of the governors'"; and to young leaders, such as Virgílio de Melo Franco or Gustavo Capanema, who tried to play a political role of their own. Valadares' letter of introduction to Vargas was his performance as chief of police in the fight against the Paulista insurrection to 1932. He does not care to justify his stand in defense of the Vargas regime; the fact that he is recompensed with a nomination as the President's deputy in the state of Minas seemed

165 E. E. Schattschneider (1960), chapter i.

166 Benedito Valadares (1966).

to be enough to demonstrate that he was right. It is interesting to see how Valadares goes to Vargas after the President of Minas Gerais, Olegário Maciel, dies:

> His death was a terrible blow, since, besides liking him very much, I was completely lost, without a chief or a guide, which is so necessary to the young in public life. Arthur Bernardes was on the other side, Antonio Carlos had his preferences. The new ones entangled themselves in political competition.. . .[167]

Valadares goes to Rio de Janeiro and asks for an audience with Vargas, from which he emerges, in practice, as Vargas' s personal deputy in Minas Gerais. Once in power, he makessome attempts to behave as a free agent and is especially active in the political maneuvers for the presidential election, which was supposed to be held in 1938. He attempts to obtain an agreement on a single candidate, who would be himself; but the 1937 coup, which was to establish Vargas as dictator, was already under way, and he decided to join. He was to remain at the direction of the state's affairs until 1945, and from then on was a national leader of the Social Democratic Party, which emerges in 1945 after Vargas's fall, bringing together the majority of the local ""traditional"" politicians in Minas Gerais and other states .

This is, in short, the secret of the *político mineiro* which survives the First Republic. Not quite the representative of rural oligarchies, nor the expression of ill-dissimulated economic interest, but the open agent of the head of State, working in open confrontations, as in 1932, or more often in undercover maneuvers, but always in a context where the major trump is access to the dominant center of political and economic power, the federal government. Valadares never comes into the open and is the main instrument of the elimination of the old state leadership's aspirations for political autonomy.

If, in Minas, the transition to the new centralization was relatively easy, in São Paulo the situation was much more difficult. First, of course, the state had not joined the revolutionary movement of 1930. But, mostly, there was very little in common between the new political leadership and the state's interests. Warren Dean quotes the fact that, when Vargas's deputy João Alberto comes to São Paulo shortly after 1930,

> He was so unaware of the size of São Paulo's industrial park that he considered resolving labor troubles by inviting the owner and one worker from each firm to a meeting. He didn't realize the audience would have numbered 11,000.[168]

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167 Valadares (1966), p. 36: “Foi um choque tremendo, pois, além de o estimar muito, ficara desarvorado, sem o chefe ou guia tão necessário aos moços na vida pública. Arthur Bernardes estava do outro lado, Antônio Carlos tinha os seus preferidos. Os novos se engalfinhavam na competição politica . . . .”

168 Dean (1969), p. 183.

In general, the policy of the new government was liberal in economic terms, and the eventual support it gave to populist demands was not particularly to the liking of São Paulo's industrialists.[169] As Dean summarizes,

> The most striking change in the economic environment of the 1930's was the increasing intervention of the government. But this intervention was not designed to accelerate the process of industrialization: the alternatives of the export economy had not yet been played out.[170]

When, after 1937, the liberal outlook was changed into an explicit policy of economic growth and industrialization, the path chosen by the government was not to support the Paulista industrial system, but to keep initiative under control of the state. The government could certainly not ignore the resources that were available in São Paulo, and soon a "rapprochement" began between government and industrialists; but initiative and entrepreneurial leadership all belonged to the former.

In 1932, hope had vanished for those who had joined the Revolution, expecting that the new regime would simply re-establish the power and autonomy of the state leadership: many of Vargas supporters in 1930 were now in the São Paulo barricades against him. One of these was the gaucho João Neves da Fontoura, leader of the Liberal Alliance, which had supported the Vargas campaign. The other was the "Paulista" Julio de Mesquita Filho.[171] Once in power, the logic of the situation was such that the new centralization carried out the alienation of the more traditional political leadership in the south. Borges de Medeiros, the leader of Rio Grande's Republican Party, who had placed Vargas in the state leadership and supported his candidacy to the presidency, also joined the 1932 uprising against him, in behalf of state autonomy. Champions of federalism but promoters of centralization--such seems to be the historical predicament of Rio Grande's politicians.

The tendencies towards an increase of executive power, an increase in the role of the central state in the social and economic life of the country, continuous co-optation of autonomous political leadership at all levels, and subordination of the economic to the political process would be firmly established during the Vargas regime and never actually from then on. At the same time, however, inter-regional cleavages gradually became intra-regional and national in a process which began in Rio and tended to remain an essentially urban fact. This combination of strong centralization and "plebiscitarian' politics seems to have been at the root of Brazilian populism since the late thirties

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169 Cf. Dean (1969), pp. 191-92, for a description of a conflict between the Ministry of Labor and the industrialists shortly before the 1932 insurrection. Free from direct industrialist interests, the central government was eventually able to pursue social welfare values which collided with São Paulo's new, exploitative young capitalism.

170 Dean (1969), p. 205.

171 João Neves da Fontoura (1963).

1. Economic development in the "new" countries

The process of political change described in the preceding chapters had, in its background, the new relationships between the country and an expanding world market. One of the most important aspects of the relationship between the marginal new countries and the central old ones was the pattern of asymmetry, economic dependency and political interference which came with it.

Less obvious, but certainly as important, was how this kind of external dependency was reflected in the country's internal structure and political process. Since there are varying degrees of freedom and alternate possibilities of behavior in even the tightest bonds of dependency, it is necessary to know which alternatives are open in a given situation, and the reasons why a given alternative was adopted instead of another. To take this perspective does not mean, of course, that the relevance and explanatory power of the political and economic variables related to external dependency will be neglected; it simply means that the analysis will be made from the standpoint of the dependent unit, taking the external system as given, and recovering, as it were, the relative internal autonomy and possibilities of choice. This chapter is intended as a step in this direction. It is concerned with changes in the "new countries," given the context of an expanded international market, and considers some alternative ways in which these countries may relate to it.

The main economic activity in late eighteenth century Brazil was gold mining. But its decline was very abrupt, going from an annual average of 14,600 kg. in the 1741-1760 period to an average of only 1,760 kg. from 1811 to 1820. The Napoleonic wars and the beginning of free trade with Britain brought a brief prosperity to the sugar and cotton agriculture, but after 1812-1815, prices declined, and "the Brazilian political independence occurs at a moment of full world economic recession and of recession in the Brazilian economy."[172] At the same time, however, coffee was emerging as the leading product in the country, a situation which would prevail from then on, as the table below shows.

172 Virgílio Noya Pinto (1969), p. 132. The data above are from the same source.

TABLE 12 BRAZILIAN EXPORTS UP TO 1931				
Year	Value in 1,000 £	Value in £ in 1950	% of coffee over total exports	% of second ranking product
1821	4.30	9.40	16.30	25.30 (sugar)
1829	2.10	4.60	20.50	37.20
1830	3.30	7.30	19.80	36.70
1840-41	5.30	10.40	42.70	28.50
1850-51	8.10	21.50	48.10	23.30
1860-61	13.20	25.00	64.70	
1870-71	15.40	34.00	50.30	
1872-73	22.30	45.00	37.60	14.70
1880-81	21.20	51.00	54.60	
1890	26.30	75.00	50.30	
1900	33.10	90.00	67.70	
1910	63.00	160.00	42.30	39.10 (rubber)
1920	82.30	67.50	49.10	6.00 (sugar)
1929	94.80	156.00	71.00	
1930	65.70	130.00	62.60	
1931	49.50	122.00	68.90	

Source: IBGE, Anuário Estatístico 1940 and 1966. APEC, Estudos, A Economia Brasileira e Suas Perspectivas, 4 volumes. Oliver Onody, A Inflação Brasileira 1820-1958 Rio 1960), for the conversion index to 1950 pounds.

From the 1860's to the first World War, the volume of Brazilian exports increased about sixfold, due mainly to the expansion of the coffee industry, which had become, since the second half of the nineteenth century, responsible for 40 to 80 percent of the country's exports.

This economic boom was certainly not an isolated phenomenon, since it occurred alongside a rapid expansion of the international market. In the well-known "First Wicksell Lecture" of April, 1959, Ragnar Nurkse presented some estimates on the expansion of international trade in the nineteenth century as compared with the contemporary period, dealing specifically with the pattern of "growth through trade." From 1850 to 1880, world trade increased) according to his estimates, by 270 percent; from 1880 to 1913 it increased 170 percent; and the increase for the 1928-58 period was just 57 percent. "The focal center of economic expansion," says Nurkse, "was initially Great Britain, whose population, despite heavy migration, trebled in the 19th century while her national income appears to have increased about ten-fold and the volume of her imports more than twenty-fold."[173] The countries which benefited more directly from this expansion were those in the "regions of recent settlement," namely Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and, of course, the United States. According to Nurkse the share of the "new countries (Canada, Argentina, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand) in Britain's imports rose from 8 percent

173 Ragnar Nurkse (1968), p. 87.

in 1857-59 to 18 percent in the 1911-13 period. The share of British investments, which went to these areas grew from 10 percent in 1870 to 45 percent in 1913.

Brazil also belonged, even if as a minor partner, to this club of "new" countries which received the impact of British economic expansion. Brazil had to pay England dearly for the international recognition of its independence and, with the economic treaty which Britain imposed upon Brazil in 1827, "the transfer of the special privileges which England had enjoyed for centuries in Portuguese commerce was completed, and the continuation of Great Britain's pre-eminence in the economic life of its old European ally was assured in Portuguese America, despite the severance of the colony from the mother country. The thread of continuity is remarkably clear, running back through the transition years of 1810-1827 to the Anglo- Portuguese relations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."[174]

Britain was not to remain the main market for Brazilian agricultural products in the late nineteenth century, but she was certainly the main supplier of loans and capital investments. As Manchester puts it, "Great Britain . . . has never made a question of maintaining its early supremacy in the field of Brazilian exportations; it is primarily interested in Brazil as a market for English goods, not as a supplier of raw materials for home consumption."[175] The United States became the main market for Brazilian products after the Civil War and, during the first World War, it supplanted Great Britain as the principal supplier of capital investments in the country.

The development of the "new" countries obeyed what economic historians have called the "staple theory," according to which the economy grows on the basis of a leading export product, which benefits from international comparative advantages due to the abundance of land and immigrant labor.[176] Open spaces for the production of new products absorbed by an expanding international market, availability of foreign capital to finance the transportation and commercial infra-structure for the new products, and the immigration of European manpower, all led to an economic impulse which should have been enough to create, in the long run, a self-sustained and differentiated economy. What has been difficult to explain is why the staple theory worked so well for some countries and did not work for others; why some of the "new" countries of the late nineteenth century's expansion of international trade are now in the club of high development, while others lagged behind.

There is a wealth of information and discussions on this problem, and it would be out of place to introduce this material here. What is important in this context is to see how this difficulty in turning the economic impulse of the staple product into self-sustained and diversified economic growth was linked to the types of institutional and regional differentiations and cleavages we have

174 Alan K. Manchester (1933), p. 210.

175 Alan K. Manchester (1933), p. 334.

176 On the "staple theory," see Richard Caves (1965), and M. Watkins (1963).

been pointing out. We will begin with a close and well-analyzed international comparison, between Argentina and Australia, and then see how this applies to the Brazilian case.[177]

2. External impulse and internal differentiation: Argentina and Australia.

Regardless of minor differences in statistical estimates, it is fairly clear that the rates of development in Argentina and Australia have been quite similar since the beginning of this century. According to Hector Diegues, per capita income in Argentina rose 99 percent from 1904 to 1960-63, while income in Australia increased by 113 percent in the same period. What makes most of the difference, of course, is the starting point. It is estimated that the per capita income of Australia was already, at the beginning of the century, 1.75 times that of Argentina.

What concerns Diegues are less the historical reasons for this difference than the reasons why the process of industrialization in the twentieth century did not reduce this difference; in other words, how did Australia keep and actually increase its relative advantage through time.

Since the overall relative performance of the Australian economy was not significantly better than the Argentine, it can be assumed that both countries behaved at a "reasonable" level of economic rationality, Australia's only advantage being the higher starting point. Under closer examination, however, it becomes clear that Australia had a well-established and purposeful policy of defense and stimulation of its industrial structure, which Argentina lacked. It is as if the relative advantage in the international market belonged to Argentina, and not to Australia; as if Australia needed to work harder to keep the same levels of economic achievement which Argentina had with a policy of economic laissez-faire. It also means, of course, that Argentina could probably have caught up with Australia in absolute terms if she had had a similar policy of industrialization.

The reasons for the differences are thus not economic, but essentially sociological and political, as Hector Diegues is well aware:

> A mi juicio la solidez político-social alcanzada por Australia en las primeras dos décadas de este siglo, el debilitamiento del poder terrateniente, la acción política organizada del movimiento sindical, y la presencia del Partido Laborista, fueron elementos importantes para lograr tempranas políticas de altos salarios y leyes sociales, y lo que debe destacarse particularmente, para desplazar la actitud terrateniente reemplazándola por una diferente actitud general hacia el crecimiento industrial, circunstancia que se consolida en la década de los veinte. Durante esta década no se advierte en Argentina una equivalente actitud hacia el desenvolvimiento industrial.[178]

177 Some of the comparative studies on this topic are Hector L. Diegues (1968); Arthur Smithies (1965); and A. Ferrer and E. L. Wheelwright (n. d.).

178 Hector Dilgues (1968), pp. 16-17.

The historical account presented by Diegues shows a well- formulated and purposeful policy of industrialization in Australia, which Argentina certainly lacked. Less convincing, however, are the links between these policies and the strength of the trade unions and the Labor Party, which the quotation above implies.

It is difficult to evaluate how much Australia was ahead of Argentina in terms of political organization and participation in the first two decades of this century. What is well-known, nevertheless, is that, in 1912, universal enfranchisement was established in Argentina by the Sanz Pena Law, leading to high levels of political participation and the organization of radical and socialist political parties. Ezequiel Gallo offers evidence which shows that the radical and socialist groups were fighting, as in Australia, for higher standards of living, but against tariffs and other protectionist measure which could help the industrial development of the country. Higher tariffs meant higher prices in the short run, and the notion that the interests of the working and middle classes are fostered when the income of the industrialist is improved was certainly alien to the popular ideologies of the time. As Gallo puts it,

> The Socialist party (in Argentina) resolutely opposed two kinds of measures: legislation tending towards a devaluation of the Argentinian peso and any attempt to raise the tariff barriers. Both measures would have had an adverse effect on the standard of living of the workers (in the case of the tariffs, it must be remembered that despite import substitution, a significant proportion of the consumer goods purchased by the workers was still imported)[179]

Which means that the little industrial development Argentina had was not due to the political strength of these "modern" social sectors, but was achieved almost in spite of them.

3. A model of change

The model implicit in Gallo's discussion can be expressed in the graph below:

179 Ezequiel Gallo (1970), pp. 57-58.



FIGURE 2

The formulation of the explanatory model for Brazil is usually attributed to Celso Furtado, and the criticism to which it has been subject follows a pattern similar to the debate on Argentine development, described above.[180]

First, regarding the negative link between industry and agriculture, there is a widespread notion that a natural hostility exists between these two sectors, which is not supported empirically. The theory works in terms of comparative costs, according to which it would be cheaper and more convenient to import manufactured products than to produce them at home, when foreign currency is available and industrial tradition is lacking. The development of a national industry would require tariff barriers, tolerance for higher costs and low quality, and other protective measures which the agriculturalists would not be interested in supporting. Besides, the establishment of protective tariffs always brings the risk of reciprocity, and the closing of the foreign market to export products.

Although correct in its more general terms, this theory does not cover all the facts. An active export economy does not exclude, as it did not in São Paulo, a series of related and unrelated industrial and urban activities. Directly related to it are items of transport, processing and commercial organization. The money economy, which was stimulated by wages paid by the coffee plantations, created a demand for products which could not easily be imported from abroad:

> Along with bricks, almost every kind of construction material was domestically produced by 1920: tiles, cement, nails, ceramic pipes, lumber, arid even plate glass and plumbing fixtures. Other

180 Celso Furtado (1959). For a historical re-interpretation of the theory, see Warren Dean (1969) especially chapters vi and x; Werner Baer and Anibal Villela (1972); Nathaniel H. Leff (1969); and several other sources mentioned in the Baer and Villela article.

> obvious examples are beer and soft drinks (and bottles to put them in), shoes, boilers, coarse textiles, furniture, stonework, flour, pots and pans, and hats[181]

A third source of manufacturing development was the decision of the merchants and importers to finance the national production or finishing of goods, rather than bring them in from abroad. This combination of export, import and manufacturing interests is quite far from the image of an urban, entrepreneur capitalism struggling against traditional agricultural sectors. The fact is that an active and dynamic export agriculture can hardly be considered "traditional" on closer examination, as we shall see further on. The positive correlation between an export economy and industrialization is explicitly stated by Ezequiel Gallo:

> The strategic variable in the process of industrialization undergone by these regions has been the steady expansion of demand, which in turn resulted from the increase in incomes generated by the successful performance of the export sector.[182]

High tariffs and external crises are usually seen together as factors which give strength to the development of national manufacture. The two World Wars and the 1929 world crisis are seen as circumstances which impaired the flow of international trade, reduced the availability of foreign currency and foreign products, and freed the national industry from foreign competition. The fact, however, seems to have been that world crises had a depressing effect on the economy as a whole, *including* the industrial sector.[183] It is true that, during the Second World War, Brazil had a limited participation in the western war effort, and this led, for instance, to the creation of the first steel plant in the country, Volta Redonda, the first motor engine plant, the Fábrica Nacional de Motores, etc. In his comparison between Argentina and Australia) Hector Diegues notices that Australia had to produce supplies for the troops engaged in the First World War; moreover, it was the main Allied base in the Pacific after 1942, having to make a war effort similar to Great Britain's.[184] What these examples show is not that the wars had a positive effect on the process of industrialization, but that they could lead to political and psychological situations in which a conscious and purposeful effort of economic organization and production could be made possible. In other words, the *market mechanisms* created by external crises tend to be mostly negative, but the *political and psychological effects* can have the opposite result.

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181 Dean (1969), p. 10.

182 Gallo (1970), p. 53.

183 Warren Dean (1969), chapter VI. Summing up a careful analysis of the data available, Dean states that "World War I considerably increased the demand for domestic manufactured goods but made it almost impossible to enlarge the productive plant to meet the demand. The fortunes that were made during the war grew out of new lines of exports, twenty-four hour-a-day production, or out of mergers and reorganizations. New plants and new lines of manufactures were not significant. It might be asked if the industrialization of São Paulo would not have proceeded faster had there been no war," (1969), p. 104.

184 G. Long (1947), quoted by Hector Diegues (1968), p. 20.

This question of market vs. political mechanisms is very important when it comes to the issue of protective tariffs. The idea of complementary interests between the export and manufacturing sectors is based on a similarity of interests and activities, which occur on a day-to-day basis. In other words, the final outcome is an aggregate of a large number of individual decisions. The idea of a conflict of interests, however, would probably need a change from the economic to the political level: that is, a clear and conscious political effort would be necessary to keep the government from raising the tariffs. In this scenario, the agriculturalists would organize themselves as a lobby in the fight for low tariffs, while the industrialists would be organized and lobbying for them.

As it happened, this scenario did not exist. When tariffs were established, the objective was not to protect industry, but to bring in resources for the government. Dean is very clear on this:

> The central government of the Republic spent more money than had the Empire; the tariff continued to be, however, the only significant source of revenue that the planters would grant. The available alternatives would obviously be more painful to them: a tax on land or a tax on incomes or profit. Therefore, the federal government, whose expenses had grown from 434,000 contos ($87,000,000) to 1,227,000 contos ($257,000,000) between 1900 and 1920, relied on customs duties to provide about 70 percent of its income. Though such a tariff would necessarily be protective in effect, its intent was merely fiscal.[185]

The political significance of this statement is very high. Tariffs were accepted by the agriculturalists, as Dean puts it, *faute de mieux*; and they were not meant to protect the industry. What they were meant for, of course, was to finance an ever-growing governmental bureaucracy, which increased three-fold in the period of maximum political decentralization of the country's history. The expanding export economy supported the State and, at the same time, accepted tariff protection for an industry which she did not particularly mean to support. The tariff system in Brazil from 1900 to 1934 was casuistic, and specific tariff protections could be obtained through particularistic means and private lobbying. Hence, Dean concludes that "the particularism of the industrialists' claims to government favors led to a dependence upon the existing political structure.[186] In short, if we consider the weight of the three sectors - the central government, the agriculturalists, and the industrialists - it becomes clear that the first certainly had the political control of the situation; the industrialists were the weakest group. The agriculturalists had some power to decide where the government could draw their resources, but they were unable to curtail the continuous growth of the patrimonialist governmental bureaucracy.

Which brings us to another element of the model, the "modern" (socialist, middle class, trade-union) sectors. Sociological common sense tends to link these modern, "leftist" social groups to the progressive social sector, the industrialists, and infer an opposition of interests between these modern and progressive sectors, on the one hand, and the agricultural sectors, on the other. It is

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185 Dean (1969), p. 71. The same situation of tariffs established with fiscal purposes but providing protective effects appears much earlier, according to studies by Gilberto Paim, which finds it in relation to Brazil's nineteenth century industrialization. Cf. G. Paim (1957), p. 30.

186 Dean (1969), p. 72.

curious how the classic opposition and hatred between workers and bourgeois seems to disappear in the context of underdevelopment, under the aegis of common progressivism and modern outlook.

Empirical evidence, however, does not support what ideologies of development would expect. Brazilian industrialists, according to Dean, did not develop a well-formulated policy of industrial development, and were not in the least concerned with national progress as such. They depended on particularist favors from the government; they had to give continuous demonstrations of loyalty and support, and "in effect they had aligned themselves not with the reformist middle class but with the landowners, and invariably they provided unquestioning political support. Industrialism, with its potential for social transformation, was thwarted in effect by a regressive and opportunist alliance with the class least likely to favor that transformation."[187]

If the industrialists did not like the "progressive" groups, the reciprocal was certainly true. Early industrialism in Brazil was similar in its ruthlessness and exploitation of labor to its British counterpart in the preceding century, and strikes and other forms of class conflicts in Brazil occurred with intensity in the first decades of the century. The country's middle class, very often dependent on the governmental bureaucracy or on the merchant groups, had a clear preference for foreign products, and joined other social sectors in the secular complaint on the "artificiality" of the national industry.

The conflict of interests between industrialists and importers, which is to be expected when the national industry starts to claim protection against foreign products, is thus enlarged with an alliance between importers and consumers from the "middle" and low sectors. Here, again, the analysis of Brazil coincides with what Gallo finds in Argentina. He shows that, in spite of an objective interest of the export groups in low tariffs, a relative stabilization of tariff levels in Argentina occurred only during the 1913-25 period, which coincides with the arrival of the Radical Party to the government:

> It is important to realize that from 1916 until 1930, political power passed to the party generally identified with the "rising middle classes." The "growing rigidity" of the tariff policy thus coincided with the time when political power was slipping out of the hands of the traditional ruling classes. And what is more, it was precisely the representatives in Congress of the new popular parties, radicals arid socialists, who opposed most actively any attempt to raise tariff barriers.[188]

If we look back at the reasons offered by Hector Diegues for the relative backwardness of Argentina as compared to Australia, it is possible to see that we have come full circle. There is a striking contradiction between Gallo and Diegues, even though the political ingredients considered important by Diegues--a strong labor movement, an organized working-class party, positively related with a favorable attitude towards industrial development--seem to have worked in

187 Dean (1969), pp. 72-73.

188 Gallo (1970), p. 57. The sources used by Gallo are Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro (1967) and Oscar Cornblit (1967).

Australia. What Gallo seems to imply, however, is that Argentina did not develop an explicit policy of industrialization, not because of the lack of some of these elements, but exactly because of their existence.

What this analysis shows is that there are two elements which are lacking in the model we have been discussing; or at least, they are not taken systematically into consideration. The first is the role and characteristics of the State in which the external impulse is implanted. The second is an explicit consideration of the transition between market mechanisms expressing the aggregate interplay of individual interests and the explicit formulation of policy orientations by organized social groups.

The two elements are closely linked to each other. There is an important difference between a new nation such as Australia, which was created as an outgrowth of the expanding British economy, and "new nations' such as Brazil or Argentina, where the external economic impulse was established within a pre-existing context of political patrimonialism and dependence on the productive activities of the patrimonial state. In these "old new nations," politics never fell into the hands of the new economic groups, even when the old power sectors had to change their style and open the political system to new forms of participation. In Argentina, in spite of massive international im- migration, political power remained basically in the hands of the old traditional elite, who owned large-scale cattle-raising properties and were skilled in controlling the state machinery. [189]. In Brazil, the number of immigrants was smaller, and they went mostly to São Paulo, an area which had been marginal to the main- stream of Brazilian society since the Emboabas War until the coffee rush in the late nineteenth century. This geographical division added an element of regionalism to the political and economic differences between São Paulo and the center of Brazilian political life in Rio, which is fundamental for an explanation of what was to happen in the country's political life throughout most of the following decades.

4.The political economy of coffee expansion

The Brazilian coffee economy began its expansion in the mid-nineteenth century, and followed a pattern of expanding frontier due to a combination of increasing production and progressive exhaustion of the land. In 1859, almost 80 percent of the Brazilian coffee production came from the state of Rio de Janeiro, 12.1 percent from São Paulo, and 7.8 percent from Minas

189 Summing up a study on the formation of contemporary Argentina, Roberto Cortes Conde and Ezequiel Gallo say that, in spite of being "bastante secularizado y fuera muy dinámico," the political leadership of the country was already too well-established in power to yield its place to the emerging immigrant groups: “Por el escaso poder económico y la relativa marginalidad de los grupos que podían haber asumido la dirección de una política industrialista, extranjeros en su mayoría, dentro de una sociedad ya estructurada y con la presencia de un grupo dirigente tradicional, resulta compreensible la dificultad de hacer acceptable una nueva política para la mayoría de la poblacion. Esto diferencia a la Argentina de la mayor parte de las regiones de nuevo poblamiento, donde casi todos eran recien llegados y se encontraban en condiciones similares.” The only possible growth was "hacia afuera," outwards, in such a way that well-established power situations would not be threatened. Cf. R. Cortes Conde and Ezequiel Gallo (1967).

Gerais. In 1902, São Paulo concentrated 65.2 percent of the production, Minas 22.8 percent, and Rio de Janeiro only 9.7 percent.[190]

The reasons for this dramatic geographic shift in fifty years were related to the availability of virgin lands, but they were also a function of the possibilities of securing a labor supply and financial support. When, after 1897, the production of coffee surpassed the demands of the world market and a crisis of overproduction was declared, the maintenance of high levels of production and income started to depend on an active policy of price "valorization" through control of supply[191]. To get labor and capital first, and then influence the conditions of the world market were tasks which demanded active and coordinated efforts by the coffee growers. This was not always possible, and on the whole, the Paulista coffee growers were much more successful than the Mineiros or Fluminenses (from the State of Rio de Janeiro). It was true that the quality of the soil in São Paulo was exceptionally favorable to the expansion of production which took place in that state. But it is not evident that the soil in Minas Gerais was that much worse, or that the differences in the quality of land were so much more important than the political and sociological characteristics of the areas in which coffee was planted.[192]

The best source on the social nature of the early coffee plantations in Brazil is certainly Stanley J. Stein's Vassouras.[193] A small settlement along the route which linked Rio de Janeiro with the gold areas of Minas Gerais, Vassouras and the valley of the Parahyba River became a central area of coffee production in the expansion which took place between 1830 and 1850, raising the volume of Rio's exports from about two million to more than ten million "arrobas" (one "arroba" equals 31.7 pounds) during the period. Decadence came to Vassouras almost as quickly as wealth and progress had a few decades before, and Stein provides a detailed and relevant description of what happened.

A substantial part of the decadence is explained by the worn-out soil, aging coffee trees, dwindling virgin forest and reserves and erosion, all consequences of predatory plantation techniques used in a situation where land was the cheapest and most abundant of productive factors. Celso Furtado has argued that this was the most rational thing to do, since the deterioration of land was the most rational thing to do, since the deterioration of land was compensated by the amount of wealth created by the plantation. This type of reasoning makes sense from the standpoint of the country's economy as a whole, since the land seemed to be endless and the country's

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190 Cf. Elisa Maria Pereira Reis (1972), p. 6.

191 For an account and evaluation of the Brazilian policy of sustaining the coffee prices, see Antonio Delfim Netto (1959).

192 An official publication of the State of Minas Gerais estimated that, in 1929, there was still about 11,000,000 hectares of virgin land suitable for coffee plantations, and that with only half of that land it would be possible to plant more than 5,000,000,000 coffee trees, or about five times what São Paulo had at that time. Estado de Minas Gerais (1929).

193 Stanley J. Stein (1957).

production did not cease growing.[194] However, for the individual planter in Vassouras, or, for that matter, for the county as a whole, economic and social decadence was hard and proved impossible to overcome. They were unable to secure a fresh labor force to substitute the aging and expensive slaves, nor did they have credit to finance their crops, to substitute the old coffee trees, or to try more rational and less predatory plantation techniques.

Coffee plantation needs credit, since it takes four years of initial investment for newly-planted trees to bear fruit. The initial source of credit were the planter's factors in Rio, who took care of the commercialization of the product and retained the loans, their interests and their profits. When decadence came, the dependence of the planters on these factors increased, and in the 1850's the Brazilian central bank, the Banco do Brasil, started to finance directly the troubled coffee planters. The planter seemed to rely on his political influence, nobility titles, and personal ties to avoid the pressure of his official creditor. Stein refers to several mechanisms through which the planters could keep "their indifference toward fulfilling signed obligations requiring prompt repayment of capital and interest."[195] And a contemporary observer is quoted as saying that "nowhere in all the world - at least not in Netherlands India - are agriculturalists granted so many legal securities to enable them to cultivate their lands in peace, as in Brazil"[196] Financial support for the planters was given for a while against all the logic of economics:

> The pump-priming occurred despite temporarily declining overseas coffee markets, the competition of cheaper coffee grown in São Paulo's expanding groves outside the Parahyba Valley, and lower production in the worn-out debtor areas of the province [197]

This growing indebtedness to and dependence on the government in Rio did not give the planter freedom of action to solve the labor problem, which was crucial.[198]

After 1850, the African slave traffic came to an end, and from then until the end of the slave system, in 1888, labor substitution became very difficult. The price of slaves almost doubled from 1852-54 and grew exponentially until around 1880, when the slave system began to crumble.[199] In spite of substantial internal slave traffic, the slave labor force grew older, the man-

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194 Celso Furtado (1968). Predatory use of land was rational, for him, not only from the individual capitalist's point of view but also from society's point of view as a whole: "If the exhaustible reserve (of soils) is utilized so as to start a process of development, not only will the present generation be benefitted but also those to come, which will be inheriting that mineral deposit in the form of reproductive capital." Furtado (1968), p. 179

195 Stein (1957), p. 241.

196 Stein (1957), p. 242.

197 Stein (1957), p. 244.

198 Cf. C. Furtado (1968), chapters xxi to xxiv, for an analysis of the problems of manpower in Brazil during this period.

199 Stein (1957), pp. 65 and 229.

to-woman rate became more even, and the slave population became more of a liability than an asset:

> This crucial segment of the plantation working force, the fifteen to forty-year olds, dropped from a high of 62 percent of the total labor force in 1830-1849 to 51 percent in the succeeding decade, and finally to 35 percent in the last eight years of slavery.[200]

It is difficult to explain the inability of the coffee- growers in the Rio area to overcome the labor problem. One common explanation refers to the difficulties of bringing together slave and free labor, since it could mean an unbearable lowering of the free laborer to the slave's condition. Manual labor would be equated with slave labor, and no free man would ever accept it willingly.

For this psychological explanation to be valid, however, the social, economic and racial boundaries between slaves and low- class freemen should have been much sharper than was the case in nineteenth-century Brazil.[201] As it was, other systems of labor had been tried in the Vassouras area before the end of the slavery system, without success. Share tenancy, sharecropping and salaried labor were tried with different degrees of failure, and after the abolition of slavery the "organization of remaining *fazenda* coffee production crystallized in the form of share-cropping or *parceria,* supplemented by jobbing."[202]

The share system implied that the proprietor did not have to care too much for the daily activities of his tenancy, while the freedmen could have a resemblance of independence and a small property. Here, as elsewhere, a pattern of exchange between economic decadence and patrimonial dependence can be observed. All influential planters of Vassouras held nobility titles in the Brazilian Empire, and the percentage of coffee barons among all title holders in the Empire rose from 21 to 26 percent from 1840 to 1870. Titles were given, according to Stein, for their "financial contributions in the Paraguayan War, or their local or national prominence in supporting the Imperial regime, or their philanthropic acts."[203] This rather generous distribution of (non-hereditary) nobility titles is an indication of the importance the planters gave to their links with the seat of the imperial government. This link was not only a matter of prestige but, as we have seen, was closely related to the sources of financing and economic support, which they could find only in Rio de Janeiro.

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200 Stein (1957), p. 78.

201 Cf. Herbert S. Klein (1969). A pattern of intensive racial miscegenation is observed, giving rise to a substantial freed population. The article concludes saying that the fact that so many freedmen were being manumitted at such a constant and rapid rate in the nineteenth century, during the greatest expansion of the plantation economy, suggests the fundamental acceptance by white Brazilians of the possibility of a functioning interracial free labor society well before the institution of slavery itself was seriously challenged. Klein (1969), p. 52.

202 Stein (1957), p. 271.

203 Stein (1957), p. 122.

Share-cropping allowed for a combination of export and subsistence agriculture, since the tenant could usually cultivate a piece of land for his own consumption. This feature, combined with the political influence of the planter, increased the ability of the more traditional coffee plantations to survive the impact of economic storms in the short run, but reduced their ability to influence the process in the long run.

The difference between what occurred in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, on one hand, and São Paulo on the other, is striking. In São Paulo, the production of coffee was boosted by an active policy of bringing immigrants from Europe and placing them in a system of very intensive and capitalist-like exploitation of labor. There are two general patterns of immigration to Brazil, one known as "colonization" and the other "immigration" as such. The first tended to be directed and induced by the central government, and was an attempt to create an independent, productive, European-like peasantry in the country. The other, promoted more directly by planters in São Paulo, and later by the government in that state, was concerned specifically with obtaining manpower for the coffee plantations.[204] The "'colonization" pattern was relatively successful in the southern states of Rio Grande and Santa Catarina, where large German colonies were established.[205] Immigration, however, was dominant, and São Paulo was, increasingly, the promoter and area of destination of this flux, as the table below shows.[206]

TABLE 13 IMMIGRATION TO BRAZIL AND SÃO PAULO, 1884 - 1888

Year	Number of immigrants	Percent of Italians	Percent going to São Paulo	Percent of expenses of the State of São Paulo with immigration in relation to expenses of the Imperial Government
1884	24,800	41	20	38
1885	35,440	61	18	35
1886	33,486	61	28	83
1887	55,963	72	57	119
1888	133,253	78	69	75

Source:Calculated from J. Fernando Carneiro, Imigração e Colonização no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Universidade do Brasil, Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia, Cadeira de Geografia do Brasil, 1950), p. 24.

After 1889, when the Republican period began, the pattern of federal and state expenditures was erratic, indicating that a division of attributions between the two levels of government was still to be established. From 1889 to 1891, the federal government seemed to take on the burden of immigration expenses; after that, the contribution of the state of São Paulo was not constant, but always significantly high. From 1902 to 1906, the central government substantially reduced its

204 An overview of the immigration patterns in Brazil is given by Manuel Diegues Jr. (1964). A basic reference is Artur Hehl Neiva (1945). Figures on immigration from 1819 to 1947 broken down by year and country of origin can be found in Artur Hehl Neiva and J. Fernando Carneiro (1950), and in J. Fernando Carneiro (1950).

205 For an analysis of the "colonization" pattern, mostly in southern Brazil, see R. Paula Lopes (1936).

206 For a detailed description of the migratory flow and types of settlement in São Paulo, see Salvío de Almeida Azevedo (1941).

participation in the financing of immigration, leaving it almost entirely to São Paulo. After 1906, the problem of manpower was practically overcome in São Paulo. The immigration pattern changed, the Italians gave way to the Portuguese and the Spaniards, and the problem which afflicted the coffee planters was no longer labor, but prices in the international market.

Table 14 - Expenses o the central government and São Paulo on immigration relative figures, 1884-1906*

Year	a. Expenses of the State of São Paulo (1889=100)	b. Expenses of the Federal Government (1889=100)	a/b (absolute values)	a+b (1889= =100)	Number of immigrants who entered the country (per 1,000)
1884	235	15.0	38.3	21	25
1885	230	16.0	35.2	21	35
1886	712	21.0	82.7	38	33
1887	2,014	42.0	118.9	90	56
1888	1,819	60.0	75.1	103	133
1889	100	100.0	2.5	100	65
1890	474	46.0	25.6	57	107
1891	320	169.0	3.0	170	216
1892	437	50.0	21.8	11	86
1893	993	41.0	59.9	24	134
1894	295	14.0	51.8	21	60
1895	1,582	45.0	88.7	82	167
1896	785	76.0	25.8	93	158
1897	1,002	4.0	617.3	28	146
1898	463	7.0	202.7	17	78
1999	383	1.1	889.9	10	53
1900	245	10.0	59.4	16	37
1901	1,196	28.0	104.8	29	83
1903	556	0.9	1,506.7	14	50
1904	69	1.4	183.7	3	42
1904	194	1.4	354.8	6	44
1905	1,149	1.8	1,635.1	30	68
1906	750	1.9	1,248.3	25	72

Source: Calculated from J. Fernando Carneiro, *Imigração e Colonização no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), pp. 24-28.
*Values from 1889 on are deflated by the exchange rate with the British pound.

A systematic effort to control the supply and influence the prices of coffee in the international market started precisely in 1906, with the Taubaté agreement, signed between the government of the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. A previous attempt to control the supply had been tried before by the government of São Paulo when, in 1902, it forbade the planting of new coffee trees for five years.[207] It is well-known that the initiative behind the Taubaté agreement and subsequent measures of price control came from the Paulista coffee producers; Delfim Netto links this entrepreneurship with the differences in the labor systems of

207 Elísa Maria Pereira Reis (1972), p. 8.

the two leading states, Minas and São Paulo. The labor system in São Paulo was of a contractual and monetary kind (*colonato*), while in the rest of the country, and especially in Minas Gerais, labor relations were based on share-cropping (*parceria*). The difference between these two systems appeared when the prices in the international market fell at the beginning of the twentieth century. The coffee entrepreneur in São Paulo was much more vulnerable to price fluctuations than his counterpart working in the *parceria* system, and this is why, according to Delfim Netto, "it was not surprising that the pressure towards (national) state intervention (in the coffee industry) began in São Paulo."[208]

The Republican system of 1889-1930 started thus with considerable decentralization of power, and with a leading state taking into its own hands the management of its interests in the field of labor supply, control of production, and so on. In the rest of the country, however, other patterns of social and political participation guaranteed that this economic leader- ship would not go too far in political terms.

5. The pattern of patrimonial dependence.

The foregoing discussion suggests a pattern of dependency already implied in the analysis of the effects of economic decadence in chapter three. The expression "patrimonial dependence" may be useful to convey the meaning of the type of symbiosis this pattern implies.

Patrimonial rule, as defined earlier, is a type of traditional domination based on an extension of the ruler's household. The existence of patrimonial domination depends on the control of society's production process by the ruler and his *entourage*. Hence, there is a link between the Weberian concept of patrimonialism and Marx s notion of "Asiatism," which refers to a pre-capitalist type of society in which private property and isolated fiefs are not present. Patrimonial domination exists, in its classic manifestation, in the hydraulic societies studied by Wittfogel; it also exists in states specializing either in military conquest or in mercantilist trade and colonial exploitation.

The important question is how patrimonial domination survives when its hold over the economic productive or extractive systems starts to dwindle. The history of Portugal, as mentioned before, shows a consistent pattern of *obtaining support for political dominance at the expense of economic concessions* to England. In his classic work on the *British Preeminence in Brazil,* Alan C. Manchester gives abundant historical evidence on how this process of exchange remained in Brazil, after its independence from Portugal in 1822. Among the treaties signed between the Portuguese government exiled in Brazil in 1810 and England, there is one that granted privileges of all kinds to British products and British citizens in Portuguese territory; another dealt with political questions, guaranteed a perpetual union between the two countries, included a British pledge “never to recognize as sovereign of Portugal any prince who was not the legitimate heir of

208 Antonio Delfim Netto (1959), pp 43-44. The comparison between the "'colonato"' and the "parceria" systems is based on Augusto Ramos (1934).

the house of Bragança," and added other political reassurances.[209] The same pattern of exchange of economic power for political privilege was apparent in Argentina where, according to the analysis of Gallo and Cortes Conde, a pattern of growth "towards the outside," with intensive use of foreign capital, kept the more traditional political groups relatively unthreatened.

The overall pattern of Portuguese colonization seems to have been one of progressive political centralization, which occurred simultaneously with and was intensified by steady economic decadence in several levels and areas. We have seen how the arrangement with Flemish interests in the sugar economy seems to have given the bulk of economic profit to the Dutch, in exchange for Portuguese sovereignty over Brazilian territory. After its independence from Spain, Portugal increased its dependence on England, and the treaties between the two countries conceded economic privileges to England in exchange for political commitments and guarantees. The climax of this dependent relationship was the treaty of Methuen between England and Portugal in 1703. With this treaty, Portugal was able to guarantee its control over the Amazon against France and over the Colonia de Sacramento against Spain, as well as the access of Portuguese wine to the English market. The price was, according to Furtado, the renunciation of the development of a Portuguese industry, and the transference to England of the dynamic impulse created by the gold production in Brazil.[210]

In Minas Gerais, strict fiscal controls were established over the mining areas, and control tightened as the availability of gold declined.[211] In the South, in spite of the modest success of the dried beef and wheat economies, military activities in behalf of the politics of Lisbon and Rio never lost their importance. And Rio, of course, became the administrative capital of the country in 1763, during the gold rush, thereafter living off the benefits of being the seat of the central administration and the Crown. Political dependence due to colonial status, economic subjugation to Portugal and especially England, and bureaucratic centralization for the exploitation of resources produced by an overall decadent economy--all of these traits comprise the broad setting with which Brazil enters the nineteenth century. During most of the new century, Brazil made mediocre progress, and, as the economy stagnated, the process of political centralization and control grew stronger.[212]

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209 Manchester (1933), p. 91.

210 Cf. Celso Furtado (1959), p. 47. For the relationships between Brazil and England, see Alan K. Manchester (1933), as well as the summary given by Furtado in Chapter vii of his book.

211 R. Faoro (1958) for a description of this process.

212 The image of the second half of the eighteenth century as one of continuous decadence is not quite correct. There is a period of economic resurgence at the end of the century, due mainly to new crops and a recuperation of the sugar prices. This development is analyzed by Dauril Alden for the Viceroyalty of Rio, and he sums up by saying that "the record of the attempts of Viceroy Lavradio and his successor to diversify the economy of the lands under their jurisdiction was a mixed one. There were some modest successes, such as indigo, rice, and wheat growing, and there were some notable disappointments, particularly cochineal, hemp and tobacco." Dauril Alden (1968), p. 381.

Historical studies will hopefully document the more specific relationships between economic decay and political centralization. Celso Furtado has suggested that the sugar economy in the Northeast was able to resist the fall of sugar prices by reverting to a type of self-sufficient activity, which comes closer than anything else to a Brazilian version of feudal patrimonialism.[213] If this was so, what happened to the administrative and commercial activities related to this retracting economy? Historians have yet to answer this question.[214] But what most likely happened is that as the mere dynamic commercial sectors disappeared or moved out, the governmental administration retreated into a kind of bureaucratic ritualism, to which the highly centralized and formalized Portuguese administrative structure was so conducive.

In general terms, the pattern of Portuguese colonization seems to have been composed of two typical movements. First, the administration gave all kinds of facilities to private initiative, and this led both to economic prosperity and to the dispersion of power. During a second stage, the administration increased its grip through a series of centralizing restrictions, leading to unavoidable conflicts with private entrepreneurs. This centralization and increase in control was a reaction to reductions of revenue; this seems to have happened in the sugar economy, and was certainly the case with the decadence of mining in the late eighteenth century. It happened again in the early nineteenth century during the Portuguese Courts' attempts to restore Brazil to its colonial status.[215]

This pattern of external dependence, which was to continue throughout this century, thus meant not only that national resources and wealth were syphoned abroad, which, in a way, is trivial; but also that, in this process, the patrimonial state was able to survive and thwart the chances of independent political organization and manifestation of national groups, which had a productive basis of their own, whether as industrialists, capitalists, or workers. Confronted with a dominant political sector, which had the support of strong foreign economic interests, national political groups could pressure, beg, and lobby for special favors and concessions from those in political power; but they could never aspire to conquer it and direct it towards their own purposes. The consequence was the lack of "political will and purpose," which Argentine economists and historians saw only in Australia, and which could eventually change a relatively deprived situation into a determined policy of industrialization and development. Only the State itself would be able, under given conditions, to try this shift, independently and sometimes at the expense of the political parties and social sectors of the country. This "lack of political will and purpose" is not a cultural

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213 Followíng the analysis of the economic decline in the sugar area, Furtado says that ít led to a sharper reversion to forms of subsistence economy, with atrophy in the division of labor, reduction in productivity, dissolution of the system into increasingly smaller productive units, extinction of the more complex forms of social intercourse, and substitution of general law by local custom. Furtado (1968), p. 77

214 This analysis is intended, but not quite achieved, in Antonio de Barros Castro (1971).

215 A major event in Brazilian history is the arrival of the whole Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, flying from the French invaders under British protection. A detailed description of this trip is given by Alan K. Manchester (1969). The political independence of Brazil from Portugal is linked to the attempts of the Portuguese parliament, the "Cortes," to recall the royal family from Brazil and reinstate the colonial status which had existed prior to 1808. See a summary of these events in E. B. Burns (1970), pp. 105-116.

or psychological trait, of course, but the outcome of a situation of internal dependence which replicates, as it were, an external dependence on the capitalist centers of the world economy. It is from this type of dependence that emerges the style of political participation which is being referred to as "co-optation," and which will later be considered again in more detail.

PART III. PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL OPENNESS IN PERSPECTIVE

1. Political development and expanded participation

From 1945 to 1964, Brazil experienced a period of multi-party competition with progressively expanded popular participation--a period of "political development," as the optimistic theories of the early sixties call it. Almost ten years after that system collapsed, the country's political leadership still debates whether some kind of open system can be re-established or whether political liberalism is just an antique, which should be buried once and for all.[216]

Aside from the frustrated electoral experiences of 1930 and 1934, the 1945-64 period was the only time in Brazilian history during which political participation was really experienced and tried out. From a long-term historical perspective, it is possible to consider this period anomalous, because of the wave of democratization which swept Latin America after the Second World War, and which lasted between, fifteen and twenty years. True as this may be, it left the country with a taste of political freedom and openness which cannot and should not be easily erased. Conceptually, it brought another important variable to the analysis of the country's political system, that is, political participation.

This last chapter reflects on this experience, in an attempt to see whether the historical framework developed so far can be used for a proper conceptualization of the structure of the political participation system during this period, and whether a proper understanding of the political process during the period of political openness can furnish some cues for an understanding of what happened afterwards and what might happen in the future. This combination of normative concern, conceptual synthesis and subjective evaluation certainly contributes to make this chapter the most speculative of all.

Representative politics is usually not very satisfying, and it is especially frustrating in a country which is as unequal and underdeveloped as Brazil. Its absence, however, can be worse, and many argue that this is at least the best possible arrangement to guarantee the values of individual rights and freedom of ideas. However, when the performance of this function is accompanied by inequalities, exploitation, waste and irrationality, values of administrative efficiency and redistribution of wealth tend to become dominant. Efficient as some non-representative systems may become, the normative goals of individual rights and freedom of thought cannot be dismissed as simple manifestations of individualism or idle liberalism. It is true that formal political rights can mask actual social and economic inequalities and the suppression

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216 In a well-publicized press interview on January 5, 1973, the President of the Brazilian Senate, Filinto Muller declared that liberal democracy was something of the past in the whole world, in an effort to legitimize the notion that the issue of political openness should be dropped as something irrelevant and old-fashioned. The repercussions of his speech, however, seem to indicate that the issue was more alive in the beginning of 1973 than he would probably like to admit. Cf. for instance *Jornal do Brasil* (1973).

of rights. It is also true, as American experience shows, that political liberalism can lead to inefficiency, injustice, international bigotry and cold war[217]; what is less certain, however, is that an anti- liberal system can do better.

In the case of Brazil, the quest for political openness is made particularly difficult by the failure. of its twenty-year experiment with representative democracy. The previous discussion concerning the continuous centralization of the country's political life in terms of "patrimonialism" hides the fact that there is a visible process of rationalization and increasing efficiency of the governmental apparatus. This rationalization tends to reduce the value attributed to formal procedures and guarantees of personal and political freedom in a democracy which is too obviously unfair and corrupt. If the price of this increase in efficiency and rationality is the loss of individual rights, freedom of organization, freedom of the press and habeas corpus only the few who personally suffer these restrictions will tend to oppose them; and among these, only some would be opposed by conviction. Either way, the case in favor of political openness and what it implies remains unfortunately too weak.

The other difficulty with political openness in Brazil is the lack of a simple, clear alternative political model. The traditional three-power, multi-party system has been demoralized. The remnants of the old political system, which subsists today in ARENA-MDB confrontations in the small rural areas of the country, do not furnish a basis for the further expansion of the political arena; on the contrary, they provide for their opponents a showcase of petty confrontations, small-scale corruption, candidate incompetence and general lack of vote interest. A simple, direct, no-nonsense and efficient administration with strong military backing has much more appeal and is much more easy to understand. In order that an alternative model be socially and politically viable, it needs to be easily

understood in the first place; only afterwards does it need to be operationally workable and politically possible.

For these and other reasons, the empirical prediction is that a viable system of open participation is not to be expected in Brazil in the near future. This does not mean, of course, that the problem does not remain, since empirical difficulties do not eliminate normative concerns. But good social science is always a combination of empirical awareness and workable solutions, and there is not much point in trying to pursue a political ideal which lacks a minimum of historical viability. And this viability depends, ultimately, on the process which would change a traditional patrimonialist structure into a highly rational and efficient administration. It is possible to think, for instance, that rationality implies freedom of thought and intellectual experimentation; some objective criteria of competence; areas of communication, and exchange of ideas. From this minimum, it is possible to expand to the inclusion of alternative values and perspectives, and alternative interests; and so on. It is possible, in short, to speculate on the functional necessity of including, in an expanding and well-operated governmental apparatus, the elements of political openness. This openness will necessarily be very different from the traditional representative, multi-party system; but it may also be more effective in terms of the progressive incorporation of

217 See for instance Theodore Lowi (1969).

social groups into the society's system of decisions and allocation of values. We can try to redefine the expression "political development" in terms of this continuous expansion of the system of decisions and allocation of values, and discuss its perspectives in broad terms.

The lack of a proper treatment of problems of political development in an era of generalized political crisis is a peculiar feature of social science literature in the underdeveloped world, or at least in Latin America. This fact can be traced, intellectually speaking, to a more general tendency towards considering politics as fully implied in its economic and sociological context, having no existence of its own. It is curious how two contradictory tendencies led to this same outcome. The first tendency is pointed out by Prof. Samuel P. Huntington and comes from the North American lack of experience with political instability. It leads to the notion that a stable and successful political system is a natural consequence of economic development and an increase in social welfare.[218] The other tendency is Marxist in its origin: it tends to see the political sphere as a simple and direct consequence of the underlying structures of production.

Politics is thus seen in both cases as having no independent dynamics and determination. It is seen, from the left, as an instrument of the class struggles and the consolidation of the victorious social revolution and, from the right, as a simple technical operation of power management and control. A conceptual gap is therefore created between the specialists in economics and sociology, for whom the political process is a simple result of economic and social facts, and the specialists in government and public administration, for whom the political process is purely a technical problem, unrelated to what happens in the rest of the society. It is obvious that things are never as simple as that, but a host of empirical studies concerning the "political" (meaning social and economic) influences upon the governmental processes, or the "political" (meaning governmental) influences upon social and economic life are not enough to avoid the paradoxes of "depoliticized" political sociology and theories of government. This problem is particularly acute when what is at stake is the political process of a country such as Brazil, subjected to several social and economic development problems.

2. Political development: institutionalization and conflicts

Prof. Huntington's conceptualization of political development in terms of institutionalization is an attempt to define a dimension of social change, which is specifically political. He defines institutionalization as the "process through which organizations and processes acquire value and stability"; levels of institutionalization are said to be functions of levels of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of the institutions.[219] Accordingly, a developed political system is the one which is able to adapt itself to new situations, develop new functions, incorporate new groups, play a plurality of functions and keep, at the same time, a basic level of consensus among the political community. It is a stable but not static system, and it possesses a

218 Samuel P. Huntington (1968), p 7.

219 Samuel P. Huntington (1968), p. 12.

legitimacy which transcends the circumstantial conveniences of the citizenry and plunges its roots into a historical past of stability, flexibility and legitimacy.

One of the determinants of political instability in underdeveloped contexts is, thus, this very instability: the series of breaks in the continuity of political institutions in these countries does not allow for the crystallization of those qualities of flexibility, adaptation, complexity, autonomy and coherence, which only time can accomplish. This conception leads, necessarily, to a conservative perspective, in its most precise meaning, namely, the perspective that there are values to preserve in old structures, and relatively high costs in the substitution of one structure by a new one.

But time is not the only independent variable, since institutional decay is also a possibility. A context of rapid changes, translated into continuous challenges for the political regime, can lead to the hardening and simplification of the political structure, which very often interrupts a previous process of maturation and institutionalization. The total lack of tensions also seems to lead to institutional stagnation, which can end up in sclerosis, rigidity and decay. Only a "reasonable" level of conflicts leads to institutional development in the sense above.[220] This "optimal level" of conflicts seems to be far from the rule in underdeveloped countries, and the known outcome is the more or less rapid deterioration of political institutions which, in one way or another, have worked up to the mid-sixties. This is true in Latin America for the constitutional governments which replaced, for a short period, the populist regimes, and also seems to hold for the African governments established after the independence which, in most cases, have been replaced by military regimes. The general situation in the underdeveloped world is thus one of the institutional decay, even though this situation may be a necessary step towards placing power relations in a situation, which may or may not allow for the continuation of the development process at a higher level. This consideration obviously weakens the theory of gradual institutionalization as a prediction or prescription for political development in underdeveloped countries, but it does not reduce the relevance of the concept as an essential political *variable.* If we make the theoretical assumption that there is a long-term process of political development, which is somehow related with the also long-term processes of social and economic development, it is obvious that the conceptualization of political development should include other political variables besides institutionalization.

3. Political openness and institutionalization

A political system which is more institutionalized is, in principle, more able to integrate and legitimize new demands for participation than more rigid and immature systems. This legitimation and absorption of demands is what one might call “openness," and one can re-phrase the above by saying that, the more institutionalized a political system is, the more open it is. This is nearly a truism, if we consider "institutionalization" only in terms of adaptability, but it is a substantive proposition if we bring together the other dimensions of the concept. Empirical evidence is abundant: it ranges from the absorption of the working class parties in Western Europe

220 The functionality of conflicts as a function of their level of intensity is something which was left out of Coser's classic study on Simmel. Cf. Lewis Coser (1956).

to the troubles of performing the same kind of absorption by the less institutionalized regimes of Argentina. We should not, however, mistake "openness" for "democratization."

It was Schattschneider who said that "government by the people" is a pre-democratic concept, in the sense that its formulation is previous to the existence of contemporary democratic regimes.[221] The definition of democracy offered by Schattschneider includes competition between leaders and organization, on one hand, and the presentation of political alternatives for the general public, who thus participate in the decision process, on the other. A political system which is able to absorb and process private demands, without allowing them to become political, can reach high levels of institutionalization without being democratic. Democracy, in Schattschneider's definition, begins to appear when the openness becomes political, and political demands of participation are accepted and legitimated as such. Participation is political when it transcends the level of specific group issues in two ways. First, the specific issues become general, and second, specific groups feel they have the right to influence and decide on questions previously considered private. A "participationist" political system of the fascist kind is anti-democratic, not because it seeks the substitution of territorial by functional representation, but because it does not allow functional groups to be concerned with questions of general interest. Territorial representation tends, in its origins, also to be private, given its dependence on stratification systems based on land tenure. If time has made it the highest expression of political representativeness, it is because of the growing multi-functionality of the territorial groups.

Two questions follow from the above. The first refers to the desirability of the two possible types of institutionalization, the democratic and participationist, or corporatist-fascist. It is quite likely that something like "participationism" is what Marx projected for the future society in which "politics" would cease to exist. The non-existence of politics means the non-existence of general problems, and a purely "technical" approach to specific problems of specific groups and sectors in society. Before the disappearance of general problems becomes real, however,[222] the forced suppression of political manifestations can lead to solutions of a technocratic type, in which technical capacity veils the fact that the area of bargaining and negotiations is not allowed to grow beyond the sphere of transactions between the groups concerned and the governmental sector responsible for its handling.

Once this is done, through coercion, ideological mobilization, or some combination of the two, a plurality of problems can arise. One is the possibility of corrupt practices, due to the low visibility of technical decisions combined with the technical unreliability of the decision-makers.[223]

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221 E. Schattschneider (1960).

222 "Real" here means only that they are not actually contested, that is, that these demands are not actually suppressed by physical coercion and/or ideological bombardment. See the following chapter, footnote 9.

223 There is a tradition in political sociology which stresses the functional aspects of corruptive practices in the workings of political systems, as long as these practices allow for the institutionalization of some "illegitimate" forms of political participation. This functionality is usually seen as dysfunctional from a technical standpoint, and A. O. Cintra notes that "in the debate between technical and political solutions, the responsibility for corruption is usually attributed to politics" (Personal communication). Our discussion shows that the responsibility

Another is the pseudo-technification of typically political areas, such as the assimilation of political with criminal acts, which are thus handled by a technical body--the police--and explained and interpreted by specialists of criminology and social control ("The social problem is a police problem," used to say a Brazilian President of the twenties). A third problem is the "politicization" of essentially technical areas, in which the control of technical quality becomes less dependent on the internal consensus of an institutionalized scientific community and more dependent upon the political approval of the political regime. In general, the differences between the technical and the political become blurred or subject to short-term fluctuations. The advantages of this type of institutionalization can be many. It can be predominantly functional, including in some cases the establishment of a long-range policy of high investments and deferred gratifications (as in the U.S.S.R.), in others, a long-range policy of social repression and apartheid (as in the white Republics in Africa), or even a combination of both, if the costs above are kept within tolerable bounds. The option between these two forms depends, on the political tradition of the country on one hand, and on the level and type of demands for participation, on the other.

When demands for participation tend to be high and politically oriented, as in Argentina, the institutionalization of a corporatist system does not seem to be possible. The alternative rests between the creation of a system of democratic participation and the continuation of a political system based on high levels of repression and political rigidity.[224]

Thus, we have the second question, referred to above, namely, the likelihood and stability of the different types of political participation. Part of the answer has already been given, namely, that the alternatives depend on the process of socioeconomic development and on the demands for participation, in the form of social mobilization, which follow from it. The second part of the answer is that the reaction of a given political system to a given level and type of demands is a function of its characteristics as a system, one of which is its level of institutionalization.

4. Socioeconomic development and political development

What this discussion has suggested is that the relation between what happens at the socioeconomic level and what happens at the political level is far from direct, starting with the fact that there are at least two important mediations between these two levels. We can speak of four analytical levels of change which deserve independent scrutiny: the levels of economic development, of change in the social structure, of the growth of political participation demands, and finally of political development. The autonomy of each of these processes does not mean that

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can also be placed on the technical side. See, for the functionality of political corruption, the classic example of R. K. Merton (1957). I am indebted to Antonio Octávio Cintra for drawing my attention to this point.

224 Torcuato S. Di Tella links the complexity of Argentina's society and the plurality of its centers of power to the well- known difficulties which strong non-democratic dictatorships have of remaining in power. His generalization concerning Argentina, which includes Chile and Uruguay, is not too convincing in that he fails to consider what a long period of political confrontation can mean to a country in terms of political decay. What he considers to be "complexity" and "differentiation" could probably be better understood in terms of the relative strength of the representational pattern of political participation in those countries. With this change, it would probably be easier to include Brazil which, within the same line of reasoning, is certainly not less complex and differentiated than those countries. Cf. Torcuato S. Di Tella (1972).

they are not empirically related, but simply that none of them can be completely understood through the others.[225]

Economic development here refers to the quantitative in- crease of per capita income or some equivalent indicator, in terms of technological change and the sectorial division of labor. The concept of social development often appears in the literature under the name of "modernization," and refers to an increase in the well-being of the populations, according to the standards of the modern mass-consumption societies: consumption of industrialized goods, education, increase in life expectancy, newspaper consumption, means of communication, etc. Social development is more than a simple change in behavior and consumption patterns, since it brings with it an increase in the scope and intensity of communications, a progressive extension of the scale of social participation from the local to the national levels, and a change in the values and nature of the stratification system.[226] This general process of social development is sometimes called "mobilization," and has a direct bearing on political life in terms of an increase in participation.

But just as modernization is not a direct outcome of economic development, so political participation is not a direct effect of social modernization and mobilization. The modernization process very often precedes the process of economic growth, not only because of the host of phenomena designated in the expression "demonstration effect," but also because of the deliberate action of political centers in creating administrative and political nuclei, which work as poles of urbanization and modernization, combined very often with the disintegration of the more traditional rural economies. These urban centers generate, afterwards:, an industrial system which depends on them for its growth.

How is the process of social mobilization translated into demands for participation in public life? It is obvious that there is no simple answer to this question, which depends on two types of variables. The first type refers to the nature of the process of modernization and social mobilization. Lerner formulated very simple propositions, which suggested that political participation (measured by election turn-outs) would increase linearly with the process of urbanization and literacy; more recent analysis looks for the roots of variations in participation in the different types of synchronism and disequilibria found within the process of social and economic development. This topic is one of the most frequent in social development literature and it is enough to say here that a situation, in which economic development anticipates and leads the modernization process, creates a political climate which is radically different from those situations in which the process of modernization precedes and is not followed, except at a distance, by

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225 The difficulty of considering these four levels independently is responsible for many mistakes in the literature on development. Celso Furtado, for instance, (1966), makes a sophisticated diagnosis of the economic crisis and its difficulties at the political level, but has little to say on the levels of social mobilization and political participation. He refers to the whole process of social development as a process of creation of "massas heterogêneas" (heterogeneous masses), and takes for granted the need for and feasibility of an "ideology of development" as the only way out. See my discussion of his book in Schwartzman (1967).

226 Cf. David E. Apter (1971), p. 29 and others, for a conceptualization of possible changes in systems of social stratification. Apter's book is the background of much of the discussion which follows, especially on the relationships between information, intelligence and coercion.

economic growth.[227] In the first case, political participation would probably tend to be more related to specific demands, leading to a progressive widening of the areas of group autonomy and political participation, whereas in the second, the conditions would be much more favorable to the emergence of symbolic forms of participation.

The second type of variable refers to factors which are more directly related to the political system, including its level of institutionalization. The responses of a political system to demands for participation only partially depend on the process of economic and social change, which its society undergoes. The transfer of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in 1808 gave to this country a degree of institutionalization, which was unique in the Latin American context, and which explains much of the country's territorial integrity and political stability throughout the nineteenth century.

The proposition I would like to stress here is that *the assumption of a causal chain going from the process of economic development to the structure and changes in the political system is untenable as a general proposition*. Attempts to explain variations in the political structure as functions of socioeconomic change tend to consider the political sphere either as a mere outcome ("the political system is an instrument of the bourgeoisie") or as an obstacle ("the traditional power elites do not respond to the rising demands of the population . . . ") to these processes. The final outcome is an extremely simplified perception of political factors. Sometimes, the alternative would be to take the political system as a starting point, but the difficulties here are related to the impossibility of making long-term processes of change follow from the general characteristics of the political system. It seems that the simultaneous use of both approaches is necessary, and that there is much to be gained if the changes in the economy and in the levels of social and political participation are considered as a process and combined with the analysis of politics as a system.

5. Political participation

It would be useful to organize these ideas in terms of S. Rokkan and S. M. Lipset's attempt to use Parsons' functional categories in an analysis of European politics.[228] Talcott Parsons, as it is well known, proposes an analytical division of the social systems in four general functions, which make the A-G-I-L framework (adaptation, goal achievement, integration, and pattern maintenance or latency). Also a Parsonian generalization is the proposition that when social systems tend to increase in size and complexity, the four analytical functions tend to become four empirically differentiated subsystems: the economic (for adaptative functions), the political (for

227 Analyses of leads and lags in the process of development, suggested by Karl F. Deutsch in his classic article on social mobilization, have been done independently by different authors with usually gratifying results. One of these currents is represented by Rosalind and Ivo K. Feierabend, who developed an index of "systemic frustration" by a comparison of indicators of '"want formation" (education, mass media, urbanization) with that of "want satisfaction" (economic growth). Another more structural line of research is followed by University of Zurich and Fundación Bariloche teams directed by Peter Heintz and Manuel Mora y Araujo. See Karl W. Deutsch (1966b); Rosalind and Ivo K. Feierabend (1966); Peter Heintz (1976); Simon Schwartzman (1972); Manuel Mora y Araujo (1972); Ruben Kaztman (1972); Alaor Passos (1968).

228 Rokkan and Lipset (1967).

the attainment of social goals), the subsystem of social and political participation (for the integrative functions) and the educational and family subsystem (for pattern-maintenance functions) . Lipset and Rokkan are concerned, in their study, with the internal structure of the social and political participation subsystem, in terms of its internal cleavages. They show how this analysis leads to the study of two main axes of political cleavages: one connecting the adaptation and integration poles (the cross-local, functional cleavage) and the other connecting the goal-achievement and latency poles (the center-periphery axis) .

Another analytical road, which is being suggested here, is to think of the four subsystems as the loci of our processes of social change; the main task in the analysis of political participation systems will then be to evaluate how much of what happens in the subsystem of political participation is a function of the interactions among the other three.

Changes in A can be considered changes in the process of economic development; changes in G, a process of transformation and growth of the state structure; changes in L, transformations in society's values and motivations (which are usually measured in terms of changes in rates of urbanization and education, and are analyzed as a process of "modernization"); and finally, changes in I are essentially those related to transformations in the structure of social and political participation.

This essentially means that the structure of political participation is seen as an intervening variable between the State and the processes of economic development and modernization; this gives us four types of participation, depending on the dominant process:

TABLE 15 TYPES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Dominant Process (A, G, L)	Dependent Process (A, G, L)	Intervening Political Structure (I)
I. Economic Growth (A)	Growth and Differentiation of the State (G)	Political Representation: Party systems of the European kind
II. Growth and Differentiation of the State (G)	Economic Growth (A)	Political Co-optation: governmental political parties and one-party systems.
III. Modernization and Secularization of values (L)	Growth and Differentiation of the State (G)	Collective movements through autonomous mobilization: charismatic populism
IV. Growth and Differentiation of the State (G)	Modernization and Secularization of values (L)	Collective movements through induced mobilization: nationalism and paternalistic populism

When, in 1945, the political party system was reinstated, it unavoidably reflected the picture portrayed so far. What was peculiar in Brazil was that types I and II of political participation existed simultaneously in different geographical areas, and the new party system responded to both the geographical and the more structural elements.[229]

229 For a historical description of the organization of the Brazilian political parties, cf. P. J. Peterson (1962).

It seems proper to characterize the two political parties created by Vargas in terms of *Co-optation* The first of these parties was called the "Social Democratic Party" (PSD) . It was formed by the state and local leaders, who had been on good terms with the dictatorship. The term "*coronelismo*" is used in Brazilian political literature to characterize a type of rural boss, who derives his local strength from his access to patronage at the governmental level, and his ability to supply local votes for his party.[230] The *coronel* cannot survive without access to the government, and it is therefore not surprising that the party, which put these leaders together, became the biggest party in the country. A similar structure of co-optation was developed in the urban areas, through the Labor Party (PTB), to which Vargas affiliated himself. Its instruments of political control were the Ministry of Labor and the trade unions, politically and financially dependent on the Labor Ministry[231]

In both political parties, electoral power was derived from access to governmental positions and decision centers. Ideological issues were obviously secondary, and the major interests conveyed by political leaders were those referring to more positions, facilities and sinecures from the government. It would be, of course, too simplistic to say that these were the only goals and purposes of the parties. At the policy-making level, more or less well-defined goals of economic development, administrative efficiency and welfare were present. But these goals had few, if not contradictory, relations with the structures created to co-opt and handle their electoral support. What these two levels of the political system did have in common was the fact that both used to operate in almost purely distributive terms[232].

The opposition to this system came from different sources. There was a liberal opposition to Vargas, which combined urban middle classes with members of the local rural leadership, who had lost their access to the centers of decision-making in the *coronelismo* system.[233] There were members of the army, who were impatient and intolerant with the price the government was paying for its maintenance in terms of political patronage. There were members of the working class who sought more militance, greater ideological involvement of the trade-unions, and more pro-labor

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230 The classic analysis of the coronelismo system in Brazilian politics is Victor Nunes Leal (1948). His main contention is that this system is not as much an expression of the strength of traditional leadership based on local, familistic and patrimonial ties, as it is of its weakness. The coronel, as a local boss in a stagnant economy, has little power, and no access to the government.

231 The best summary of the Brazilian labor system and its relations with the Ministry of Labor is given by Philippe Schmitter (1971), ch. v and viii.

232 The contrast between distributionist political "arenas, '" on one hand, and regulatory and redistributive arenas on the other, is developed for the United States by Theodore J. Lowi (1964). Although this study was based on a close scrutiny of decision-making processes in the United States, there is little doubt that this framework could be very useful in a broader political spectrum. In Brazil's case, it seems clear that this framework could lead to a significant step further in the study of the repercussions of a system of political patrimonialism and co-optation at the decision-making level.

233 For an analysis and up-dating on the study of Brazilian local politics, see José Murilo de Carvalho (1968); Bolivar Lamounier (1969); and especially Antônio Octávio Cintra (1971).

policies from the central government. There were military, intellectual and working-class groups which sought to orient the country's policy towards a more nationalist foreign policy.

It is possible to summarize all this in terms of how the access to government was obtained or sought. The co-optation system was either considered adequate, or in need of expansion, or in need of restrictions. What all the groups had in common, roughly speaking, was that their political influence was derived either from the control of governmental agencies, from their access to the government for a politics of patronage, or from their demands for more access for given groups and sectors. It may be disturbing to put mobilization and co-optation together, since mobilization is usually understood as a process of growing participation, political concern, and, hence, representation of interests. But it is certainly important to distinguish a process of "radicalization from above" from a process of growing demands for participation. One can assume that no "mobilization from above" will occur without some attempts at participation, and, in this sense, there is no co-optation without representation, that is, when there is nothing to be co-opted; but what matters most, in terms of the system of political participation, is the relative weight of the demands for representation and the ability and resources to co-opt. Brazilian political figures like João Goulart and Brizola, who used their access to governmental positions and resources to create a radical political movement in 1963-64, are good examples of this combination. The ultimate example of this mixture of mobilization, control from above and the lack of actual structures of participation and representation is Fascism. When an economic system is dynamic, organized and structured social groups get together politically to influence political decisions that have some bearing on their share of society's goods, which are not owned patrimonialistically by the government or its bureaucracy. This kind of politics is what I am calling the "politics of representation," of which the liberal regimes of the Western World are the better known examples, although not the only conceivable arrangements.[234] Its essential condition is economic and/or organizational autonomy and self-reference; in Brazil, this was developed mostly in the São Paulo area. Representation politics often took the form of liberal ideologies, which defined governmental intervention in politics, economics and welfare as an absolute evil; or of trade union movements, which had wage issues as a central concern, and which were based more on autonomous organization than on access to the Ministry of Labor[235]. Finally, it developed as populist movements, which included elements of personal charisma corresponding to less structure and

234 David Apter showed a clear perception of the limitations of the Western model of political representation, but I am a little uncertain about his ideas on the forms of participation which should correspond to his "hierarchical systems." See David Apter (1968).

235 It is easy to see that the cleavage in terms of representation vs. co-optation cuts across the class cleavage. Philippe Schmitter shows very clearly that representation politics in Brazil was surprisingly inconspicuous even in period of open politics, manifesting itself mainly in the area of São Paulo. Many years earlier, Hélio Jaguaribe (1962). had already called attention to the cleavage between the "cartorial" and other autonomous sectors of the Brazilian social strata.

autonomy at the grass roots, but also to less direct control and patronage in the central government.[236]

The crucial test for the conversion of a set of relatively well-articulated interest groups into a system of interest-group politics lies in the measure in which there is a need for a generalization of private demands into broad and multi-purpose political movements. As Schattschneider suggests, this change from private to generalized demands arises when the bargaining process demands and allows for the incorporation of progressively wider sectors of society in the disputes. This perspective can be important if one asks why the São Paulo area did not provide the country with the strong representational political bodies, which its development and relative marginalization suggest. One kind of answer is that economic interests in the area were able to satisfy their demands in very specific terms, leading thus to actual depoliticization. The other answer is that much of São Paulo's economy was and still is strongly and directly open to the external market, and that this kind of linkage tends to make the issues of internal politics less salient. In either case, the net result was a combination of some interest politics, political apathy and relative marginality. Only when the stability of this arrangement was shaken did the level of political concern arise. It tended to manifest itself in terms of law and order, but, mostly, in terms of a liberal perspective, which abhorred politics and government interference in society. And this, of course, is a combination of goals, which is very difficult to hold together.

Figure 3 gives a simplified general picture of the Brazilian party system in the Third Republic.

236 For an analysis of the development of the Brazilian Labor Party and its urban extraction, cf. Gláucio A. D. Soares (1972), in particular "As Bases Socioeconômicas dos Partidos Políticos." This forthcoming book is certainly the best source for a detailed understanding of the Brazilian political process in the 1945-64 period.



A good test case of this four-fold classification would be the analysis of the Brazilian labor movement in the 1945-64 period. As usual, the pattern of organization and political behavior of the trade-union movement in São Paulo was remarkably different from the rest of the country. In the late forties and early fifties, some of the most militant and radical sectors of the Brazilian labor movement were based in São Paulo--this was a period when the Brazilian Communist Party was stronger in São Paulo and in open confrontation with Vargas and with the control the Labor Party exerted upon the trade-union organization in most of the country. Later, as the Labor, Communist and Nationalist movements tended to get together within the Labor Party, an array of independent, non-aligned unions started to emerge in São Paulo against the nationally dominant groups. A split occurred in the Third National Unions Conference held in São Paulo in 1960 on the attempt to create a nationally integrated Central Union, and the result was that the bulk of the Brazilian working class remained basically marginal to the national labor movement during the crucial years of 1960-63. One consequence of this was the astonishing disappearance of all traces of a national labor movement in Brazil after 1964[237].Thus, there are cases to fill in all four cells in the table

237 As usual, the details are very complex, although the pattern remains. See the details of the attempts and failures to create a national Central Union Organization in Brazil in Schmitter (1971), pp. 190-93. In a note, Schmitter quotes a '" research" performed by the National Conference of Workers Circles, a Catholic organization, which shows that the newly created Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores was strongest in Pernambuco (71 per cent of the syndicates), Pará and Piaui (61 per cent), Maranhão (59 per cent), Guanabara (47 per cent) and Rio de Janeiro (47 per cent). If São Paulo is placed at the bottom, it becomes clear that the strength of this National Federation of Workers was almost perfectly and negatively correlated with industrialization.

combining co-optation vs. representation with radicalism, in the analysis of Brazil's labor movement; and this perspective helps to understand the movement's weakness and demise.

6. The changing voting patterns

A first picture of voting patterns in the 1945-64 period is given in Table 17. The alliance between the two parties created by Vargas, the Partido Social Democrático (PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, PTB) won all the elections except the one in 1960. Only in 1950 was there a split in the alliance, because of a personal move by Vargas, who had imposed his name for nomination but had not been accepted by the political leadership of the PSD (the figures in parentheses for 1950 correspond to the votes given to Cristiano Machado, the PSD candidate). Vargas's victory in 1950 is an indication not only of his personal charisma, but also of his direct command of the political. clientele, over and above the leadership of his major party. His major source of support was, however, urban and popular. The split within the PSD in Minas Gerais gave 32 percent of the votes to Cristiano Machado: this reflects the predominantly rural society and political structure of this state. It was quite clear that the PSD allegiance to Vargas was due less to ideological preferences than to the need to remain close to the source of power. When Vargas tried to transfer his personal leadership to his would-be political heir, João Goulart, the coalition became too threatening to be accepted by the most conservative sectors of the Social Democratic Party, which joined the opposition against the increasingly urban, working-class oriented and radical Labor Party.

TABLE 16 BRAZIL, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1945 - 1960: PERCENTAGES OF VALID BALLOTS				
	Votes for PSD-PTB candidates	Votes for UDN candidates	Votes for PSP candidates	Others
Brazil				
1945 (Gen. Dutra	55.30%	34.70%		9.90%
1950 (G. Vargas)	70.30% (21.5%)	29.60%		. .
1955 (Kubitschek)	35.80%	30.30%	25.70%	8.20%
1960 (J. Quadros)	32.90%	48.20%	18.80%	
São Paulo				
1945	57.70%	27.90%	. .	14.40%
1950	65.01% (10.6%)	25.00%	. .	
1955	12.70%	33.00%	45.80%	8.40%
1960	15.30%	55.00%	29.60%	. .
Minas Gerais				
1945	57.30%	40.60%	. .	2.10%
1950	65.20% (32.3%)	34.80%	. .	
1955	58.60%	23.30%	11.50%	6.50%
1960	43.70%	44.50%	11.80%	
Guanabara				
1945	33.90%	37.50%	. .	28.60%
1950	60.50% (5.1%)	29.50%	. .	
1955	29.50%	25.90%	39.40%	5.20%
1960	28.30%	47.20%	24.50%	

Source: Calculated from Brazil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos 1964

São Paulo's participation in the alliance was accomplished through the person of Adhemar de Barros, formerly Vargas's caretaker in the state. In 1950, Barros felt strong enough to create his own political party, the PSP, and in 1955 and 1960, he was an independent candidate for the presidency, carrying Rio and São Paulo in 1955, but getting only about 25 percent of the national votes. It is clear that Barros was always a regional candidate, who did not fit the national cleavage between PSD-PTB and UDN.

The election of Jânio Quadros in 1960 was São Paulo's first and only victory. Quadros emerged without the support of any well-organized party structure, and climbed step by step from the local government in the city of São Paulo to the presidency. His appeal was personal, his only issues were honesty and severity; his personal figure was unclean and unkempt, in contradiction with the broomstick which was his electoral symbol. To pass from local to national politics, he

had to be absorbed by the UDN ticket, even though he had little in common with this party. He was able, when in the government, to attract the opposition of almost everyone, and resigned from office after eight months, leaving the country in a crisis from which it would not recover.[238]

Quadros' election did not mean that the balance between the co-optation vs. the representation systems inclined towards the latter, but rather that it had been superseded by a new cleavage between the tendencies towards the expansion and those towards the restriction of the political system. Balloting for vice-president was done separately, and João Goulart, the Vice-Presidential candidate from the PSD-PTB coalition, defeated his opponent, who was well-identified as a man from the UDN. The PSD-PTB presidential candidate was a general identified with leftist, nationalist groups, and the acceptance of his candidacy by the PSD was an indication of the party's inability to articulate a winning candidate of its own. General Lott was a loser on many accounts. His surprisingly high returns in the state of Minas Gerais is really an indication of the PSD's difficulty to act independently of official determinations emanating from the central government.

The erosion of the PSD-PTB hegemony can be better analyzed through Table 17, in which, data for congressional elections are displayed. The PSD never ceased to be the biggest party, but its relative size fell progressively as time passed. Alliance and coalitions of all kinds tended to absorb up to 50 per cent of the congressional votes. An analysis of these coalitions has not yet been made, but Table 17 and 18 presents both the data on coalitions and an attempt to classify them according to the dominant party in the three states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Guanabara. This attempt is, of course, provisional, and should be backed by a detailed analysis of the political processes in each state--which would be out of place here. It is enough to note here how the three parties in the co-optation system disappeared completely from São Paulo in 1962 as independent political entities.

TABLE 17 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, PARTY VOTES AND VOTES FOR COALITIONS (VALID VOTES): 1945-1962. PERCENTAGE FIGURES

	PSD	PTB	UDN	PSP	Others	Alliances and coalitions
1945	44.00%	10.50%	27.40%		22.10%	-
1950	27.00%	16.40%	17.00%	7.30%	12.10%	20.20%
1954	23.10%	15.60%	14.30%	9.30%	10.70%	27.00%
1958	19.00%	15.90%	14.30%	2.50%	11.50%	35.90%
1962	18.30%	14.20%	13.20%	1.00%	5.00%	48.30%

Source: Calculated from Brazil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, *Dados Estatísticos,* vol. 6, 1964.

The disappearance of the big national parties in São Paulo was followed, not by an increase in political regionalism but, paradoxically, by a progressive nationalization of state politics. If we look at the congressional alliances in this state, we notice that, in the 1958 election, the PSP entered into an alliance with the PSD, even though the former was clearly dominant (it had 411,510 votes for the state chamber, as opposed to the PSD's 181,700). In 1962, the PSD-PSP alliance came in

238 For a keen analysis of Quadro' s resignation in terms of the developments in the Brazilian party system, cf. Hélio Jaguaribe (1961).

second to an alliance of two regional parties (Christian Democrats and MTR), which also benefitted from Jânio Quadros' political inheritance in the state. In Rio, the Labor Party entered into an alliance with the socialists, and received the support of the illegal but active Communist party. Only in Minas Gerais did the party configuration remain remarkably stable, with a coalition between the small PTB and the even smaller PSP in that state.

TABLE 18 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS. PARTY VOTES: THREE STATES, 1945-1962: PERCENTAGES OF VALID VOTES

	PSD	PTB	UDN	PS?	Others	Coalitions and alliances
Guanabara (city of Rio de Janeiro)						
1945	17.50%	26.90%	23.10%	2.30%	30.20%	
1950	14.00%	39.80%	17.90%	7.20%	21.10%	. .
1954	10.30%	29.50%	(32.90)%	11.10%	16.20%	35.00%
1958	14.80%	28.70%	33.80%	20.60%	2.10%	14.80%
1962	13.90%	49.80%	30.00%	.	6.30%	63.70%
Minas Gerais						
1945	47.00%	7.20%	22.20%	. .	23.66%	
1950	38.70%	12.90%	29.30%	3.10%	16.00%	
1954	44.90%	12.50%	25.10%	4.50%	13.00%	
1958	43.00%	12.30%	19.90%	3.60%	12.20%	
1962	42.60%	(15.40)%	31.30%		10.70%	15.40%
São Paulo						
1945	36.00%	17.90%	21.50%	5.50%	19.10%	
1950	15.30%	20.90%	13.10%	29.20%	21.50%	
1954	29.40%	17.20%	8.70%	24.50%	20.20%	
1958		10.70%	9.70%	(38.50)%	41.10%	62.00%
1962		(15.10)%		(28.20)%	56.70%	89.30%

Source: Calculated from Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos, vol. 6, 1.964. Figures in parentheses correspond to votes given to alliances (See the text for additional explanation).

The 1962 congressional election was characterized, both in Rio and São Paulo, by the presence of strong candidates who concentrated the votes. Leonel Brizola, from the PTB-PSB alliance, concentrated 62.8 per cent of the votes of his coalition while Amaral Netto, from the UDN, got 47.5 per cent of his party's votes. Emílio Carlos, in São Paulo, got 44 per cent of the votes of his PTN-MTR alliance. In Minas Gerais, however, the most popular candidate, Sebastião Paes de Almeida of the PSD received only 80,000 votes (as opposed. to Brizola's 269,000, Amaral Netto's 123,000, and Emílio Carlos' 154,000), comprising only 10.6 per cent of his party's votes. The concentration of votes in legislative elections was a sign of the ideological polarizations which were taking place in the urban centers; however, it was characteristically absent in Minas Gerais.[239]

239 The concentration of legislative votes on a few candidates was not a new phenomenon of the early sixties but, in earlier years, it had usually been linked to strong, personalistic figures from the executive. Thus, Getúlio Vargas himself got 24.1 per cent of the votes of the city of Rio de Janeiro for the 1945 congressional election; in 1950, it was his son, Lutero Vargas, who concentrated 14.5 per cent of the state's votes (Vargas was then the presidential candidate). In 1954, Carlos Lacerda, a newspaperman who became notorious for his ferocious attacks on Vargas, got 24.2 per cent of the votes; he and Vargas' 5 son, Lutero, together obtained 42.5 per cent of the state's votes. In 1958, Lacerda had again 15.4 per cent of the state's votes; it is impossible to find the same pattern of concentration of votes in other states.

During this period, congressional representation was proportional to the state's population, but enfranchisement was limited to the literate. This added strength to states like Minas Gerais, which practically were not affected by the increase in mobilization politics that characterized Rio, São Paulo and a few other big urban centers, like Recife and Porto Alegre. A gap started to develop between the politics leading to executive posts and the politics leading to congressional elections. The latter process remained stable and absorbed much of the mobilization effects; the former was much more exposed to these effects. The PSD-PTB coalition was palatable to the army and to conservative sectors, while the PSD was in the lead, but when Goulart had to replace Quadros, the crisis broke. The first solution, characteristically, was to force a parliamentary system which could empty the powers of the President. This was done in 1961, but Goulart was strong enough in 1963 to call a national plebiscite which restored his full constitutional powers. After this, the crisis was irreversible, and led to his overthrow in 1964.

7. Conclusions

If one wants to generalize from these changing voting patterns, the following traits seem to be most relevant.

Two lines of cleavage defined the political system in 1945. One was regionally marked, and corresponded to the co-optation vs. representation systems. The other existed within each of these systems, and went roughly from left (the PTB) to right (the UDN) on the co-optation side. In the São Paulo area, the left was represented in 1945 by the Communist Party (it got almost 20 per cent of the congressional vote in that state, but only 8.2 per cent of the national vote, and was finally declared illegal in 1947). The center right never acquired a definite party configuration in that state..

As time passed and the levels of education, urbanization, and industrialization increased, the co-optation system started to falter. Participation increased, and political alienation, as indicated by the proportion of null to valid votes, also increased;[240] this was particularly acute in the São Paulo area, in congressional elections. The pattern of political alienation for presidential elections is less clear[241].

240 These figures on turnout must be considered in the light of the disenfranchisement of the illiterate (about 50 per cent of the population) and the population's age structure (about 50 per cent under 18). Since to register and vote was mandatory, abstention or lack of registration could create all sorts of difficulties in legal and bureaucratic procedures. It is expected, therefore, that turnout grows with increasing urbanization and education, and the rate of actual to registered voters is little more than a reflection of the up-dating of the electoral lists. The same is not true, however, for blank and null votes, which are a clear indication of political disaffection. The increase from 2.3 per cent to 21.1 per cent of these invalid votes is a first indication of the political system's progressive failure to correspond to the constituent's values and aspirations.

241 For an attempt to analyze the different state patterns of turnout and blank and null votes, cf. S. Schwartzman (1971).

TABLE 19 BRAZIL, TURNOUT FIGURES FOR 1945-1966: ELECTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND CHAMBERS OF DEPUTIES

Total Yeopulation (1,000)a	Percent of registered voters / population	Percent of actual voters / population	Actual / registered voters	Per cent of blank and null votes / votes	
				Presidential elections	Chamber of deputies
1945 46,590	16.2%	12.8%	83.1%	2.3%	3.2%
1950 51,944	22.0%	15.8%	72.1%	4.3%	7.0%
1954 59,564	25.3%	16.6%	655.0%		6.6%
1955 61,469	24.8%	14.8%	59.7%	5.2%	
1958 67,184	20.5%b	18.9%	92.0%b		9.1%
1960 70,992	21.9%	19.0%	81.0%	7.2%	
1962 75,695	24.6%	19.6%	79.6%		17.7%
1966 85,139	26.3%	20.3%	77.2%		21.1%
1970 94,508	30.6%	23.7%	77.4%		30.3%

Population figures are from the Brazilian census for 1950, 1960, and 1970, with interpolations for other years; b The decrease in registration and increase of the actual registered voters for this year is due to a renewal of the official enrollment lists.

Source:Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos, 8 volumes, 1964-1971.

TABLE 20 INVALID (BLANK AND NULL) VOTES, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (PERCENTAGES)

year	São Paulo	Guanabara (city of Rio)	Minas Gerais	Brazil
1945	3.1%	1.3%		2.3%
1950	4.2%	4.6%		4.3%
1955	3.5%	2.5%	6.6%	5.2%
1960	5.1%	4.3%	10.0%	7.2%

Source:Brasil, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos, 8 volumes, 1964-1971.

TABLE 21 INVALID (BLANK AND NULL) VOTES, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (PERCENTAGES)

year	São Paulo	Guanabara (city of Rio)	Minas Gerais	Brazil
1945	3.9%	1.5%	1.9%	3.2%
1950	9.3%	5.4%	6.6%	7.0%
1954	7.6%	4.5%	6.5%	6.6%
1958	13.6%	6.9%	9.5%	9.2%
1962	29.8%	15.6%	15.1%	17.7%
1966	35.3%	25.3%	17.3%	21.1%
1970	34.6%	24.6%	39.7%	30.2%

Source:Superior Tribunal Eleitoral, 8 volumes, for 1945-1966; and Boletim Eleitoral, XXI, 241, August 1971, for 970.

São Paulo's entrance as an independent political agent into national politics was first made in terms of representational politics of a stabilizing or restrictive character which acquired, however, almost immediately a mobilizational connotation. An analysis of interest groups, the trade unions, and even the educational system in the São Paulo area indicate the basis of its representational politics, but its alienation from national politics meant that these groups never assumed the shape of articulated political parties The PSP started, from the beginning, using mobilizational appeals, and used as much political co-optation as was possible at the state level.

The victory of Jânio Quadros (UDN-São Paulo) and Goulart (PTB) in the presidential elections of 1960 had two essential consequences. First, it meant that politics had become national, and that the political isolation of São Paulo had come to an end. Second, and perhaps more important, it meant that the route towards the nationalization of politics was via an increase in political mobilization and the emergence of clearly ideological cleavages at the national level. Minas Gerais, which had had the same political profile as the rest of the country in presidential and congressional elections up to 1954, lost its place to Guanabara, which had set the pattern for the 1960 presidential election.

Although the balance of forces was adequate for a political system based on limited suffrage, co-optation of political leaders, and electoral isolation of the economic centers, it could not be maintained when mobilization increased and politics became national. Political co-optation through mobilization of the urban centers demanded a kind of mobilization system, which lacked organizational support, as well as economic, military and international backing. The alternative was to restrict the levels of political participation and force the re-introduction of a restrictive type of co-optation. The new arrangement, after 1964, would increase the power of the executive, but channeling, at the same time, political participation through a two-party system in the legislature. It is worth noting that this formula was acceptable to the PSD, which could continue patronage politics at the local level, while counting on a strong executive to restrict attempts at political mobilization.

TABLE 22 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1966 AND 1970 (PERCENTAGES OF VOTES)

	São Paulo		Minas Gerais		Guanabara		Brazil	
	1966	1970	1966	1970	1966	1970	1966	1970
ARENA (govt.)	34.6%	48.6%	63.6%	48.5%	20.4%	25.3%	50.5%	48.4%
MDB (Opposition)	30.0%	16.7%	19.0%	12.2%	54.2%	50.0%	28.4%	21.2%
blank and null	35.4%	34.6%	17.4%	39.7%	25.4%	24.6%	21.1%	30.2%
Total	100%							

Source: :IBGE, Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1966; and Boletim Eleitoral , XXI, for 1970.

Regional politics apparently disappeared with the two-party system. However, the high levels of participation in São Paulo during the 1960 elections faded; the same thing happened in Guanabara. With the restriction of mobilization, political alienation increased, and the Congress

entered a downhill race which ended in its complete subordination to the executive.[242] A new kind of co-optation system was installed, based on a military and technical mandate, and the political system came to a level of almost complete closure.

If the analysis is correct so far, some conclusions seem to follow necessarily. It becomes clear that political cleavages in an underdeveloped country like Brazil cannot be understood in terms of more or less explicit variable such as "modern" and "traditional," or rural-urban. Brazil shares with the rest of Latin America an outstanding lack of agrarian parties, and this is a strong indication that political cleavages do not cut along the rural-urban line. The party which came closest to being a rural party in Brazil was the PSD, but its strength lay, not in the countryside, but in the control and exploitation of a huge and complex governmental structure.

Another conclusion is that the Brazilian internal political process simply cannot be explained away by its insertion into an international context of dependency. External factors are obviously very important in the sense that they place limits on the alternatives, which are open to the country, but they are not sufficient to explain the developments that led to the present political configuration of the country.

We can now return to the opening question: what kind of political reopening is possible in Brazil? We can certainly say that co-optation politics with limited participation no longer seems possible in a non-coercive regime. As the State rationalizes to cope with the pressures of underdevelopment in a context of demographic explosion and rising aspirations, piece-meal patronage becomes unsatisfactory and politically inefficient.[243] What was formerly a sound political career based on administrative advocacy becomes political corruption. Brazil is now witnessing the death of its old "political class."[244] Much of this process is in the hands of the government and manifested through direct and indirect sanctions. In addition to this, the process is hampered by its lack of function in a context polarized between administrative and economic efficiency and political mobilization.

The prospects for representation with limited participation are even dimmer. The 1932 Revolution in São Paulo was probably the peak of many attempts to establish an autonomous political force in the country vis-a-vis the co-optation system. After 1945, this kind of politics in São Paulo led more to political withdrawal than to party structure and organization; when São Paulo emerged again on the national political scene, it was in terms of charismatic mobilization and expanded participation. As the government extends its control over the economic system and increases its role as an entrepreneur as well as its participation in all sectors of the country's life, it

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242 Sergio Henrique Hudson de Abranches and Gláucio A. D. Soares (1972); Wanderley Guillerme dos Santos (1972); and Clóvis Brigadão (1971).

243 The logic of this process was well-characterized by Peter Heintz (1964).

244 The concept of "political class" belongs to Brazilian political jargon and expresses well the existence of a system of political leadership, which does not depend as much on the exercise of representation by other classes as it does on a special social position, defined by a relationship of dependency towards the State.

is indeed difficult to admit the possibility of an open political system, based on traditional representational politics in the foreseeable future.

The three remaining possibilities are that a political opening will not occur, or that it will occur with expanded participation in either the representation or co-optation mode. There is no reason to assume that the political system cannot remain closed or highly restricted for a long period, with some oscillations. Scattered empirical evidence seems to indicate that the urban middle sectors are willing to accept and support a closed, military-backed regime, if the economic crisis is not overwhelming, and the demographic explosion does not lead to a crisis in the countryside. The social costs of this alternative are, of course, an entirely different matter.

Expanded participation in terms of representation is difficult to conceive, since it would require fundamental changes in the present governmental organization. The final possibility is mobilization with and through the governmental structure, with or without the present leadership. This alternative has been intensely discussed in terms of the Peruvian experience, and it is not beyond the range of possibilities.[245]

The future is, of course, unknown, and each of the possible alternatives must be ultimately tested by its efficiency in coping with the tensions of underdevelopment. One of the main difficulties, which will certainly arise in any attempt at political openness, will be the almost total lack of a new civilian leadership. The system of the 1945-64 period did not leave heirs, just orphans. The major political problem for Brazil in the years to come will be its ability to establish forms of autonomous and legitimate representation within a governmental structure, which seems to become progressively more centralized and overwhelming. This is not a problem which can be easily solved - and it is not merely a Brazilian problem either.

245 It is interesting to note that the "Peruvian way " used to attract the attention of Brazilians much more than the political process in Argentina, which seems, however, much closer to the restoration of representative democracy than do other military-backed governments in Latin America. It is possible to speculate that the differences between Peru and Argentina might be traced back to the historical split, which freed Argentina from the Spanish colonial administration in Lima (I am indebted to Roberto Cortés-Conde for calling my attention to the parallel between São Paulo - Rio and Buenos Aires - Lima).

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: WHICH KIND OF POLITICAL SYSTEM?

1. Political system: types

Political science as an independent discipline can only justify its existence by contributing to a political arrangement in which the political process can be constantly examined, evaluated, criticized and improved. The idea of this criticism and improvement is to provide a balance between efficiency and the range and scope of the political debate. Very often one of these items is sacrificed to the other's benefit. But to renounce this role altogether is to transform political science into either a sterile description of the exercise of power, or an instrument for the engineering of power administration. That is why this conclusion is addressed to a survey of the alternatives for political development, which are still within the range of Brazil s possibilities, in an attempt to bring the discussion from the past into the future in a meaningful way.

I have been referring throughout this work to a dimension of the political system which goes from an extreme of absenteeism to a maximum of intervention and control in the country's political life. This is the same kind of problem that concerned Reinhard Bendix in his classic comparison of entrepreneurial ideologies in four countries[246]. What distinguishes England and the United States from Russia and Eastern Europe is, says Bendix, the intervention of the State in the labor relations of the latter two, which leads to a series of difficulties in the adjustment of authority relations in the economic sphere. David Apter, in a completely different context, refers to the same idea when he suggests the distinction between "hierarchical" and "pyramidal" structures of authority.[247] While the "pyramidal" system corresponds to a political model with the State as the target for political demands and pressures, the hierarchical system corresponds to the notion of a tutorial state intervening in social and economic life, and discouraging the emergence of autonomous political representation, either through coercion, or through the co-optation of emerging leadership, or both. A hierarchical structure of authority tends to limit political and public forms of participation and replace them with a combination of private demands and forms of expressive social mobilization.

An attempt to utilize Apter's conceptualization in an interpretation of Brazilian politics can be found in an article by Antonio Octávio Cintra and Fábio Wanderley Reis.[248] The Brazilian regime up to 1964 is defined as "consociational," that is, pyramidal, with a non-ideological, instrumental political culture. Political power in Brazil is seen, in that period, as "held, in general, by a traditional elite, which derived its power from the property of land." The relatively small presence of pressure groups favoring economic development is attributed to electoral mechanisms, which limit the access of new interest and pressure groups to the Congress. The fact, later studied in detail by Philippe Schmitter, that pressure groups in Brazil tend to operate in the area of the executive, does not seem to be so much an effect of the electoral system as a consequence of the

246 Reinhard Bendix (1956).

247 David E. Apter (1965).

248 Antônio Octávio Cintra and Fábio Wanderley Reis (1966).

continuous presence of the central government as an agent of social and economic intervention and initiative. There is little doubt that the 1945-64 Republic, together with the 1889-1930 period, is the most "consociational" period in Brazilian political history, but it is not less true that hierarchical structures were dominant during the imperial period throughout the nineteenth century, during the Vargas Regime and after 1964. The concentration of power in the executive branch of the central government was for Brazil not only one of the main reasons for the poor functioning of the liberal constitutional forms imported from Europe and the United States, but it also explains a high degree of state intervention in the social and economic life of society.

2. Political systems: determinants

Which factors lead to the different types of political systems discussed above? It is possible to say, generally speaking, that the way in which contemporary states have been solving the political problems of their integration into the modern world will determine their power structure, authority system and style. The political problems of modernization are of two types. One derives from the causal chain which goes from socioeconomic development to the demands of political participation. The other is dependent upon the history of the system and the history of its relations with the outside world. It is impossible to offer here a general approach to these problems, but it is not impossible to find good examples of it in the literature. A first example is given by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962).[249] Economic development can start in different ways depending on the timing of its beginning: in England, the capitalist accumulation of capital was enough; in Germany, a financial capitalism was necessary; and in Russia, the State itself had to take the lead. He does not offer a theory on why some countries started their development before others but, in the case of Russia, he says that serfdom was the paramount obstacle to its early development. Barrington Moore starts from factors of this kind, namely the alternatives of modernization in the countryside, as keys for predicting the formation of different systems[250]. His theory is too well-known to be spelled out here, and it is enough to note how the kind of predictions of fascist vs. democratic vs. socialist outcomes depart so radically from the kind of predictions one could get from standard correlation analysis, which never went much further than Lipset's correlations between democracy and levels of development.

It would be difficult, and out of place, to try to generalize from the insights of Gerschenkron and Moore. It is obvious that the situation in Latin America today is radically different from the countries they studied. But there seems to be an almost perfect correlation between a decentralized political system in the past, combined with a strong feudal structure, and economic development in the present. Flourishing centralized empires of the past were unable to adapt themselves to industrial society, while countries with a relatively smaller and underdeveloped political superstructure were much more able to absorb more modern and efficient patterns of organization and production. Contrary to what is often said, feudalism does not seem to be a determinant of underdevelopment: it is its absence, and the predominance of an overdeveloped state structure, which seems to be at the roots of underdevelopment. Having arrived late in the industrialized

249 Harvard University Press (1962).

250 Barrington Moore (1966).

world, these countries can count only on an out-of-date and oversized political structure, their patrimonial inheritance, to make the jump towards the high standards to which they aspire.

3. The scope of the political community: costs and benefits

We have now the general idea of what determines the scope of the political community, understood as the set of persons and groups who actually participate in the political decisions of the country. This scope can be measured in terms of amplitude (how many people participate?), its relevance (what kind of issues are brought to political decision?) and its level of coercion against deviant behavior. These three measures tap a general dimension of political openness, and we can now proceed to a systematic discussion of its consequences in terms of costs and benefits.

This topic was already sketched, in the discussion on the desirability of more political vs. more private forms of participation. It is possible to resume this discussion here in terms of the proposed negative relation between coercion and information.[251] The general idea behind this proposition, suggested by D. Apter, is that a legitimate, non-coercive political establishment is able to receive a free flow of information that ceases to exist when coercion is exerted and compliance ceases to be voluntary. In our terms, information corresponds to situations of ample political participation, in which political (allocative) decisions are taken, following a more or less complex bargaining process; where coercion corresponds to situations where the structure of political participation is narrow, and decisions are imposed upon the "non-political" sphere of society. The following alternatives seem to correspond to these two poles:

a) *intelligence and information*: it is not by chance that highly coercive regimes are those which have to develop more elaborate intelligence systems, in order to compensate for the lack of political information, which tends to flow freely in an open political community. The data collected through intelligence devices (whether by means of an institutionalized intelligence agency or not) are sufficiently different from the other kind of information to deserve a separate analysis. The object of intelligence observation is defined from the outset in terms of its utility or disutility for the political establishment and its goals; this leads to a situation in which any bargaining between observer and observed falls necessarily into a zero-sum type of situation. Data gathering through intelligence systems implies, thus, a rigidity which is exactly the Opposite of the information gathered from partners in a community, where the situation is non-zero-sum and the rights of others are recognized.

b) *policy-making and policy-implementation*: information, as distinguished from intelligence, can be essential in the process of policy-making, but can be a nuisance in the process of policy-implementation Since intelligence gathering implies a previous definition of the situation in terms of who are "the others," it is possible to imagine that, the more a political center relies on intelligence data, the less able it will be to change this previous definition. If one considers that policy-making consists, precisely, of decisions that somehow alter the previous patterns of value allocations and distribution, we can assume that, the higher the reliance on intelligence, the lower the capability of policy-making. On the other hand, data from intelligence is compatible

251 David E. Apter (1965), p. 300.

with the very effective policy-implementation of some previously defined goals, if all the relevant factors are within the range of governmental action. The other side of the coin is that when intelligence is lacking, the political establishment is entirely open to information, data from intelligence sources is not considered. This is an indication of the lack of autonomy of the political systems for which constant political bargaining is an essential survival condition. The basic characteristics of this situation are a combination of sweeping policy-making decisions and little or no policy-implementation The conclusion seems to be that a Political system needs to be autonomous enough to be able to process all the information it can get without losing its capability of gathering the intelligence data necessary for its policy-implementation, so as to avoid falling in an all-intelligence or all-information kind of situation.

The essential difference between intelligence and other types of information is that political information induces a system to adjust itself to new realities of the environment, whereas intelligence data is mainly feed-back on the system by the system itself. The self-adjustment of a system to new information - the quality that Karl Deutsch calls "autonomy" - depends also on the system's capacity to keep its integrity, which can be a matter of internal resources of another type. To be completely open to information, or to rely exclusively on intelligence, seem to be alternative ways of coping with the same problem of little autonomy.[252]

c) *two types of bargaining: political issues and political scope.* There are two types of bargaining that go on in a political system: one regarding the allocation of specific values, or options about the specific social, economic and cultural issues, and the other regarding the scope of the political sphere itself - who can vote, who can be elected, who should be heard for which kind of decisions, etc. Bargaining on political scope is carried on at the periphery of the political community, since it concerns precisely the rights of entrance into this community; whereas bargaining on issues follows some institutionalized patterns (because it occurs within a community where the form and extent of participation by all parts are accepted by all). Bargaining on scope tends to take on an aspect of "political crisis" concerning the rules of the game and the spectrum of political participation.

Schattschneider suggests that the most important strategy in politics is that related to the scope of conflict, in the sense that, in any conflict, there is always a movement towards increasing the number of persons involved[253]. In spite of this, he also notes that the scope of the political community in the United States has remained stationary at the level of about 60 per cent of the potential electorate. The recent emergence of black and youth minorities in the political

252 An example of the preponderance of intelligence over information are the many difficulties brought to the American government by its intelligence agency in the area of foreign affairs, of which the Bay of Pigs incident is perhaps the most notorious. The reliance of the American political establishment on intelligence for internal affairs is much smaller, and cannot remain for long when it occasionally occurs. In Latin America, however, internal intelligence seems to be an essential instrument of data-gathering in military regimes. (This was written before the Watergate affair brought up the startling difficulties of an attempt to use systematic intelligence operations in domestic affairs in the United States). Cf. Karl Deutsch (l966a), and Peter Heintz (1964). For an application of Heintz's model to Brazil see Alaor Passos (1968).

253 E. Schattschneider (1960), p. 3.

community is probably changing this situation, which is being accompanied by the well-known characteristics of political crisis.

The relative weight of either type of bargaining is a function of the actual structures of participation, and the levels and types of political emergence at a given point. It is possible to consider bargaining on political scope as disruptive to other types of bargaining inherent in the process of decision-making. It is possible to think that, the higher the gap between the demands and the structure of participation, the more the questions of scope will prevail; this would lead to the upgrading of security problems concerning policy-making and implementation, and a predominance of intelligence upon information, which in turn would lead to increasing difficulties in political bargaining regarding issues, and so on.

d) *technical vs. political decision-making.* The alternative between information and intelligence can be re-examined in terms of the alternative between technical vs. political decision-making. In effect, when a former Brazilian president stated that "the social problem is a police problem," he was denying the right of participation to a given group in the political community. All governmental policy regarding this group becomes, in consequence, a technical matter, handled through the respective technical body, namely the police, which uses intelligence data as its normal sources of information. This kind of "technical" treatment was a consequence of the fact that the "social question" implied an attempt to widen the scope of the political system. During the Vargas regime, however, the political community was closed: nevertheless the social question was handled through other technical bodies of the Ministry of Labor and the welfare system. It is possible to provide job security, a system of medical assistance, institutionalized systems of wage bargaining and so on, in a "technical" way, if two conditions are met. First, there must be a consensus on the qualification and impartiality of the technicians who make these decisions. Insofar as the Labor Justice is recognized be all parts as neutral and impartial, and its criteria of good and evil are shared by all those affected by it, its decisions will be accepted as "technically" correct. The second condition is that the conflicting parts must not try to escalate the scope of their conflict from the private to the public area. If these two conditions are not met the only way of keeping the issue within a technical frame is through coercion - and this is when the expression "technocracy" can be properly used. It characterizes a "technical" handling of issues which would tend to be political, but are contained through some form of coercion.

In which conditions are the depoliticization and technification of a given issue a real process, that is, a process without technocratic connotations? It is important to note that there is always a continuing process of politicization and technification of issues of all kinds--the local administration in the United States tends to become technical nowadays, while issues of foreign affairs are moving rapidly from the technical to the political sphere[254]. The essential condition for technification seems to be the institutionalization of scientific and technical communities; this

254 The depoliticization of the international relations issues in the United States of 1958, as related to questions on civil rights, is clearly shown by Miller and Stokes in their article (1963). The correlations between the perceptions the representatives have of the voters' attitudes and the actual attitudes of the voters was of .63 for civil rights issues, but fell to .19 on foreign relations issues. The correlation between the voters' and representatives' attitudes on foreign affairs was as low as .06.

institutionalization is, again, a function of time and of a "reasonable" level of conflicts, which allows it to grow mature without sclerosis, and to acquire value and prestige. The implications of this process of transfer from the technical to the political sphere, with a technocratic alternative, are very significant. It has a direct bearing on questions such as the role of the legislative, the development of bodies of central planning, local and regional government, etc.

Another factor that influences this process is of a much more difficult conceptualization. Samuel Huntington uses the expression "praetorianism" to characterize societies in which all groups try to play a direct political role in the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Praetorianism is the opposite of institutionalization; it is caused, he says, by the absence of political institutions, which could mediate between some groups and the rest of the political system.[255]

The lack of intermediate groups and the instability and briefness of power and authority taken together, put a high premium on rapid and direct access to central power and a low premium on long-term loyalty to a less sensational but more stable share of responsibilities and institutionalization.[256]11 The consequence seems to be a downhill process of increasing instability and praetorianism for the underdeveloped countries, which can only be stopped by coercive means.

It is again Schattschneider who gives us a hint on an alternative. He makes a brilliant analysis of the contribution of American trade unions to the Democratic party, and the conclusion is that what the party gains with this support is probably less than what it loses for being identified as the party of "big labor."[257] The conclusion seems to be that political party is something more, and something other than the sum of the interest groups which they aggregate. There is a high cost in the total politicization of an interest group and, in spite of examples such as Indonesia after Sukarno, growing praetorianism is not a necessary future for a country like Brazil. But the example of Indonesia is probably a warning in the sense that, the further this process goes, the more difficult it is to stop it, and the more predictable the final technocratic and coercive outcome will be.

The general conclusion seems to be that at a given level of political openness, the emphasis on the free flow of information, and the gradual development and institutionalization of different institutions are not only ethical principles but also functional needs without which no political system can develop properly and play its role in the search for the highest standards of life and social participation in the contemporary underdeveloped world. There is always the possibility of a coercive technocratization of the political system, aiming at the implementation of given policies of economic development, combined perhaps with a long-term promise of political open- ness. The main attractiveness of this alternative is its simplicity, but its ethical costs, combined with its functional difficulties, are big enough to justify a constant effort to avoid it.

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255 Huntington (1968), p. 196.

256 Huntington (1968), pp. 196-97

257 E. Schattschneider (1960), p. 50 ff.

4. Conclusions

The discussion so far can be summarized in terms of the links between the flow of communications and the characteristics of the political system and processes. One model suggests that a link exists between a political system's openness to bargaining and the free flow of information, and its ability to engage in a process of decision-making. The opposite model describes a closed political system, in which demands are privatized, information is channeled through intelligence-gathering agencies, and the system's capability for decision-making is impaired, although the capability for policy-implementation is increased. The first model was said to be conducive to the institutionalization of technical decision-making bodies; in the second model, the technical bodies tend to become technocratic. It is therefore necessary to conclude with a brief discussion of the assumptions implied in these models[258]

The crucial point seems to be the difference between intelligence and information. The expression intelligence," as used in this context, has less the broad meaning of "control of the environment" than the more specific sense of "data gathering" of a specific type: namely, the data necessary for developing the means to reach a given end. Once the goal is defined, data-gathering is essentially a technical task. The definition of a task as "technical" implies that the circle of participants in the decision is frozen, the hierarchy of values is established, and value differences are assumed not to exist. There are two ways of defining a situation as technical, by institutionalization or by superordination. In the first case, there is both developed competence and social legitimation of the decision- making body; in the second, the lack of legitimacy changes the technical into the technocratic. Technocracy is thus sub- politicization - a process by which the political content of politics is concealed through its transformation into a simple operational decision.[259]

The term "information," as opposed to "intelligence," was used here in the sense of a flow of data referred to the ends, rather than to the means of political action. The kind of data which flows in an "information" situation refers precisely to the values of the parts involved, the scope of the political community, the rearrangement of technical structures, and so on. The exchange of this kind of data is exactly what a political process is about, and this is why there is a logical incompatibility between free information flow, in this sense, and political closure. This is also why the lack of information is in principle incompatible with political decision-making: without information, values and goals are taken for granted.

This is not, however, the full picture. First, there is an autonomy of the intelligence function. Technical knowledge also brings information about ends because, even when the channels of communication between man and man are closed, there can always be channels open between man and "nature," be they geographic, economic or even social. The notion that what one expects determines the function of knowledge is not correct, since information can always outgrow

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258 The following paragraphs benefit from Prof. Karl Deutsch's comments on S. Schwartzman (1968), a paper presented to the Rio Round Table of the International Political. Science Association., October, 1969.

259 I owe to Prof. Hélio Jaguaribe this precise conceptualization of technocracy.

the expectations that may exist about its content. The openness to unsuspected information depends, however, on factors which go beyond the cognitive aspects of the data flow: a highly bureaucratized intelligence- gathering agency in a technocratic situation is more closed to new information than a flexible and highly-qualified technical body in a less rigid context.[260]

Second, the linkage between information and political openness can lead to an overestimation of the cognitive efficiency of the political process. It is not true that every demand brings with itself the information necessary for its satisfaction. A free competitive political process is probably a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the satisfaction of the technical needs of a modern complex society. This objection can be somewhat reduced if one restricts the term "information" to the meaning given here: a free political process is essential to the circulation of political data about values, preferences and relative strengths; this must not be mistaken with knowledge necessary for the full implementation of these goals.

Third, a more profound objection may be that the suggested connections between information flow and political bargaining implies an overly restricted image of politics. Politics cannot be reduced to bargaining--it also implies solidarity, generosity, sacrifice, identifications, discoveries of new values and new areas of solidarity and conflict. The usual concept of politics as bargaining is not the same, however, as our view of politics as a constant flow of information and interchanges on values, preferences and goals. In its more traditional sense, politics as bargaining implies a constant conflict over scarce resources, according to some more or less well-established rules of the game. This model implies a basic consensus concerning values, and an image of rigidity over time, which is alien to the image suggested here. A truly open political system is able to withstand not only hard bargaining over scarce values but also a constant redefinition of these values, the bargainers and the rules of the game. This type of political openness implies a kind of stability which must be more deeply rooted, and much more flexible, than the political stability based on superficial consensus and reduced participation, which seems to have satisfied the political scientists in the western world until recent years.

Ultimately, the chances for political openness in a country like Brazil seem to depend less on what will happen at the level of social stratification and corresponding demands of participation, than on what will happen inside the huge and ever-growing governmental bureaucracy. The future of political openness is probably not as much related to external controls and pressures as it is to differentiations and functional needs developed inside the administrative apparatus as a whole. If this is so, the next step in the analysis of the political development of Brazil will be mainly a study of changing patterns of authority and participation in large-scale organizations, rather than the classic studies of political participation, ideologies, political culture, and so on. It would be up to this new line of studies to verify the empirical validity and historical chances of the propositions contained in this overview of political openness.

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260 This closure of well-established structures to new information is not a privilege, however, of technocracies. Even purely scientific institutions have vested interests to defend and are resistant to dissonant information. Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn (1962).

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